

SYNTHETICA

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

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PRE-CHRISTIAN EDUCATION.

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SYNTHETICA

BEING

MEDITATIONS

EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL

BY

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"METAPHYSICA NOVA ET VETUSTA", AND "ETHICA, OR, THE ETHICS OF REASON"
GIFFORD LECTURER IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH FOR 1905-6

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME I.

BOOK I.—ON KNOWLEDGE

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"The function of Philosophy, we are often told, is to organise and unify knowledge. To this end it is before all things necessary to make knowledge itself an object of reflection and study."—WARD.

"Philosophy is hard, while to think one-sidedly and to make theories which ignore the deepest instincts of our nature is not so difficult. Philosophy always will be hard, and what it promises even in the end is no clear theory nor any complete understanding or vision."—F. H. BRADLEY.

"But there is system and a purpose in this universe, and of this universe Man is indisputably the highest term, the consummate outcome; what has proved itself his ultimate activity, must be allowed the highest place in this system and in this purpose."—HUTCHISON STIRLING, *Secret of Hegel*.

PREFATORY NOTE.

THE following discussions arise out of two previous Books¹ and have occupied me for a long time. I called them, from the first, "Meditations," because that word most accurately expressed the form they took with me. I have retained the name because it indicates the general character and structure of the whole Treatise, and also in the hope that it may be accepted as an explanation of repetitions that were inevitable in what was substantially a dialogue with myself.

Having had the honour of being appointed Gifford Lecturer in the University of Edinburgh, I based my lectures chiefly on the second volume of this book which was at the time of my appointment approaching completion.

My thanks are due to Professor A. S. Pringle-Pattison, who read the proofs of both volumes and made valuable suggestions. I have also to acknowledge the kindness of Monsieur G. Remacle of Hasselt.

S. S. LAURIE.

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH,
May, 1906.

¹ *Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta*, by Scotus Novanticus, 2nd Edition,*1885.
Ethica, or, the Ethics of Reason, 2nd Edition, 1885: Williams & Norgate.

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FIRST BOOK
ON KNOWLEDGE.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

If we are to interpret experience aright, we must, above all, watch that which experiences, and endeavour, by tracing its movements, to find the nature and limits of its functioning as an “in and for itself being” that finds itself in certain relations to a Whole that transcends it. As mind moves along, what is it doing? and what does its activity reveal to us of the absolute Whole within which it lives and functions?

MEDITATION I.

THE PRIMAL ACTUALISATION: Mind a Conscious Entity—Fundamental Correlation of Subject and Object—Natural Realism.

THERE is an event from which all thought on Mind must start, and that is the primal actualisation in mind-experience—the feeling of a “somewhat” which is *not* the being that feels.

Without dwelling here on the transition from non-conscious bodies to feeling or conscious bodies, we may see clearly enough that all feeling, sentient, and conscious bodies are differentiated from others by this very fact

of feeling or consciousness. This is (to use Aristotelian language) their form or idea—that through which, as a prius and condition, they find their relations and realise their bodily as well as mental activities. They are not bodies that function consciousness, but bodies in and through which consciousness is functioned; and, in the case of man, self-consciousness also. This is the concrete as presented to us.

Thus, fixing our thought on consciousness as supreme idea and true significance of an animal body, we interpret it by its highest term, and are entitled to say that the animal is a conscious being that exists as a body or in and through a body; and in like manner when we come to man, we say that he is a conscious and self-conscious (or thinking) being that exists in and through a body. So we say that a blade of grass is a concrete of life and body. Is it the body that functions life—the dead the living, or is it life (the “form” of the vegetal world) that functions body?

If, then, men call feeling, consciousness, self-consciousness by the general name “mind” to distinguish it from the body in which it is involved, they are entitled to do so because it presents itself with characters wholly different from that of body, nay, repudiates the characteristics of body or matter (so-called). But we must ever remember that “mind” is only one side, though the inner side, of a concrete dual unity: it is the specific character of the whole—the outcome, issue, “form,” purpose of the whole. But, inasmuch as it is a “concrete dual unity” that is presented to us, we say that body is a necessary condition of mind being functioned.¹

¹ I am necessarily somewhat dogmatic here; but I think the sequel will justify my position.

None the less we can interpret the body by itself as one side of the concrete, and mind by itself as the other side of the concrete. We can also investigate the phenomena of the interaction of mind and body and *vice-versâ* (psycho-physics).

If body exists *for* mind, it is also a fact that mind exists in and through body. The reciprocity and involution are beyond question. Accordingly, we are constrained to say that an animal is a conscious being involved in body as a condition of the existence of consciousness and all that is implied in that; and man is a conscious and *self*-conscious being involved in body as a condition of his specific mode of existence as a mind here and now.

This, it would seem, is to say little; but note further: "Being" determined to a specific mode of existence is, I submit, an individual "entity"; and, accordingly, I shall not be deterred, by the fashion of the day, from calling mind an "entity"; by which I mean a specific determination of Being individualised: any *imagining* of which, however, is to annihilate it as mind and to transmute it into a "thing," in the loose popular sense of that word. Mind is a thought-thing, not a sense-thing.

Why then *also* call man a conscious and self-conscious "subject"? Because he is conscious only in so far as he feels an "other" than himself. He might revolve round his own conscious entity to all eternity and make nothing of it. The primary experience is Feeling and a "felt other" in a synthesis. It is a synthesis of two opposed "things" in one experience. As opposed and correlative, we call the feeling entity Sub-

ject and the felt "other" Object. They are convenient names for an experience that nobody questions. Now, this "subject-object" may be fitly called the primal actualisation—the great event from which all reflection on man must start. It would seem, then, that the feeling subject and the felt object, as they stand, so must they fall, together; and this is the basis of natural realism. For the term "object" is a generalised reflective after-thought to express a correlation. What really happens is that an entity (a reality) stirs the feeling of itself in another entity (reality).

Other considerations are forced on us as we contemplate the primal event. The Feeling subject is *called into life* by a presentation that *negates* it. The subject presents itself to us (when we reflect on experience) as a mere potentiality of life and feeling till it is elicited by that which is *not* it. Thus the two "realities" are given as independent of each other, to the extent not merely of opposition but of reciprocal negation.

Accordingly, it is not "object," as an abstract, that insists on finding and evoking subject, but "thing" as a complex of qualities or energies. If we posit an object-thing at all, we must take all that it gives to conscious subject or none. This gives rise to difficulties of interpretation; but a fact unsolved is better than a false solution. It is as spaced, figured, coloured, movent, etc., that subject receives the object-thing. Again, the subject reveals to us no content save the object-thing: it waits for its content: in so far as it is anything but a re-acting receptivity, it is empty. Further, the object-thing exists *as* presented. Finally, the object as given brings externality with it and compels subject (implicitly) to affirm externality of non-subject: objects

are sensed as outside each other and outside subject, and this outness or externality we call Space. The Object thus given in its complex whole, is all that philosophy and science have for interpretation whether we call it a "thing" or not: and as a "given" it is accepted by all, I understand. Call it "idea" or sensation or impression, and we simply, *so far as investigation goes*, change the name.

Two questions now arise. "Feeling subject-entity" and "felt external-object-entity" are there within the absolute Whole: but first, inasmuch as the external object exists in the primal experience as in *subject*, and must always and at last, as at first, exist as in subject, how is it that we can feel it as *external* not-subject? It certainly has no existence of any kind for me save in so far as it is in me; and so it is with all possible experience. Since then I can be aware of objects only as in and within my subject, do they exist or can they exist anywhere or anyhow save in a conscious subject? This question, as put, admits of only one answer, because it is begged in the correlative terms subject and object: the question, if more exactly put, is, Can there be an entity or "existence" save in a conscious subject?

It appears to me that object-thing is given as *negating* subject and independent of it; and to sense the "mode" of its independence is its externality. If the object is external to and independent of the conscious subject, it has a *per se* existence: it is an entity. By thing or *per se* existence we merely mean a "being" that negates other beings and shows itself to be a being by what we call sense-qualities and activities. It is in this sense that

the feeling subject is a *per se* existence or entity showing itself in its recipient and other activities—all as involved in “body”.

If we accept the above propositions we have at the foundation of all possible philosophy and science not merely subject-object, but “entity-subject” and “entity-object” in the primal synthesis of sentience.

But let me explain: when I say that conscious subject is an entity, I merely mean that it is a specific determination of Being (negating all other beings), that remains one and permanent in the diversity and flux of felt presentations and re-presentations. It is identical with itself. (I confine myself to normal states.¹) It uses body as the vehicle of its recipient and active activities, and body, as a *per se* existence negating mind, is at once vehicle and resistant and conditioner of the activities of mind. In the case of disease, body enslaves mind; and, if it ceases to live, mind disappears for us, and grave questions of mind-continuity arise thereupon.

Further, given an object-entity which is independent of and external to recipient subject-entity, is it correct to say, as I have done above, that the former enters into the latter *as* it exists, or are the difficulties that arise in connection with the transeunce such that man can never be sure that he has in consciousness the thing as it exists, but only some modification of the object-thing adapted, in or by thing-subject to its own peculiarities of constitution; and consequently, that the object in

¹ The “How” of Identity I do not discuss. I am unable here to pursue the question beyond the given fact; although the general question of identity must be considered in the sequel.

consciousness does not emerge in consciousness as it really exists in the totality of things outside the subject? In other words, is my awareness of that wall "immediate," or is it somehow mediated so as to effect in my consciousness an object which is not the wall as *in-verum natura*, but only the wall *for* me? In other words, have I a relative awareness of the wall, but not an absolute awareness? I choose to put the question of natural realism in this way. A frivolous question, it may be said; but it is an important one; for what is true of sentience is true of reason, and all possible knowledge: nay, Newton's *Principia*, and so forth, would be a mere disporting in a subjective world of relativity of subjective sensations, if our knowledge of a sense-object is not immediate.

"Natural Realism" says that the subject is conscious of the wall immediately, and its awareness is therefore an absolute awareness, if it be clear and distinct.

Inasmuch as the object is a "thing," it is permissible to call it a reality giving itself to another reality which we call the subject. And here, again, a question suggests itself. Since I can find no initial content in the bare subject, and since, consequently, the subject-reality (prior to the appearance of self-consciousness) appears to be a mere potency of recience and reaction, would it not be more correct to describe the primal actualisation as object realising *itself* in a sentient thing for the sake of *itself*, no less than for the sake of the sentient thing? If we dwell on this, we shall find that there are secrets in the processes of Absolute Being as creative which we can never penetrate. Just when we are on the point of seeing, things are hidden away. But this position I, meanwhile, take up, *viz.*, that finite object realises

itself, as a "being," entity or thing, in finite subject, and that finite subject realises itself, as a "being," entity or thing, in and through object; by which is here meant the grand-total of experience.

We have, then, valid and absolute, *because immediate*, awareness of the object, and the next question is, What is it that is delivered as object by the mysterious cosmic forces to me a sentient subject? What does this or that presentation present? And here I would answer generally, that it presents all I can ever feel or sense and all I can ever know, except the form of knowing itself. If I can interpret one object, I therein interpret the whole world of experience. All physics and metaphysics may be said to be there in that stone wall.

I ask myself now, What is object-thing in its completion as an existent thing *in rerum natura*? and I answer it is *there* precisely what it is *here* in subject-thing: the object exists in the Absolute Whole as I find it in, and for, conscious subject. Again, What is subject in its fulfilment, or *fulfilled* potency, as an existent entity *in rerum natura*? and I answer it is object—the total of experience. And yet object and subject, at first and at last and all through, face each other as antagonists—as reciprocally negating energies. This is what I mean by Natural Realism. And the ultimate synthesis for me is the infinite object, or God, fulfilled in the finite subject-mind in so far as that mind can bear the mighty burden.

Before going further, I shall indulge in a few polemical words in order to make my own position clear:—¹

¹ I need scarcely say that much that I say in these earlier *Méditations* can only be justified by the development of thought in the sequel.

Nobody, I imagine, denies that there can be no object save in subject and no subject save in object. These terms implicate each other, and it is a mere tautology to affirm their necessary correlation. The question (at least to me the natural man) is this: Is the object a *res* or reality, distinct—nay, also, separate, from the subject, which object (we may say) seeks and finds the subject *in order that* it may be felt and known?

We are speaking, remember, of a *finite* subject and its object. Let us keep to this. And the question then becomes, Can there be no existence in the Absolute Whole save in so far as it is an object to a finite subject? The language used by certain writers justifies me in putting a question the negative answer to which would to my mind be ludicrous. "Can there, then, be an existence in the Absolute Whole which is not an object to an infinite subject?" This is a totally different question. And as to this, it appears to me that to say that there can be no existence which is not *present* to the consciousness of infinite Subject, is either nonsense or a mere way of saying that all existences are *in* and through Mind-universal;¹ and consequently (*a*) nothing can exist save *in* and through Mind-universal, (*b*) the sum-total of existences are dependent on the One Being-Mind. If this be all that is meant, we may accept the belated re-assertion of the venerable doctrine of a Contingent World.

The question will then arise, Is the Contingent sum of things wholly dependent? Is the world merely the

¹ There is much *in* my mind that is not present to it as object, although *how* it stays there and crops up, when wanted and when not wanted, I have no idea. Is that which is Potential *ipso facto* dead?

way of living for a One Being (Pantheism)? Or, Is the way of living of the One Being through dependent independents? Or does the One Being in throwing out, *eodem actu*, throw aside, its own creation as a non-significant trifle, and withdraw to some lonely Sinai? We leave these questions in the hands of the general argument that follows.

Meanwhile I ask leave to say, There is a Given in all Sentience—a Given so urgent and insistent that it almost wholly obscures the sentient subject, which, as sentient, lives in and for the object : the object, in truth, occupies the field to the suppression of that which makes the object, as such, possible. There is, further (as we shall see), when the Will-dialectic (Reason) takes up the Given, an “affirmation” of the Given *as* given, and as independent of subject.

Now this Given which we call “object” either evolves its own subject as the mere terminus of its energy (a wandering idea that lays the egg of a subject sentient of it), or it is evolved out of and by the subject as the manner of its life ; in either of which events we have a monism which abolishes the one factor or the other as separate realities. Or, finally, the object is an external energising “thing” which makes its way to an internal recipient “thing” and, falling into it, constitutes the synthesis of subject-object which is the form of all experience. Meanwhile both subject and object remain alive and well in their separation in the Absolute Whole, and when one of them dies, the other goes on ; if all finite subject-things died, the object-thing would go on. I say that each remains alive and well as a separate entity, just as I say that a tree is a separate entity in the cosmic whole from the soil out of which it springs and from the

squirrel that runs along its branches. It may be said, nobody denies this. If so, why then not say it and confess to a natural realism? For this is natural realism—this is the *naïveté* of the common man. He is a Dualist because, and only in so far as, he is a Pluralist.

And the question ultimately is, *What* is “given” as object? above all, how is its externality given? How, it may be said, is this “outness” carried “in”? Or put it otherwise. How can the externality which is felt only inside be, at the same time, felt *as outside*? This is arranged for—must be arranged for, if there is to be veritable subject and object in the cosmic whole; if, in other words, there is to be life or knowledge at all, or anything save a continuous dead One.

It is evidently worth while to continue this line of thought, and to endeavour to lie close to the primal actualisation in consciousness and liberate it into its parts. What is the process in the actualisation, and does this process throw any light on the emergence in the subject of the consciousness of the externality of the object?

Note.—Later subjective idealism says that we are “constrained to think” the objectivity of the sum of our “ideas”. But if we are constrained so to think the sum (our inner world), we must be constrained so to think each member of the sum. If by “objectivity” be meant that the idea (say of a table) is a non-subject presentation to subject, it is superfluous to discuss the question. No one denies that kind of objectivity. Every one admits that there is “object”. If objectivity, on the other hand, mean the independence and externality of the object, the “constraint” by which we are compelled to “refer” the “idea” to an external object must go a little further and “constrain” to the affirmation of that object as in identity with the idea. We should then have merely a gloss on Reid’s doctrine of the uni-

versality and necessity which is involved in the *sensus communis*—a gloss because it interposes the superfluous and fictitious “idea”. Such an attempt at explanation cannot save us from subjective ideologism—a theory which rests, I consider, on an extravagant and crude dualism, as I hope will appear in the sequel, if I succeed in making clear to others the attitude of mind in which dualism or natural realism is to be conceived, *viz.*, as a monistic system and as the only true idealism.

MEDITATION II.

THE PRIMAL ACTUALISATION (*continued*): Genesis of Experience—
Pure Feeling and Inchoate Subject—Rudimentary Consciousness:
the Internal (Intra-organic) Other (Sensation)—The External Other:
Way in which the Inner becomes aware of Externality—Attuition
(Synopsis).

(1) PURE FEELING AND INCHOATE SUBJECT.

WHEN I speak of a conscious individual “entity” I mean that here, as a matter of fact, we have an individual, organic, one “being” which is capable of and exhibits consciousness. And no man (I submit) can take a single step in the explanation of Mind who does not affirm this to begin with, whether he is aware of his affirmation or not. As a postulate of rational psychology and of all mental life it must be granted, whatever explanation we may afterwards give of it and of its processes in the realisation of a world in and for itself.

What, now, is the *primordial* state of this conscious “entity”? It is Feeling. There is in its inmost life-movements no reference, apparently, to the “outer” or “other,” though that reference is certainly implicit. It is a vague indefinite diffused state of being which is yet *living*. Nothing is differentiated. The potential is only beginning to function itself into activity; mind is at the point at which difference and distinction begin to arise.

It will be objected: How can there be Feeling even of the vaguest kind unless there be a differentiation—

an "other"? *Strictly speaking*, there cannot be. And yet it requires very little observation of the inner world to see that there are infinite degrees in elementary consciousness, and that we can follow back its manifestations down to a minimum of Feeling, at which point it vanishes into mere potentiality. At this minimum point Feeling is, as regards any content, vague and unshaped; but it *has* an object, *i.e.*, a "Felt"; and that object is *Being*. Feeling and Being-universal are not in an identity, for there is already *more* than a promise and prediction of duality. There can, I would say, be no primordial Feeling save as inchoate "subject," and there can be no subject without "object" of some sort. Pure Feeling has for its object universal Unconditioned Being.

Feeling lies at the basis of all possible intelligence-life, the most rudimentary and protozoic as well as the most lofty and abstract and universal. We *feel* even the Ego and self-consciousness (but this is not a *datum* to the conscious subject as other objects are, but first, as we shall, in the sequel, see, created by the activity of the subject and thereupon delivered to Feeling). Those feelings which have a qualitative difference from one another and arise from within us subrationally are *data* in the ordinary sense.

My claim for primordial Feeling may be questioned; but if you will cancel one determination after another in ordinary consciousness, you will leave nothing save an entity with the potentiality of feeling and re-flexion (reaction). But an entity which has the potentiality of consciousness and reason must (in Time) begin, somewhere and at some point, to feel. I have said that feeling is in the beginning an indefinite feeling of indefinite un-

conditioned Being, and in this Being the embryo subject is as yet lost. Perhaps I ought to say it is identical with it and not identical: it is Becoming. The two float into each other. Out of the vast undetermined, that which we afterwards call the "subject" is *becoming* a determinate that can feel "the other". No determinate other is yet presented to it. It is asleep, but dreaming so to speak. In the "*becoming*" from sleep to the feeling of some determinate, the subject is already, in the region of feeling—the feeling of Being: it is already anticipating its future career as an active subject-entity within the Absolute Whole.

The subject, then, let us say, is a determinate being—an "in and for itself," whose root-character and function is Feeling. And the primordial feeling is (I hold) of universal unconditioned Being of which and in which "subject" is itself a determinate. It cannot part all at once with the Universal from which it is being detached in the interests of its own finite life: and, indeed, it never parts from it. In the highest flights of suprarational mystic vision it never parts from it. *There* indeed it *intuites* the indeterminate or unconditioned just as, in the beginning, it *feels* the indeterminate or unconditioned. In the initiation of subject as Feeling, accordingly, there is the feeling of the Universal; this we wrongly call a state of "indifference," because difference is not yet distinctly proclaimed. Subject-feeling and Being-universal are as yet almost in identity, and yet the scission is effected and a germ-subject is there. In other words, Universal Being has now moved into the possibility of its own re-flexion in, and by a finite centre-point or nucleus of itself. Universal Being

mèrely inwardises *itself* as *feeling* of Being in an individual point. This is the genesis of subject : "Becoming" has become a definite entity.

(2) RUDIMENTARY CONSCIOUSNESS—THE INTERNAL OR
INTRA-ORGANIC OTHER (SENSATION).

To pass over successive and progressive steps of growing mind which elude our obtuse perceptivity, we reach the point where there is the beginning of the "particular" in Feeling : that is to say, the point at which events within the organism are experienced as different and as one after the other. And by this we mean that they are *received*, and received by *that* in the organism which constitutes it a "being that is conscious," or has the potency of consciousness—a conscious entity. And without presented differences subject-feeling cannot possibly rise to the next stage of Mind, which we call sentience or sentient consciousness : it is through the "other" alone as particular differences that consciousness-proper (sentience) can emerge.

From the first secret stirring of differentiation within the organism of the mind-being there is a long road to the consciousness of an "other," which other is the "outer" and is the proclaimed negation of the conscious entity. The individual being, as a potentially conscious being, is still blind and deaf and dumb : it is in a dark prison and trying to work itself out into the light of day. The heavings and commotions and dynamic interweavings which go on in it defy our calculus. These distinctive feelings must occur even in the foetus after a certain point of development.

It may be said, doubtless, that I have been affirming a conscious entity or "being" in the animal organism—abstracting a mere phenomenon of organic life from its wrappings and conditions, biological and other. This I certainly do, and I have justified it in so far as it can be justified at this stage of our inquiry. We have before us an organised individual whose differentia, "form" or "idea" is consciousness or the potency of consciousness, which is the same thing. The differentiations, even within its own total organic system of possibilities, energies or activities, cannot evoke *it* by inner stimulation without becoming, however vaguely and dimly, a negating "other" for it. A bean planted in the ground springs into life by slow degrees. It is neither external forces nor the forces of the food-stuff enveloping the embryo that make the bean, but a certain inner potency in the embryo, of a kind different from all other potencies, which is here straining after life by subtle movements within itself, and finding the life it seeks by the help of forces which are *not* itself, but which it subsumes. So, conscious subject—the "form" of the animal genus—is pushing itself into life out of mere vague Feeling by the help of the external stimuli or environment in which it finds itself placed, and by making these *its own* through response to stimulus, it grows and swells into real, out of potential, existence, and from being a bare potency it becomes finally a full reality.¹

We have now evidently passed from Feeling in its large generic and fundamental sense—the pure feeling of unconditioned Being, which feeling may be almost

¹ In what sense the sentient entity is not a *tabula rasa* will appear hereafter.

said to be and not to be—to differentiated feeling within the organism ; still, however, obscure and vague. What seems to be going on here at this stage? A mere absorption of stimuli feeding or building up a dead conscious subject into which, as into a reservoir, the non-subject is poured? It would appear quite otherwise. The native functional activity of the subject, in so far as it functions consciousness or the feeling of “the other,” receives the inner organic stimuli and *itself* converts them into its *own* pabulum for the building up of what may be called the concrete body of sentient mind. That is to say it *receives* stimuli *and in the crisis of its own reflex action* is dimly aware of them—in other words, it is sentient or conscious. In this reflex (passivo-active) *act* of consciousness the stimuli are appropriated by, and assimilated to, the conscious subject, and are the food whereby the body of conscious mind is nourished and built up. They, so far, constitute the “real” of mind as opposed to mere potency and process.

The conscious entity has evidently now taken a long step towards sensation in the full meaning of the word : rudimentary sensation has in fact appeared. For, in so far as it has (as the result of frequent repetitions of the same movement) reflexed a particular feeling into its locus—a part of its own body, it now feels a *particular* disturbance. There is, now, a duality towards which Pure Feeling was the initial step.

Now, the feeling of an object by a subject-being or entity and the re-flexion of it into its cosmic locus I call rudimentary sensing or sensation. In and through this, duality, if not dualism, makes its appearance ; for

the germ-subject is now stimulated into the *clear* sensing of object, and we have sensational consciousness.

This awareness of a particular non-subject is, I say, rudimentary sensation: all stimuli are, at the point at which they enter a conscious entity, we know not what. The subject is not conscious of "sensations" or "ideas": this would be to say that it is conscious of consciousnesses or that it sensed sensation—an absurd statement. It is of objects and objects alone that subject is conscious. It has not yet got a clear outstanding object however. For subject *and* object which exist in the vague beginnings of the sensing of an internal "other," emerge into clear consciousness only with the first clear differentiation of an object in space.

The inner stimulus, in the earlier stages of conscious life, touches the subject as, or along with, a feeling of pleasure or pain. The common use of the word "feeling," indeed, is as of that which is pleasurable or painful: in other words, that which suits the constitution and needs of the organic conscious being or does not suit it; in other words, falls into identity or contradiction with it. But both pleasure and pain are indifferent, so far as consciousness *qua* consciousness is concerned. The consciousness of the stimulus (the object) is one thing, the pleasurable or painful in it is another. Abstraction is thus again necessary, if we are to be careful of the denotation of our terms. Consciousness *qua* consciousness, awareness *qua* awareness, knows nothing of pleasure or pain: it is, in this respect, in a state of feeling-indifference; a movement doubtless of some sort goes on, but not such as to excite feeling as *pathic*. Both pleasure and pain—the one suited to the con-

scious organism, the other not suited to it—are equally necessary to the building up of the body of mind in the multifarious world in which it is placed, and which it has to make its own and use. For, the world—*i.e.*, all that is *not* the conscious being itself—is the true life of mind as merely conscious; and not yet self-conscious. In this central point of conscious “subject,” universal experience as “object” has to focus itself, there to find its own final significance and revelation. By appropriating the real, *i.e.*, the universal “not-itself,” the empty conscious being grows into life and reality, and this precisely to the extent to which it appropriates it. On the other hand, the object may be metaphorically said to hasten to find in consciousness or mind its own final expression. It carries its own forms with it that they may be felt, reflexed and registered, and so serve as food—substance of subject-mind.

So far, however, as pleasure or pain is concerned (the colour or tone of the stimulus), *consciousness* purely as such is, I have said, indifferent; and “subject” merely uses these characteristics of its consciousness to steer its own way as one among many existences in a troubled world.¹

When we speak of feeling, it is important to distinguish these two kinds of feeling—feeling in its primary differentiation from all else as mere Recipience of the object as stimulus; and pathic feeling. Recipient feeling, in short, is consciousness at the crisis of the reflex-activity which constitutes the stimulus an

¹ If at any time I should fall into language which seems to indicate that a sentient subject receives “impressions” like soft clay, or mirrors impressions as if it were a looking-glass, this will be due merely to the exigencies of expression.

object. This crisis of objectivity is at the same time the crisis of appropriation and assimilation or absorption by the conscious subject: absorption of what? An idea? No, an object. The conscious "being" is now, as we saw, by virtue of the object, to be regarded as conscious "subject". Prior to this event, it was simply a specific being struggling into vague feeling, but it attains to subject through the movement out of identity of feeling into duality by means of the stimulus of the "other" or object.

It would appear then that there are apparent, in the analysis of the primal intra-organic experience, three steps or stages *after* a stimulus has been presented, for which we have no better words than (1) Reflex activity proceeding from a dynamic point *a* within an organism, directed against a negating stimulus, *b*; (2) The thereby effected emergence of *b* as object and *a* as subject ("this here" and "that there"); (3) Appropriation or assimilation of *b* as reflexed by *a*, *i.e.*, the return of *b* as *now* object, into *a* as *now* subject. But these three steps or moments, though they can be distinguished in thought, are not three events that can exist separately. There can be no recipient feeling or (so-called) impression which does not involve the two succeeding steps: so the second step cannot be thought save as containing the first and third, and the third cannot be thought without the first and second implicit in it. If this is correct, then here in the primary experience of a conscious subject we have a complex before us which is a "One" constituted by three mutually necessary elements. These elements are now, therefore, as distinguishable, though not separable

to be called "moments" in a one movement. The rudimentary act of consciousness, then, in the infant animal is to be so described; and *that* even while the stimuli have, as yet it may be, their source within its own organism. All this becomes more evident when we are clearly conscious of externality.

(3) THE EXTERNAL OTHER.

I have been trying to unveil for myself the genesis, and follow the history, of a conscious being relatively to its own inner organism; but, meanwhile, experience of an outer is being forced on it, and the fact of the outer supports, sometimes traverses, the development of sentience of the inner. The conscious being is enveloped in a concrete organism or body, and it early awakes to the awareness of other bodies outside its own.

First of all, it awakes to an indefinite diffusion or continuum of a non-subject which we call Space. Space is not given as a thing *per se*, but as *Being spaced* or extended without differentiation. Now it appears to me that this object is a thing, because it is not merely Being spread out; but Being spread out to sense—*i.e.*, Being as phenomenon. The subject receives this and reflexes it as an indefinite extensity, and an "outer" springs into consciousness. This outer universal presentation or Object is quickly felt to break up into diverse extended and (now) qualified objects.

These feelings of Space and outer diverse presentations are felt *as outer*, and a question arises when we reflect on this fact. Mind cannot be aware of any stimulus except *as within*: how, then, does it affirm

externality, space, locality? The process, so far as I can detect it, is precisely the same as that whereby the conscious subject became aware of the first vague intra-organic differentiation of an "other". There is recipient feeling in the subject; a reflex-activity in which is found the note or character of the said feeling (a "moment" in the objectivising process); and the instantaneous return of the object, as so characterised, to the subject as *now*, and only now, conscious of it: that is to say, absorption or assimilation by subject of the matter of recipience. This appropriation involves a deposit which remains as a factor in the building up of mind as a substantial empirical reality. In other words, the object is not only appropriated but retained. Retention is the condition of Memory, and Memory (*in* an organism not as a faculty *of* an organism) is the condition of growth; for without this, mind would be a mere potentiality of recipience and reflex-activity, always beginning, never progressing.

But what does the reflex action of the conscious subject-entity here mean? It is no longer a placing of the content of the received stimulus in a vague and indeterminate way as somehow "not-*a*," as in the case of inner rudimentary organic experiences, but the clear placing of the received stimulus outside itself in space as a positive and characterised object *B* and the return of the object so characterised to conscious mind to be there held; which last event is not to be distinguished from absorption and appropriation. This event is not to be called a pure "act"; it is a process, involving movement doubtless, but it is essentially *passivo-active* or reflexive. It is the same process which now *localises*, as that whereby stimuli from within the organism have

been in the habit of being vaguely localised in different parts of the body.

Unless there were a reflex action placing outside what is always received and felt inside, it is manifest that there could be no spatialising or localising at all. There *might* be an outer world, but it could not be "sensed" as outer.

I said that, while the inner organic feelings were always pleasurable or painful more or less, yet so far as bare consciousness is concerned, they are neither pleasurable nor painful. This is more manifest when we become conscious of space and of spaced and localised things. There is, doubtless, a certain excitement when a new object comes within view; but this *quality* of a stimulus is not taken account of by consciousness *qua* consciousness. And even this "quality" soon disappears and the subject, as a consciousness, is quite indifferent to it. There is always, it is true, a certain sub-satisfaction in the healthy exercise of every life-function, but this is generic, and it is not dependent on the roundness or squareness or redness or blueness or hotness or coldness of the experience. Pleasure and pain may be involved in the thing as experienced, but they are not the experiencing.

The formerly experienced duality of subject and object is now emphasised by the *felt* externality of the latter and the *felt* internality of the former. The terms internality and externality can have no meaning until object and subject have clearly defined themselves as related oppositions or negations. Each separate presentation is a separate by negating all others, and it is "object" by virtue of negating the conscious subject.

The conscious subject may now be regarded as having transcended the indeterminateness of pure feeling, and as introduced to the whole diversity of objects which constitute Nature, or, let me rather say, sentient experience. Individual mind as Pure Feeling, whose object is unconditioned Being, evolving itself into the higher potency of sentience finds itself reflexing and appropriating Being as now conditioned and differenced. Inner sense and outer sense henceforth provide the sentient subject with all possible raw material of its specific life. This material is pressed on it from all sides and gladly accepted, *not* with a view to knowledge (for to this the merely conscious or sentient subject is indifferent), but merely with a view blindly to correlate what it receives with its own instinctive needs and its capacities of pleasure and pain as an organism. This correlation involves reflexive-activity in the sentient subject: as a dynamic centre, it re-acts and *feels* its way to the satisfaction of its wants. This, I presume, is what is meant by adaptation to environment under the instinctive impulse of an organism to preserve and conserve itself. And "instinct" is reason *in* and *for* the sentient creature, but not *by* it: it is an impulse and act accomplished without the prior image of the act. Hence it is that acts which have become in us automatic are often called instinctive. They are rational, but not, after a certain amount of repetition, self-consciously rational.

It is only a small part of the vast and various Object—the universe of things, that each conscious existence ever appropriates. Each is determined from within, *i.e.*, by the inner necessity of its own peculiar nature to select what suits the continuance of its life as a matter

and mind organism, and turns that into itself. All else is to it a vain show. The intellection of an animal is determined, I say, by its inner needs or necessities: hay has no interest for a fish nor roast beef for a cow. The record of the inner needs of each conscious organism would yield its fundamental psychology, reveal its potentialities and forecast its experience. In all *living* things there is an inner straining towards something or other, apart from those movements which are the result of mechanical automatic processes. This straining (which we may call Desire) is the bare potentiality of activity, which becomes a reality of activity when the fit occasion or object presents itself. But activity, either in general or as specifically directing itself, is not, *qua* activity, caused or generated by occasion, although its direction at any one time may be determined by occasion. Seemingly purposeless straining has purpose implicit in it; in other words has "object" immanent in it, and finds its opportunity to live and be actual *in* the occasion. Hunger, thirst, and all that comes under the head of Appetite illustrate this straining towards activity which appropriates as much of the universal "other" as satisfies it.

When we call such strainings "instinctive" we mean that they are immanent in the specific being we are considering—implicit in it. They are its connate potentialities and properties. The said "being" appropriates what it needs and leaves the rest. The satisfaction of these connate instinctive or implicit impulses is associated with pleasure or pain in varying degrees. As occasion arises, we also find an implicit power of resistance, or of evasion, with a view to save the individual life (and this in plants as well as animals); and, further,

sympathy which is a feeling of pleasure in other beings of a like kind and a pleasure in being an object of pleasure to them—these feelings reaching their maximum of intensity on the emergence of sexual desire and in the presence of offspring. All those feelings that involve other objects are inherent in the constitution of the “being,” only awaiting occasion to become factual. They create its “positive relations” to the world; or within The Absolute Whole.

Note that the first two moments of the process that issues in the consciousness of an object in sensation are *below* consciousness. Consciousness—the awareness or feeling of an object *as such*, is in the crisis of the final moment only—the moment of the *return* of the charactered object to the subject.

In this animal, or purely sentient, experience of an object, Is there judgment? It seems to me that it would be a loose use of words to say that there is. The sentient awareness of an object is not in itself judgment. There can be no judgment where there is no affirmation. Doubtless animals act *as if* they had “judged”; for that sparrow outside my window does not pick up a seed mistaking it for an insect or anything else. It may be said therefore to have “judged” that the seed is a seed and not anything else. But this awareness of identity and difference is not judgment—a mental affirmation yielding a proposition. To call it “judgment” is to confound the various subtle moments which go to the constituting of the final act of “Knowing”. Such sentient awareness is simply the pre-condition of judgment—it is judgment “becoming”—implicit judgment: the object in sentience is on its way to being judged

by 'a subject which can judge. (See note at end of Meditation.)

Man as sentient, it would now appear, is not merely receptive. There is activity on the presentation of the datum; but it is a reflex activity, and further, an associating and automatic activity—associating activity, however, in this sense that experiences associate *them selves* with one another so as to yield a record of the external as given (passivo-active).

(4) ATTUITION (SYNOPSIS).

Feeling and Sensing alike are common to man and all sentient creatures, but in the lowest organisms it might perhaps be distinguished as sensibility, *i.e.*, the feeling of a single quality or point, and rises gradually to the highest form of sensation which I would call Attuition. "Attuition" is a sense-synopsis of a given complex. This plane of conscious life (the attuitional) which yields the matter of all reality, the philosopher must, I submit, be prepared to dwell on long and patiently. If we, in our pride of reason—which, at the stage of attuition, has not yet emerged—"scorn the base degrees by which we do ascend," we wilfully fling away a key which opens many doors: for, in the contrasts and similarities of the sentient or attuitional movement and the subsequent reason or dialectic movement, we find, it seems to me, the solution of many questions which arise in the criticism of knowing, and see a possible explanation of some of the contradictions of knowledge.

Anyhow, whether or not a feeling subject can feel universal unconditioned Being in which and of which it is, prior to any discrimination of determinates or par-

ticulars—this is the Real, *viz.*, Being and all that we truly receive as the differentiations and predicates of Being, whether of inner or outer sense, whether simple or complex—stones, stars, men, things, affections, emotions, relations and acts. Thus, even in the rudimentary movements of feeling and sentience, we are driven from the phenomenal presentation to the noumenal basis of reality, from the Many into the arms of the all-embracing all-sustaining One of Being, from the finite and conditioned to the non-finite and unconditioned. Such, I hold to be the record of experience. And what can Philosophy ever be in the last resort, but an exhibition of experience in its truth ; which truth, however, must comprehend the unseen implicates of that experience ?

A few words more on the independence of the object : Is the object-thing of which we have been speaking truly external to me and independent ? I say that as a negation of subject and as given in the mode of externality, it is independent of finite conscious subject. Apart from that in which it realises itself, *viz.*, a conscious subject, the external is an abstraction it is said. Of course ; but I submit that the said same conscious subject affirms the independence of the object—in what sense we shall see hereafter. I must take all that the object delivers to me or none. It delivers externality and its own independence in the primal actualisation, and I have analysed the process whereby this is accomplished. As Schelling said, “not because there is thought (or sentience) is there existence, but because there is existence there is thought”.

The “attitudinal” subject, of which we are now speak-

ing, naively accepts the object at its own value. It is very simple-minded : to it there are no contradictions. It receives, reflexes and recovers the object into itself and is therewith content. The infinite of space and time, infinite duration, the unreality of floating predicates, cause and freedom, have no meaning to it. Nor does the ethical contradiction of Will and achievement, of the existence of Evil, or the biological contradiction of life and death disturb the equanimity of the non-rational. It seeks no interpretation, no God. It is out of the next movement of mind—the dialectic or reason-movement—that all contradictions arise ; and we should *primâ facie* expect that Reason is bound to provide a solution of its own self-sprung contradictions.

When I say that subject and object are separate entities constituting a synthesis which we call Consciousness, I mean that they are separate just as the plurals that fill the world of experience are separate one from the other. That is to say, they are all separate one from another, but there is a common One of Being. Each is not a *self-existent*, but only an existent of a specific kind functioning itself within the universal scheme of things.

If this be not so, then subject and object are only moments in the one event, *viz.*, experience ; and consequently there is neither subject nor object, but only a consciousness of a resultant of two moments or factors which, for convenience, we call subject and object. And this, again, is to say that consciousness of an object as an external is impossible, and that we are never conscious of anything save the resultant of a *relation* of two unknowable factors—not the object, but a *tertium quid*. And note this : if “subject-object”

be alone the true object, then we must have another underlying subject to be conscious of this subject-object, and so on for ever. And yet, it is always subject-object that we have in presentation.

If we ask, further, Is the subject a *per se* and the object a *per se*, the answer must be No; but if we ask, Is the object-reality a *per se* and the subject-reality a *per se*, the answer is Yes, in the same sense as the expression *per se* (by or for itself) is to be applied to all the infinite plurals that exist. So *you* are not merely an object to or in *my* subject, but you are an "in and for itself" just as I am, although to you I am also an object. Do you doubt this? Or do you think your existence (not for me but for yourself and cosmically) is dependent on your being an object to my subject? What is true of you is true of every other "object".

Let us say, then, that a non-sentient reality passes immediately into the sphere of a sentient reality where it completes itself as a "felt," and constitutes, *just as it exists in the cosmic Whole* (and to the extent of the capacity of the subject), the real or content of the subject, building it up out of empty sentience to full reality.

To trace the secret processes whereby a sentient subject rises to meet the stimulus and reflexes it and appropriates it seems to be beyond our powers; and no less beyond us are the processes of retention and those whereby the appropriated object is subsequently cast up into consciousness as a re-presentation. Could we realise the subtle movements whereby subject-object effects itself as a consciousness, we should see a wonderful sight, and find ourselves perchance at the open door of the mysteries of Being. Stimulus, Recipience,

Re-flexion and Appropriation are merely a rough summary of what takes place.

At a higher stage of mind, when the dialectic emerges in the subject-reality, the "real" of Attuition, which is only a synopsis, is built up into what we call an Actual or known. Or, if you choose to put it so, the object-reality, which has fulfilled itself as a "real" in attuition through passive activity of sentience, now further completes itself in the subject as an "actual" through the active-activity of the Dialectic. All the while the said object-reality is an object-actuality; but it can be this only for a conscious subject which has evolved the dialectic in itself. All the while too, and at all stages of mind, it is the infinite Object-actuality which is seeking the reflection of itself into a finite subject, not only in order that thereby the subject may grow to its full stature and dimensions, but that the object may grow into that full stature and dimension in and for finite mind which it *already* occupies in infinite Being and Mind in which and by which all things exist that do exist.

And yet, not only is the object in attitudinal synopsis incomplete and inadequate to itself, as, on the advent of reason or the dialectic, quickly appears; but even for finite reason the object is inadequate to itself. For, if finite reason dialectic, when it emerges, is forced by its essential nature to contemplate all actual and possible experience as a vast organised whole which is a One containing all differences, it is manifest that there can be nothing which can adequately explain any *one* experience except this Whole itself. We may call it "The Absolute" if we like; but in any case, from the moment that the conception of "The Whole" as a system finds a place

for itself in rational consciousness (and it must find a place there), it requires no laboured argument to demonstrate that the part cannot resolve its own contradictions and inadequacies save in and through the Whole. The proposition is manifestly an identical one, and it is mere tautology to insist on it. There is nothing which the universe of things offers to man which is down to its roots and away out to its infinite relations knowable. For myself, I am simply trying to find what Experience is—what it yields me, as I humbly follow the gradual building up of the Object in Subject ; which is the whole doctrine of Knowing.

Note.—And what is judgment, when does it appear ? It is a self-conscious discrimination (*i.e.*, a discrimination possible only to a self-conscious subject) of *a* as not other things, but itself—its own identity. It is an activo-active not a passivo-active process, and is Percipience. In actually distinguishing and perceiving *a*, we affirm its identity with itself and this is the primary act of judging, *viz.*, $a = a$; and involves the laws of Identity and Contradiction. Up to and inclusive of the moment of attuition or sentient awareness, there is not even the beginning of knowledge as knowledge ; nor consequently of thinking. The first act of the self-conscious subject in the sphere of knowledge-proper is (as we shall see) percipience, and the result is the raising of the “sensate” into a “percept”. In the presentations to sense there is, of course, thought—thought objective and universal, just as in the working of the consciousness of the attitudinal subject there is thought-universal. But there is nothing in the conscious subject *as sensing* which we can call knowledge or thought, without landing ourselves in inextricable and wilful confusion.

We have been in these words forecasting “knowledge” : let us return to Sentience in its highest form of Attuition.

MEDITATION III.

PLANES OF MIND : Evolution of Mind, *viz.*, Pure Feeling—Sensation—
Attuition—Reason or the Subjective Dialectic—Intuition.

THE preceding Meditations assume Planes of finite mind with special reference to the human mind ; and it is, indeed, necessary to introduce the point of view thus early, although it may anticipate much that has yet to be made good.

Absolute Unconditioned Being unfolds its inner nature as an externalised infinite series of finites ; but this, not as an aggregate which may or may not settle down into a system, but, as an evolving and continuous process which, as evidently ordered, we call Law. At a certain point of evolution, the stage of “ Life ” has been reached, —it matters not, here, whether that first life be animal or vegetal. Unless the creative Energy is to be at this point arrested, the next evolution of the Divine nature would seem to be in its character inevitable ; for the full expression of a conscious and self-conscious Being, if such be the nature of the Source, next demands the finitising of Feeling and Consciousness. The inanimate world thus and then begins to find in feeling and conscient entities its meaning reflected. That which lies hidden in the non-conscious world passes into feeling and consciousness, revealing itself to individual mind within the range of the capacity of each evolving

stage. Just as the system emerges from Infinite Mind, so it finds its terminus and completion, as a finite externalisation, in finite mind. Finite mind itself, like all Nature, then starts on a process of evolution: it moves from the rudimentary and simple to its complex fulfilment in reason which brings with it a consciousness of consciousness. At this stage, finite mind becomes equal to the comprehension of the mighty Whole, and can, through each man, place back in God the image of His own infinite activity and proclaim Him as the All in All, The One, The Absolute! But the self-conscious Ego, the highest term in the finite evolution of Mind known to us, is, like all else, involved in the modality of the lower spatio-motor categories. Were it otherwise, man would be cut off from nature, and exist as a world apart, gazing with blank and objectless eyes.

The slow and subtle evolution of infinite Mind in finite forms no man can pretend to trace; but it is obvious enough that we encounter it on successive planes which may be distinguished with sufficient accuracy for our guidance in interpreting Man, whose mind contains all lower planes in a one complex. Each plane of mind, in order that it may be "mind," must have an object adequate to that particular stage of mind and to which, also, the stage of mind is adequate.

(1) At what point does the action and re-action of unconscious life pass into sentient life—the beginnings of finite mind? At the point, we may say, at which a being refers all that enters it to itself as a one of recipience and, *ipso facto*, refers the receipt to an "other". We have now subject-object, but the reference to the self and the other is an implicit reference merely. The subject is a

mere *point d'appui*—a reflexing and assimilating “somewhat,” and the object is not differentiated as object, but only dimly felt as *not* that which receives. I call this the stage of Pure Feeling; and the Object to this embryo subject is the vague indefinite of Being-Unconditioned.

(2) There is Sensation in its earliest form as feeling of an “other” *there* opposed to and negating subject *here*; in this sensation-moment of mind-evolution, the Feeling-subject is introduced to the vast diversity of the existent universe as constituted of separate and determined “particulars” negating the subject and each other: these, in a confused way, it receives, reflexes, and appropriates for itself—a still vague and restricted consciousness.

(3) There is the highest stage of Sensation (or Sentience generally) where the subject receives and reflexes the separate totals in presentation as *given co-ordinated totals* (whose elements it does not yet discriminate)—diverse single totals in relations of Space and Time and Motion, and acting on each other. The more intelligent animals are on this plane of mind. I have named it the Attuitional. This Attuition contains quasi-perception and judgment; but *only implicit*. The resultant for the conscious subject is Synopsis.

(4) Finally, we are called on to behold emerging out of the subject as attuitional a free energy moving, after a certain manner, in order to grip and “know” the world, including itself. This is Reason or the Subjective Dialectic. Of this more fully in its proper place.

(5) Reason itself, straining towards a further insight, predicts, though it does not quite attain, a still higher plane which we may call Intuition.

Now, to each plane of mind, the world of experience

(the Object) is what is possible for that particular plane of mind, *i.e.*, inherent in its potency as a subject-entity.

At what points mind evolves itself out of one stage into another we cannot precisely say. The process is too fine and delicate for our coarse perceptions. In fact we are compelled to regard mind, in its evolution, as we have to regard all else in space and time, as a discrete continuum. At each stage of sentient existence a being, if normally constituted, receives and reflexes all of the non-subject that is necessary to its own organic completion. It has, in other words, for its nutriment, the "Real" on its own plane of universal Being; and each successive plane is a moment in the universal cosmic movement, and, as such, has absolute truth on that plane, however partial and imperfect its acquaintance with the Object may be relatively to the Absolute Whole.

It is essential to note that there is no saltus perceptible. Each plane of mind is immanent in that out of which it arose.

These planes of mind are moments in the concrete whole of man-mind, and in him they are to be distinguished rather than separated. Man thus comprises in himself all the planes of mind to be found in the world of experience as an ascending series, and gathers them up into the unity of the highest—the subjective dialectic as free self-conscious reason which, by virtue of its comprehension of the lower, becomes the interpreter of these and of all experience. Man is literally the microcosm. This dialectic, as free energy, seeks to "know," *i.e.*, to realise in consciousness all its complex content so as to yield knowledge or the truth of things—to realise for itself the world as it objectively exists.

In this highest stage, subject as self-conscious, can reflectively contemplate the operations whereby experience finds a lodgment in the empty subject-entity and builds it up into a Real of content out of a mere potency of recipience and reflex activity: dynamical operations these in the sphere of mind similar to what may be discerned in the sphere of matter.

I may here recall: The primordial event of which all others are repetitions, I have called the actualisation in a conscious subject; and from this, it appears to me, all interpretative thinking must start. Under this name I include all the moments whereby a first consciousness is constituted; and when a "reason" looks at this closely, it is the *whole* of what he envisages, not a part merely, that constitutes the Real, *i.e.*, the truth, of the great mind-event. The whole is a concrete synthesis, and each moment is involved in the others. In describing and defining he merely takes to pieces reflectively what is "given" in a one experience.

Now, we have said that the first thing he finds when he contemplates the inner transaction is a process or movement which *is*, and an "isness" or "thinghood" which is the condition of the possibility of the resultant actualisation. Nay, he is aware of two thinghoods (*i.e.*, realities) coalescing in the actualisation, and these he distinguishes as that which feels or is conscient and that which is felt—the conscite. The former is here and permanent, the latter is there and diverse and fluent. The former he aptly names "subject," the latter "object". Meanwhile, every moment is in and of universal Being. Subject and Object as distinct "beings" are thus given in the primary actualisation as of equal

validity in the scheme of things. If the one falls out, the other falls out. The consciousness of an object is found, when we reflect, to be a synthesis of subject and object.

The reality of subject is well enough denoted by the old word "entity". To define an entity, as distinguished from a process in or of Being, is beyond our power, if by defining is meant the explication of its inner nature. But if entities are facts in consciousness, I ought to be able at least to describe them: and I describe a conscious sentient entity thus: A nucleation or involution or articulation or specific determination of Universal Being whereby an independent centre of actuality is constituted *in rerum natura*: in other words, an individuation of the Universal into the particular—an individuum.

The primordial "feeling" of Universal Unconditioned Being as object, and, further, the consciousness of subject as nucleated fact or individuation accompanies us in all thought, and constantly recurs. It is the fundamental fact and description of embryonic finite mind, which thus begins its career as in and of the Universal, and carries this feeling of the Universal with it in all future evolution. Assuming here a Creative Mind, we see it externalising itself in shapes and processes inorganic and unconscious, and then unable to rest till it has transfigured this stage of Itself by moulding it into a Feeling-potency which shall in its successive evolutionary stages reflect *Mind*-universal.

Of the highest finite evolution—the man-mind, we say that it is a conscious entity; but also, as we have seen, an entity conscious of itself *as* an entity or individuated part of Universal Being. As such, it is a centre not only of passivo-active receptivity, but, further, of active activity. It is Reason or the Dialectic.

The object-entity in collision with the subject-entity has its flash of resultant in the actualisation, and this on the sentient plane. This actualisation or synthesis is the object passing into the subject as a feeling or passivo-active or recipient entity. The one permanent-individuated being, whose differentia is that it is a feeling or conscious centre, receives the data of inner and outer experience and absorbs them into itself, thereby constituting them the body or real of itself. That is to say, the constitutive "matter" of itself (which self we call subject) as distinguished from the potency of fact and act and process which are the "form" of itself, *viz.*, "being-conscious," or, in one word, Consciousness. Accordingly, the subject and object remain in their separate individuation, but each alike is a living experience only in the flash of the collision and interpenetration or synthesis of the two which we call the "actualisation".

Note.—To speak of mere reflex action as involving a *feeling* of the stimulus is, it seems to me, to confound different planes of Being. A selective and adaptive re-action involving what Professor Ward calls "subjective selection," may be due to an internal stimulus within the organism or it may be extra-organic, and it is only by analogy with a higher stage of evolution that we can say that the re-action contains "feeling"; for feeling presumes a sub-reference to a subject that feels, and is thus within the distinctive domain of finite mind. Mind or the Dialectic is *in* everything; but we do not say that everything is *a* mind—a central unity that receives and *appropriates* objects for itself. The world is in every department of observation a discrete continuity of "Becoming," and at what point mere reflex-action passes into Feeling or inchoate conscious subject we cannot say. None the less is it necessary to limit the term "mind" to that which contains a reference, however dim, to a self or subject

The root-beginning of a mind-subject is what I call Pure Feeling,

and its object, I would repeat, is Unconditioned Being. Let us dwell for a minute on this question of initial and evolving mind.

Mind-universal, which is in all things, is at a certain stage of the finitised life of Absolute Being reflected into itself and its initiatory form and function is Feeling. Feeling is the germ and possibility of finite mind. The subject-feeling is not a "thing," but it is a determination of universal Being into a phenomenal shape and phenomenal conditions of recipience and re-action. It evolves itself or is evolved (it matters not which) into an entity of more and more complex and wide-reaching potencies by virtue of which it equates itself, as recipient and re-active and assimilative, more and more with the universe of things—the infinite Object. Finally, it unfolds the supreme potency of equating itself with *itself* as object, and, in and through the same energy, equating itself with Mind in the infinite Object, and so grasping its experience as an Absolute Whole.

Without object, subject-entity would be mere potentiality, just as without a finite externalisation Absolute Unconditioned Being must be (to us) mere potentiality [But potentiality is not "nothing".]

It is a wonderful evolutionary process—this of mind; and in so far as it is specifically mind, its function seems to be the reflexion and assimilation of all that is not itself, in order that thereby it itself may grow to its full dimensions. In this one pin-point of man-mind the Universe and the God of the Universe can find themselves. There is nothing so wonderful as just that, we should say. And yet there is a wonder on a wonder, for while the lower mind-stages, although wholly inadequate to the great Object, are yet rounded and adequate to themselves, the highest of all, *viz.*, Reason, is characterised by restlessness, dissatisfaction, contradiction and general inadequacy, and points to a higher than the present actual.

From what I have said it would follow that mind reflects the Truth of things; but it also appears that mind is not to be restricted to "thought," but in the case of Man comprehends Feeling and Sense as well as Dialectic. The infinite Object reveals itself in finite subject in all its reality and truth to the extent to which the subject is capable of receiving and reflecting it. This is Natural Realism, as I understand it. To posit a void between subject and object is to posit a breach of Continuity in the system in which we find ourselves.

MEDITATION IV.

SENSATION : Sensational Consciousness and the Diverse or Plural—
Conditioning of Unconditioned Being—The Given Realitas-Phe-
nomenon—The Reality of the Object is its Being.

FROM the initial synthesis or actualisation, which we call consciousness as primary (passivo-active) act and basal fact, all speculation, I have said, must start. We would fain follow the subject-object in their correlated ever-growing life ; but it is quite beyond our power to trace the various minute degrees of ascent from the indifference of Feeling, or from the Feeling of Unconditioned Being in an embryonic subject, up to the full activity and sweep of self-conscious Reason. It is enough here to emphasise the fact that there *are* degrees, that finite mind as an ascending process is a *discrete* continuum ; and that it is only on the completion of the active movement in a self-conscious subject that the Object presented to it stands forth in *its* completeness : in other words, is “known”. Meanwhile, all is God evolving Himself as a Finite.

It suffices for my main purpose that I should bring prominently into the argument the two great stages of subjective mind above the stage of “Pure Feeling,” *viz.*, the Sensational and the Rational. The sensational stage, which (beginning with a consciousness merely of

a somewhat *not* the subject) unfolds, in ever-increasing capacity of recipience and re-flexion, the potencies of a conscious subject-entity in presence of an object : [I say potencies, not "forms" or *a priori* categories]. At last we reach the completed animal intelligence, which, though still sensational and reflexive, approaches, in its highest manifestations, the border-line of human reason. It is this highest form of animal sensational intelligence that I have designated by the term "attitudinal". The *total* object in sense is at this stage beheld, received, and reflexed as a single co-ordinated total. The object is *there*—an organised whole waiting to be taken; but the conscious subject can take only what it has the power to take and the impulse to take. And, moreover, what it does take is taken and assimilated as co-ordinated and aggregated sensations in the lump; not separated into parts that are affirmed as separate judgments and synthesised into unities: much less is the object apprehended in its full "actuality" (*see sequel*).

There are *given* to attuent subject total complex "singles" in endless diversity, I say, but there is no synthesising *by* subject; only a reflex synthesising *in* and *for* subject; properly speaking, therefore, only a synopsis. Conscious subject, in short, receives, reflexes and absorbs into itself syntheses *already constituted for it* in an external system. And in the process of recipience and re-flexion there is a *vis mentis* of a specific kind—a passivo-active energy. This stage or "moment" of finite mind yields the Real; that is to say, the Datum which is absorbed and reflexed precisely to the extent of the potencies in the subject—be it snail, rabbit, dog, or man.

If, then, you ask me, What is the Real? I reply it

is' what we receive through feeling and sense immediately : and if you ask me, Where is it? I answer, *Circumspice*. In brief, the Real is the *realitas-phenomenon*—the concrete presentation of things as ordered in Time and Space.

It would appear then, that the Real of which we are speaking is not the actualisation *of*, but the actualised *in*, consciousness, in so far as the synopsis is clear and distinct. This Real is the presentate (object-thing), but it issues (for subject) out of the triune movement that results in the actualisation. Consequently, it will be well here to distinguish by words what is distinguished in fact. I call the movement triune only as a general expression ; for in truth we have seen that the whole process involves Stimulus, Subject, Reflex-action, Object, and Appropriation as actualised in and for the Subject. There are, accordingly, if we are to be minute, five steps discernible. The question as to the Real, however, has arisen chiefly in connexion with the actualised presentate as object, and I shall endeavour to confine my use of the word to this object. We may include the other moments in the process under the term "factual".

In due course, I shall endeavour to show how it is that the synoptic object or Real is raised, through the activity of the new and higher energy of the subject as a dialectic, into an Actual—the object as in a *self*-conscious experience. Meanwhile let us keep as closely as we can to the merely attitudinal record. The sentient subject is not creative ; but it has in its essential nature the potency of receiving the Whole, of making it its own and reflexing it as a sensed. Accordingly, the whole natural world may be said to be innate in

every mind to the extent of its potencies; for the individual conscious subject contains potentially all forms and shapes waiting to be elicited by "given" forms and shapes when they present themselves. But the stimulus that evokes the potencies is not some unknowable and incomprehensible "somewhat," but the very objects themselves as poured forth into an outer by the Creative act. God may be said to convey His categories by means of the things in which they exist; the subject in which they are realised has, meanwhile, the innate potency of receptivity and appropriation.

Now, what is the presented object? Shows and shapes and appearances—an aggregate of predicates? These, *as such*, cannot be true reality. But is the presentation merely a presentation of shapes and appearances—the broken glass in a kaleidoscope? Assuredly not; there is an unseen implicate—basis of subject and object alike. This is obvious and patent. How could a mere "appearance" be an objective "reality"?

Whence, then, comes the "reality" of the object in attuition? From the Feeling of Being. The Subject in its embryonic stage is Feeling—Feeling of indefinite undetermined Being: it *is* itself Being and *receives* Being: it is bathed in Being so to speak. As pure Feeling evolves into sensation of the diverse, the feeling of Being is *continued into* the diverse presentations. The feeling of Unconditioned Being is now the feeling of Being conditioned or determined,—the One in the Many. There is no breach of continuity. The evolution of Feeling into Sensation is the inchoate subject

keeping pace (so to speak) with the movement in Unconditioned Being differentiating itself as individual beings. This feeling of Being which accompanies us everywhere—the ultimate ground of the possibility of experience—is, from the first, *received*. it is empirical. Objects are Unconditioned Being differentiated or determined into a world of things; and this is how these are given to the growing subject, that is to say, they are given as *being*; and in this is their reality.

Every presentation has, *as such*, equal validity whether it comes from within the body or without. Even illusions are, *qua presentations*, valid. Their truth or reality depends on whether or not they are presentations of existence subsisting independently of a particular mind, and the test of this is whether they would, under normal conditions, be experienced by the *species* to which the particular individual who experiences them belongs: in other words, whether they are universal or objective (in that sense of this latter word in which it means universality): in other words, in so far as they are in the “Common Sense” (*Sensus Communis*).

When, subsequently, as self-conscious beings, we turn back on the process of consciousness and the attitudinal resultant of it which we share with the animal world and which is the basis of our own mental life, and ask “What in it is ‘real’?” we merely ask “What in it is cosmic fact or truth?” And further, it is clear that it is the (already described) *process* as a triune which is the truth or cosmic fact as that is gathered up in the final and resultant moment of the actualising in and for a subject — *i.e.*, the actualisate or object (thing).

There is no reality, no fact, no truth, no anything, if the fundamental process whereby alone anything can be for man is not itself a reality to begin with; nay more, if each moment in that process, *viz.*, subject, non-subject stimulus, and consciousness of non-subject are not all equally realities, facts, truths. The reality of plurals, infinite in number, no doubt gives us great trouble when we seek to construct a philosophy of our total experience, for philosophy always seeks The One. But we cannot help that: our philosophy has to adjust itself to facts; and, above all, to the fact of plurality. It is the "Being" in things that saves us from a plurality of mere adjectives, and this even while finite mind is yet on the sentient plane. In view of our future argument, it is necessary to dwell on this.

MEDITATION V.

BEING : Being as the One Ground of all Diversity—Being, Sole, One, and Universal—Being the Common Bond of Things—Attributes of Being—The word Phenomenon.

WE have seen that the fundamental fact of all experience and of the possibility of experience is subject-object—a synthesis of two (a factual synthesis not, *qua* synthesis, conscious)—a duality in which reflection finds the one element to be as real as the other. Object—the datum in sentience exists independently of the subject. What is the object as a somewhat, a reality? It is a permanent possibility, we are told, of setting up sensations or experiences in a subject! And what, then, is the subject? It is nothing save the sensational activities over again. Accordingly, object, *i.e.*, the world, is a permanent possibility of setting up sensations, and subject is a permanent possibility of sensational re-actions!

We are also told that the subject is not a “thing”; and, of course, a permanent possibility—the object, is not a “thing”. This follows from the fundamental explanation of experience as permanent possibilities. If neither subject nor object are “things,” then reality (derived from *res*) is in floating and disconnected sensations alone. In that case floating sensations are “things” only when they have been manipulated by

association and reflection. What is it that associates sensations? What is it that reflects? Whence Universals?

The mind of the ordinary man in the street reels in the attempt to realise to itself this doctrine as an explanation of experience. We cannot explain the external object by any one abstraction. You are to me a permanent possibility of sensation of course. But is this all you are? The question is, Granting that there are existences of some sort, what do these when they present themselves to me bring with them? I must listen to *all* they have to say, if I am to be fair to them. As composites in a "single" or as combinations in a "one," what do *they bring with them*, I repeat? *Inter alia*, they bring with them "being". They present themselves to me as "beings"; as Being One and Universal differentiated thus or thus, not as floating predicates or adjectives that have lost their way and have been caught in my net, as they were drifting aimlessly through space.

What then have we before us in the given presentation? Shapes and motions in every degree of relation and complexity, simplicity and subtlety. These touch a conscious subject and are at once lighted up to their full reality as objects *there* as well as *here* in the subject. The subject as conscious tells them what they are. All meanwhile, are individua: all are related in Space and Time.

I am confining myself to that which is given as object to the conscious attitudinal subject in the modality which we call the *realitas-phenomenon*. I have spoken of this as the Real. What is my title to do so? The

answer has been already given : it is the *Is* implicit in the presentate. It is phenomenon as *Being* which is the Real—Being as phenomenon. It is a concrete. And this not merely in a conscious subject, but objectively in the system of the universe as that is revealed in and for a conscious subject.

If, then, I am asked : “Is there any content in the concrete as *given* other than the shapes and characters and motions in which it presents itself to sense, and which are the matter and occasion of our predicates ?” Or, put it otherwise : “In the crisis of the ‘becoming’ of object for subject, is there any deliverance to the subject other than shapes and characters ?” The answer is, Yes,

There is BEING-IMMANENT.

The modality of experience—spatio-motor shapes and relations—are given to us as *being*. Space *is* and Time *is*, and both consequently are *realia* in so far as they are *beënt* phenomena. So with the pathic suggestions arising in our own organism. Each *is* : all *is*. This is the cardinal fact of all consciousness of the self or of the other. The thing presented *is* : it is *felt* to BE at the sentient stage of subjective mind : it is *perceived* and affirmed to BE at the reason-stage ; but it does not await the emergence of reason before becoming the content of attuent subject. In a sense it is true that Being is the lowest and barest category : in another sense it is ultimate reality and holds all the categories : and this fact of “being” is not merely the guarantee, but the truth, of reality : there is no other. Without it all vanishes into nothing or at best into “such stuff as dreams are made on”

How, now, do we acquire this fundamental unseen

fact? The attuent subject more or less clearly *feels* being in its own organism, and every object presented to it comes *laden with being* as at once ground and possibility of itself, and as the guarantee and reality of itself. It is the universal Ground and Implicate. It is not a logical abstraction, but a given empirical reality — *the* reality. It is received and felt.

In all phenomena as presented to me, Being, I say, is given. It is in them as their non-sensible reality, and it is also *in* the subject, which, however, first receives the fact and thrill of Being from the non-subject; for, until there is an "object" (extra-organic or intra-organic), the conscious subject is a mere potency of energies of a definite kind, and consequently asleep. The attitudinal subject feels Being as the bearer of subject and object, and of all that exists or can exist. It is not one more predicate of the object: it is in every predicate. It is the most immediate of immediates. Being is Ground of subject and object: it is the Whole, and it is every part, of experience. It is the one great fact. Save Being, there is no "substrate" of the whole or of the parts.

Nor is this my first acquaintance with Being. It is so many æons since I was a germ-subject and, as Pure Feeling, lived in communion with Being Unconditioned that I have almost forgotten it. But if I dig deep down into the strata that the tides of Time have laid down, I shall come to the bed-rock; and find that Unconditioned Being was my first experience; and my second was and is the same Being as now diverse and conditioned.

We can abstract Being, as we can abstract any experience, from all others. And as an abstract, Being

is, of course, predicateless. So it must be, as the Sole Universal—the Universal Positive, the Primal and eternal Ground—the first and last moment of the Absolute Whole. Being is not itself a predicate, and, consequently, it cannot be treated as *summum genus*. It is the ground and possibility of all predicates and all genera. I find the following sentence on page 127 of Professor A. S. Pringle-Pattison's *Hegelianism and Personality*: "It is not the category 'Being' of which we are in quest, but that reality of which all categories are only descriptions and which itself can only be experienced, immediately known or lived". That reality is, I submit, Being as it is here presented. Below this no man can go. All the actual and possible is simply Being thus or thus determined—Being clothed as with a garment. Being is the universal Noun-Verb of the Universe. Space is Being "othered" as a continuum of extension. Duration is Being exhibiting itself as a one infinite Protension of During in opposition to the succession of finite pluralities in sentience. The one-after-the-otherness of presentations along with the sub-conscious feeling of a protensive continuum, is Time. [I do not ask *how* Space and Time are effected in the cosmic system. Whatever physical antecedents they may have, the resultant here and now is Space and Time *as we sense them*.]

Accordingly, we are entitled to say that the Real in attuition is the phenomenal *as Being*, or rather, Being as appearing. Being is the one continuum; and each of the particulars which go to make up the complex whole of attuition also *are*; but they await discrimination by us as percipient energies.

And when the dialectic emerges, the conscious subject

perceives¹ and affirms Being (already in pure feeling and in sense) as in all and constituting the ground-reality of all—the Sole One. It is then, and only then, a “necessary” as well as a universal, because the opposite is unthinkable,—it is the synthetic condition of all feeling and of all thinking,—the primal and indestructible fact of all appearance and existence. The transitions which we see from one state of being to another are merely the Time and Space conditions peculiar to a finite experience. That is all. “Becoming” is itself Being—the Being of Becoming.

To conceive of Being as an innate idea or *a priori* category of the finite subject is the characteristic of an untenable dualism. As a conscious subject I awake out of potentiality into the feeling of Being—Being here and Being there. It is simply the universal fact of the parts and the whole, in which and of which I also exist as a fact and a factor. I am within the Universal. Each individual consciousness only “opens out a way” (to use a phrase of Browning’s) whereby the universal enters, to the extent of the potentiality of the individual subject, be it that of a mollusc or of a man.

It is this underlying feeling and fact of Being that first expands my narrow individuality until, ere long, it seems to embrace the immensity of God Himself. It is non-finite unconditioned ground, and also immanent holder, of the finite. It is not permitted that man

¹ Perceives, I say; but not as a sense-perception. Perceiving properly defined has nothing to do with sense: it is *act* of reason and involves judgment and affirmation. *As such* it transcends sense and the whole sphere of the attitudinal. (*See sequel.*)

should be other than universal even from the very first. Here in Being, he first encounters God and is widened and exalted. It contains the basis of sympathy not only with his kind but with all life, with all nature: All things breathe as one. And by Being-universal I mean, in the words of Aristotle, *τό ἀπλῶς ὄν*, or (if you please) the Substance of Spinoza, "that which is in itself and conceived through itself—that the conception of which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed". It is one, sole, unique in the diverse of experience. In realising this fact, Man is no longer a mere individual.

There is, then, no *ultimate* reality save Being: the phenomenon is real in so far as it is Being—it is the display of Being. I may separate them in thought, but they are nowhere separated in the system of things. I must accept what is given. The task of philosophy is to find what is given, clearly and distinctly to know it as given in and for attuition, and, thereafter, as given in and by Reason.

We ask for a Continuum: we have it always with us in every feeling and in every act of percipience: it is the Plenum: it is Being. Each thing, each ultimate part, is different from every other; but there is a continuity from the lowest to the highest: all is veritably One in Being. I cannot escape from this if I try ever so hard. That the profoundest thought to which Metaphysic can attain should all the while lie on the surface is strange. Men when they would "think," too often miss the obvious: the ultimate of ultimates is in the sphere of Feeling. The deepest and best is not far from any one of us.

The phenomenon, then, "as being" is the Real, because it *is*. By phenomenon I mean here all that is given in and to sense—the modality of Being-universal. The object, however, is not merely an aggregate of phenomenal particulars reposing in Being, as will appear when we rise to a higher plane of subjective mind. Meanwhile, let us accept the concrete presentation as reality—as revealing the truth of mysterious Being as alone it can be revealed on this plane of the absolute process.

In brief, the ultimate possibility of *my* experience is Mind as determined Being of a specific nature: the ultimate ground and possibility of *all* experience (subject and object) is Being undetermined.

To say that the "Whole is *alone* the Real" seems to me to darken counsel by an obvious proposition. Whether there be God or not, the Whole or The Absolute can alone be, in a sense, the Real; but we are not, therefore, to deny "reality" of any part of the finite manifestation. We want an explanation of the finite differences within The Absolute. Am I who feel and think not a Real?

Note that when I say that I cannot be aware of phenomena save as Being, this does not mean that Being as universal and immanent in the particular is the *cause* of the phenomenal. I am as yet on the attitudinal plane of mind and showing that phenomena are "reals" as Being—that Being is *in*, not behind phenomenon. But we shall in the sequel see that the true or full way of regarding a presentate is as a dialectic determinate of Being revealing its nature in sense-qualities and finite relations.

Being-Immanent as Sole One and Universal.—I have been speaking of Being in the diverse and particular; but there is more to be said, for I am in the awful presence of the primal synthetic necessary of all actual and possible things and thoughts.

In the concrete I find Being *here* in subject, and Being *there* in object, and Being everywhere as sole ground-universal of the system of things.¹ What is it that gives vitality to those mountain slopes save life itself as Being? This *feeling* of Being would seem to be predicted in the plant, if not indeed in germ already there: it is in the experience of the animal as a feeling being; it is in the consciousness of man as a feeling and as a sensing being—both in the feeling subject and in the content of the object; it reveals itself to his consciousness as that which *bears* phenomenal experience; and, thereafter, it is the primary affirmation in the dialectic act of percipience—which is this (as we shall find)—“‘*That*’ *there is*”; and finally, it is found to be the universal in every concrete—the one in the many, the identity in all differences. It is not a predicate or property of things, but itself the reality of all things. In the rock, the flowers and the stars it is Being which reveals itself to us.

In short, Being, in so far as it is an experience, is not only in both subject and object as the same identical Being, but as ultimate reality of both subject and object alike. Here, and here alone, we find the “substance”

¹ On the subjective side of the dualism of experience, we find *feeling* as the universal ground of all possible recipience and re-flexion of presentations—feeling which is itself, to begin with, indifferent and predicateless and whose object is indefinite Being. On the objective side we find Being as universal ground of all possible predicates—itself predicateless.

of the *realitas-phenomenon* and of all things, man included. There is no other "substance".

The same continuum of Being is, I say, there and here and everywhere. No break of continuity between object and subject, or things generally, is possible. So far, All is One. The consciousness I have of myself is a consciousness of Being, the feeling an animal has of itself is a feeling of Being, the feeling which animal and man alike have of the non-subject is a feeling of Being. It is immediate as ground of all: it may be said to be mediated, at the stage of Sense, through the finite, but this only because it is "given" in and with the finite.

Wherever I have a sense-experience presented to me as a complex of predicates, I can, by an act of Will, isolate each and look at it by itself. That tree, its colour, its many leaves, its motion as it waves in the breeze, are, each and all, realities—"kinds" of Being. They would not be so, were they not at once Being and Qualification in a union which thought alone is competent to separate. I abstract the qualification and try to look at it; it vanishes into nothing except in so far as it *is*. I abstract Being and leave it naked of determination: still it *is* in consciousness. Being equals Being. It is the sole pure affirmation. Phenomenal forms have vanished, but Being remains; for it is not a logical abstract: it is not an abstract at all. It is the one Real. It still lives—the self-identical condition and ground of the possible in determination—the verb-noun of the adjectival universe.

Determination without Being is an impossible consciousness: Being without determination is—Being. I cannot see it, I cannot figure it, I cannot as yet in any

way discern a positive quality in it. To do so, I would have to convert Being into the phenomenal of difference, quality, determination, in and by which it presents itself to me. To do so would be ultroneously to destroy a "pure" experience at the very moment I have gained it for myself—a wilful and perverse procedure. Being is Nothing, only in the sense that it is no—"thing," no determination.¹

Lotze says (apropos of Herbart) that being, if simply posited, cannot be brought into relation with the facts of the universe—the system. But one has only to look straight to see that Being is given already in, and in the realisation of, these facts—as constituting the ground of these facts, the sole continuum. True, I may not be able to bring this Being into relation with the system in the sense of showing the *how* of the relation. This, however, I know, that I feel Being immediately as prius of all determination, and also feel (and subsequently know) it as in and through the determined—the system of things. Being is not that system, however, though it is the ultimate reality of it. The fact of the interpenetration of the non-finite (Being) and the finite (Determination) is *given* (Being and not-Being); and these, not as two contradictorily opposed notions, but as in mutual traffic with each other; conciliated contraries, not contradictions.

Facts are one thing : an attempted explanation which

¹ Lotze says : "The Being which on the evidence of sensation we ascribe to things consists in absolutely nothing else than the fact of their being felt". But yet he says Being is independent of our recognition of it. There is surely contradiction here. The recognition of Being is of Being *there* in things. The feeling of Being is not simply a "feeling" and nothing more.

will show the "how" of conciliation and reduce all to unity is quite another.

Being is the Common Bond.—In any cosmical synthesis, then, I must be allowed, following the humble empirical method of a Natural Realist, to start with this fact of Being—Being objective, universal, and implicitly containing (potentially being) the whole realm of the possible and actual—subject and object. There is no hypothesis here; no result acquired by a process of analogy or of inference: we are in presence of the sole reality though we behold it as yet in the slumber of potentiality—*sola et unica substantia*. Being, to recall an ancient thinker, never *was* and never *will be* but always *is* undividedly present, everywhere self-identical as the continuum which holds all things together—the one in difference. I differ from you and from a tree or a stone, but we are all alike: we are one with a difference. It is this feeling of Being as a one and continuum, I have said, that is at the root of our joy in all the forms of nature. We see the "One" of our differing selves, and there is a joy in this large, this infinite, kinship. The ultimate ground of all sympathy, cosmic or personal, is fellowship in a One of Being. And where there are many existences alike in their differences from all else, like draws to like, as in herds of cattle, flocks of birds, shoals of fish, communities of men; that is to say, the community of Being (sympathy) is irresistible. The universal One-ness is intensified by the addition of every difference in which a class of existences are alike. We rational beings not only *feel* this, but (unlike the animals) we perceive it and affirm it. Hence it is that your self is my self, and

that there is in truth but one Human Self prior to, and at the basis of, the individuality and personality of each.

Prior to the emergence in a conscious subject of the active dialectic which analyses and abstracts and synthesises, I could not be aware of this Being so as to *affirm* it. In the sensational or attitudinal consciousness of presentations it is only sensed. The discriminative activity of the dialectic brings into explicitness and affirmation the implicit fact. It may be true that, in the operations of active reason, I get down to the universal fact by stripping the subject of its phenomenal presentations and reducing it to indifference, and by similarly stripping the object or datum of its predicates or differentiates; but I am getting down only to what I *already have and must have in prior sentience immediately*.

Being, then, is the sole ultimate Reality—*unica, sola, et universalis*. There is, and there can be, nothing save Being and its predicates in the large sense of Attributes, Forms and Modes. Were Being itself a predicate, the universe, it is clear, would be a conglomeration of isolated beings; and all relation, all community, would be impossible. Nay more, were Being a predicate, we should be *compelled* to demand the being of this Being. Were there, on the other hand, no predicates there would be only a silent "One". The universe of sentience, then, is the concrete of Being and Predicates. In other words, the content of the presentation in experience is not only the *a posteriori* categories—phenomenon, but Being as ground of their possibility and as their ultimate Reality.

Attributes of Being.—Are there, now, any predicates in or of Being which, as non-phenomenal, are universal in all possible phenomena and necessary to the constitution

of an ordered world and a rational experience? I think there are. For, when I interrogate experience it seems to me that, while Being, relatively to itself, can only be spoken of as Being and is predicateless, yet, *in its opposed relation to the finite other*, it reveals many attributes. I call them "attributes" because they are not *of* it but *in* it and convertible with it: (1) It is universal; (2) It is one; (3) It is continuous; (4) It is permanent; (5) It is absoluto-infinite, and the *prius* of predication; (6) It is ultimate ground and source of the possibility of all things that exist, including mind as well as (so-called) matter—the "Potential" of the existent. In relation to our experience it is the One on which the Many rests, the great affirmation of which the finite is the negation, the continuous where all is diverse, the sole self-identical in the flux of existence—the ultimate reality of, and in, the Concrete Total.

These are not predicates in the ordinary sense, nor yet properties: they are mediated through finite predicates as being the negation of these predicates, and they are to be designated as "attributes," for without them Being would not be Being.

There is no other "substance" than Being, no other support for wandering adjectives; and is it not enough? or must we have one more big adjective which shall be "High-master" of the others? The concrete phenomenon *is* by virtue of that which is *not* phenomenon. If Being, too, were phenomenon, we should have to seek a ground for *it*.

I would not dwell so much on Being were it not that an adequate apprehension of the primal and basal fact of Being seems to point the way to the simplifying, if

not the resolving, of some questions. Most of our difficulties arise from our restricting our view to the phenomenon in its abstractness as phenomenon. There, of course, we find never-ending flux and the unsolvable problem of identity. There we find the contradiction of the individuum and continuum: there we find the infinitely finite of continuity and discreteness. But if we grasp the Object in its concrete totality as resting in all-pervasive, all-sustaining Being, we may cease to trouble ourselves about material substance: if we grasp Being in its oneness of continuity we may cease to trouble ourselves about material continuity (which would, of course, make the atom impossible), for we now have non-material continuity of Being in which the atom (whether static or dynamic) is a possible conception; for the "many" in a unity of differences is truly a one continuum of Being. Objective Time itself, as a succession of presentations, is a succession in and through the continuum of Being—the successions are the pulsations of Being; and without this conception the experience of succession could never yield Time as an objective fact. Successive movements are but the pulse-beats of the Being-continuum, in itself timeless; and these pulse-beats, in turn, are inconceivable save in and through a finite series. Then, as regards subject and object: they are One in Being, but neither is thereby cancelled. The object is not x clothed by a formative α (the subject): it is not α as a process projected (I speak of finite subject): it is not $x + y$ (the subject) nor $x \times y$ (the subject); but simply b an external reality presented to and "becoming" in and for α , which also, cosmically viewed, is an external reality, but relatively to b an internality. A and B are not mutually

exclusive contradictions, but contraries ; not antagonisms but oppositions in a One.

The atomistic doctrine of subject and object thus disappears ; but none the less is there duality, nay, dualism, as form of existence. It has been the recoil from this atomism which has led to untenable theories. There is One Being in which and out of which all differences arise, including the supreme opposition of subject and object. All are one in Being ; but that "moment" of the vast cosmic movement, in which and of which we are, is what naive realism says it is. One Being lives through the "many" of itself : it never loses its oneness. "Becoming" is conceivable only as in identity with the One of Being.

The Word Phenomenon.—To a few it may seem a contradictory thing to say that the "phenomenon is" ; but this is because they first read unreality into the word phenomenon as opposed to some true reality or other. The external must always be to a finite consciousness as sentient, a system of predicates. If you regard them as a mob of predicates flying about and held bound by nothing, the unreality is obvious enough. But take them as actually and concretely given as rooted in Being, and their unreality at once disappears. To some, on the other hand, it would appear that there is nothing real save qualities and predicates. These men may be said to be outside philosophy. They cannot see and handle Being, and therefore, to them, Being is not.

To speak, then, of the phenomenon—the static and dynamic of sense-experience—as an illusion, is false ; to speak of it as a picture thrown on a screen is a misleading analogical illustration ; to speak of it as the

parallel of Mind demands two independent beings which cannot communicate ; to speak of it as sign or symbol or metaphor or adumbration, would seem a weak evasion. These ways of speaking may serve rhetorically to emphasise the phenomenon in its abstractness *qua* phenomenon or predication : but there is no such phenomenon *given* : what is given is phenomenon-being—a contradiction (so-called), but yet the mode of all Reality : a contradiction, however, which is only appearance, and, when closely looked at, passes into mere opposition or contrariness.

In short, the term “phenomenon” to denote the characteristics of the Real as given in and to sense or feeling, is a very apt one, if we do not import into it a theory of knowledge which reduces it to mere *Schein*. The Truth for Man is simply the Actual there before him as it presents itself first to Feeling and subsequently to Reason (Thought). The reality of phenomenon is guaranteed by the “being” of phenomenon. It is *given* to us as being ; it is subsequently *affirmed* by us as being.

Phenomenon, then, is Being existent ; it is the true expression or utterance of the ultimately real ; it is the sense-form of the ultimately real—the finite way in which the ultimately real finds its own externalisation, and it is to be received by us with wonder and gratitude as the revelation of God in Space and Time. Because I can abstract the beautiful and subtle expressions of a countenance from the soul behind it, the physical expression is none the less a reality as the very way by which I penetrate to the living spirit and as having all the reality of that spirit ? So also, the highest utterance of the prophet comes to us through sensible signs, which

signs are the thought they convey, only now in sense-forms. • In themselves they are merely “articulated air”

I have not been speaking of the whole of presentation as in a *rational* consciousness ; but only of object in sentience as attuition. The primary actualisation within a conscious subject is a complex concrete, in which much more will be discerned as implicit when we rise to the dialectic plane of mind. When we have found the *Whole*, it is only then that we shall have found THE ACTUAL. We then shall “know” ; and not till then. We shall know the “thing,” that is to say, as regards not only its universal modality, but also in its beënt form or dialectic ; and, if we could reach, under these universals, a complete and coherent statement of experience, we should, perhaps, round the knowledge of our sphere of Being within the Absolute Whole, and achieve for thought an Absolute Synthesis.

Meanwhile, we may sum up our gains. We find the Feeling of Absolute Unconditioned Being at the root of finite subject ; and, at the stage of sentience, we see it pass into finite differences as immanent in these—the world of plurality. We find in that phenomenal plurality the same One Being as now immanent reality of all that exists or can exist. There is, it may be said, a suggestion of mysticism in these things, and, in truth, there is an affinity between Mysticism and Natural Realism. But with a kindly and perhaps too sympathetic hand, I would waive aside the mystic ; for he lives in a dreamy world ; and if he would only take a step further in the analysis of experience, he would find that the God he seeks does not dream, and that if his aim is to be one with God, he must bestir himself.

MEDITATION VI.

PHENOMENON : Phenomenon as Concrete *is* ; as Abstract is *not*—
Negation as giving individuality and independence — The
Phenomenon as a revelation of Absolute Being through Nega-
tion—Matter—Monistic Pantheism.

THE word phenomenon which we have inherited means appearance, and it connotes the conviction that sense-experience, and indeed all other experience of man, in so far as given, is not the whole of the reality before him. Presentation and presentate are words that beg no question ; but when we ask what is precisely given in a presentate of sense, we are compelled to take the whole or none. The whole is the various qualities with which the presentate comes to us laden, and which belong to the category of Phenomenon ; but there is something more which they bring into consciousness, and that something more, as we have seen, is Being. Phenomenon is a concrete of qualities in and of Being. That a “reality” is thereby constituted means that the presentate is not only an object, but objectively existing—that is to say, a fact in the cosmic system independent of the subject which is conscious of it.

(I am still speaking of the presentate as in the attuent consciousness.)

Each stage of evolving mind has its object as given, and every ascending stage of mind carries the lower

with it. Even in contemplating the diverse of presentation, the subject is aware of Unconditioned Being deep down (when at the reflective stage it looks for it), and it carries that Feeling into the presentation as now conditioned Being—Being immanent in all differences.

Being in itself has, at this stage of finite mind, no differences save as revealed phenomenally. It is one, unique, simple, universal, while penetrating and sustaining its phenomenal externalisation. It thus reveals its nature, but remains one with itself. Were it not One with itself through all phenomenal differences, it would have to be regarded as differencing *itself*; and this differencing, whatever form it took, would be “other” than Being, though containing it. And this is just what seems to happen, but not as differences within Being, but differences revealing Being.

Being contains no positive and constitutive finite predicates save as phenomenon. Its *full* reality is in its modality; just as the reality of the modality is in Being.

It seems to me to be a tautology to say that the One of Being can difference itself only as a finite other. The infinite series of diversities are, relatively to each other, finite; but, first of all, they are finite and many in relation to the Infinite One of Being. Thus are we brought face to face with the fundamental contradiction in our experience—the One *and* the Many as constitutive of a single Whole. This contradiction cannot be resolved on the attuent plane. The dialectic (as we shall see) resolves it to thought in so far as it reveals the One *in* the Many; although we can never penetrate to the “How” of the phenomenal process.

This, however, we may now see clearly, that the finite

diverse is a negation of the One of Being. The One of Being can exist or externalise itself only in its own Negation. To think the phenomenal *as such* is to think nothing; for it is always given as a concrete, *viz.*, Being-phenomenon. The concrete, *as* phenomenon, contains Negation—Negation of Being as ground of the possibility of phenomenon. The finite is the negation of the non-finite. Our difficulties, accordingly, seem to increase; for we have before us in the given of presentation a negating finite—negating the positive non-finite of Being, just as we have the many negating the One of Being.

This character of negation in the phenomenal finite is the non-being of the Greeks, but it is not to be disposed of by this phrase. For the negation is there as possibility of the finite; but note, *it is there*. In other words, the Absolute Whole *contains* negation as the possibility of the appearance of finites. Each “thing” is thus a synthesis of Being and not-Being in a concrete.

Now as regards these contradictions: while it would be presumptuous in me to say that I can solve them, it is not presumptuous to say that I accept them and try to interpret their significance within the plane of evolving mind on which I, a man, stand, by bringing them to the bar of a higher plane of mind: which, however, we have not yet reached in our argument.

The One of Being, let us then now carefully note, can appear as a pluralism only through that which is its negation. The principle or fact of negation makes the finite possible, and all phenomenal forms are, as abstracts, negation or nil; but yet they *are*, because they *be*. They are the “other” of universal Being; and to be the

“other” is to be not the “same”. As not the same, ‘as diverse and finite, they are negation. Being can appear only as that which is not itself; and yet the not-itself *is*. The reality of the presentate, then, lies in the synthesised conflict of being and non-being. The negation *is*. This is, I think, the fundamental contradiction in our experience.

Negation of Being is to be regarded as a metaphysical principle, like Being itself. But Being as ground of all is ground of its own negation, and negation itself cannot be *except as Beent*. Being is *in* negation and negation is *within* the Absolute Movement: it is, consequently, to be strictly called a contrary or opposition, not a contradiction, of Being.

In attuiting the world in which we are placed, this negation presents itself to us as diverse shapes and motions separated in Space and Time. Each individuum negates all others, while it, also and above all, negates the One of Being. Thus, and not otherwise, does the One of Being exhibit its modal characters. We ourselves are *within* the evolving process; and, accordingly, the beent negation presents itself to us as, first of all, a world of Space and Motion. Things through diversity and individuality are alone possible: through diversity and individuality they are alone thinkable by us. Negation, I say, is a moment within the Absolute Synthesis; nor can I see any difficulty in realising to thought a world of oppositions to a One from which they are never set free, though each is centre of its own activity. By emphasising finitude, we create a contradiction which seems unreconcilable, but which melts before our eyes when we rise to the beholding of the finite as rooted in Being—the non-finite One.

I seem to be making a great deal of the obvious, but the exposition of the obvious may possibly yield the fundamental.

The concrete phenomenon, then, it would appear, "is" and "is not". It may be plausibly urged that we make free with "contradictories" inasmuch as Yes and No, when said of the same thing, is usually held to dispose of an argument by reducing it to absurdity, when it suits us so to use the principle of contradiction. "Yes" cannot be at the same time and the same place and same relation "No," because the "No" is excluded by the identity of "Yes". So with analytic judgments generally. Such contradictions, if admitted to be valid, paralyse thinking. I cannot in the same breath affirm an identity and negate it, relatively to that identity. When, however, I say the "phenomenon is" and emphasise the term "phenomenon," I do not negate Being relatively to itself or to its own identity, as if I said "Being is not Being". I negate Being by the "other" of itself, which is yet within itself. And when, again, I emphasise the term "is" I negate phenomenon, not relatively to itself or its own identity, but relatively to the "other" of itself, or rather the ground in which it inheres, *viz.*, Being, of which "the other" is an unveiling. The affirmation and negation are one in a third identity—the concrete thing. They are conciliated as a reality there before me. So, *e.g.*, in the oneness of a physical law; its identity, as it appears in numberless sensible shapes, is conciliated with the particular. The "how" of the union of contradictories in a third identity we cannot explain until we know the Absolute Whole; which we cannot know. We must be content to get down to the actual facts of experience and hold by

them. It is correct to say that the "other" of Being is inasmuch as it is "Other". It is only as phenomenal *abstract* that the Other is the contradictory or negation of Being to thought.

Note.—In the contemplation of diverse singles, we see that every presentation establishes its own identity by negation. It is itself by virtue of not only being itself, but of its being *not* other things. The act of percipience at the dialectic stage of mind will more fully reveal this. In each particular percept the "is" may be said to be constituted by the "is-not"; but this does not mean that "is-not" is constitutive of the "is" of a percept as an actual; but only that the "is-not" is constitutive of the *possibility* of the "is"—an important distinction sometimes overlooked. The affirmation of an object is an *affirmation* in and through negation. Affirmation of a positive "somewhat" is the "end" of the percipient movement as we shall see; but this positive, whether as an affirmation of finite reason or as an actual in the objective system, cannot sustain itself save through its negative relations. That is all.

Matter and Monistic Pantheism.—I have presented to me then beent phenomenon. What then and where is "Matter"? The physicist seeks for its genesis and its primordial nature when he seeks for the "Atom," but he is in his pronouncements more speculative than the metaphysician. The latter, however, has his own difficulties. He sees God in all things, and sums up what he calls "Matter" in the *a posteriori* categories. But these are to him merely adjectives, and are to be regarded as the way whereby Absolute Being reveals itself to itself and to us. This, however, is too easy

a solution : it does not explain the diverse plurality of individuals. "God *in* all things" has been translated into "God *as* all things" and we have Pantheism. The hold, which we and all other particular existences have on Being and reality, will not permit this large and sweeping solution. Given infinite Absolute Being, the diverse is finite and, as such, negates its source. Through negation it is resistant and individual. These phenomenal individuals we see acting, each from its own centre, by ways and processes which are fixed and produce an ordered system of pluralities. The ways and processes we call Laws, and they have the fixity of fate and seem regardless of man, and his needs and desires. Without the principle of Negation, the finite and individual are unintelligible. The metaphysician, then, must retrace his steps, and, casting aside "God *as* all things," he must return to the formula "God *in* all things," and he must add, "these 'things' and their laws being the negation of Absolute Being". The life or externalisation of Absolute Being is, as a matter of fact, in and through Its own Negation. The phenomenon or predicate thus negates Being, while Being affirms *it*. It is a contingent, hanging on necessary Being. It is not merely the passive vehicle for the manifestation of Being in so far as it *is*, but, through the fact of negation, it holds its own and re-acts on Being. There is a ceaseless flux and re-flux of Being and of negation in the modality. And not only does negation react on Being ; but, as beënt negation, or concrete phenomenon, it *acts* in the system of things as from its own centre. It acts as one body on another body ; and, further, it acts on Being itself, since it holds the negating and resisting condition whereby Being can become an external and

finite. "That," says Heraclitus, "which strives against another supports itself." The whole externalisation is primarily negation of Being-universal. Through the *a posteriori* (so-called by us) or modal categories, accordingly, Being reveals its truth through that which is itself, while yet not itself. Through this modality God reaches me who am within the system as a self-conscious other of Him; indeed, the supreme negation of Him. And yet, because the ground-moment is continuous Being and the phenomenon can be only *as* Being, its activity, though it *seem* to start from its own negation-centre, is essentially derivative and contingent activity. Derivative; because it (phenomenon or predicate system) exists at all only in so far as it *is* the very Being which it turns upon and even holds in a kind of bondage, while at the same time it makes the life of Being possible as a Many. This inner contradiction may be unsolvable; but the obvious fact seems to me to be capable of only this form of expression. But let us remember that negation is not set up against Being, but is in and of and within Being. All is One.

The phenomenon, accordingly, as *negation*, has its own rights—laws of existence. These operate, often to our dismay, in limiting the possible range of Being as determined (of which hereafter); and, further, in fulfilling their own laws of growth, decay, evil and death. In these we have the mechanism of Nature. The infinite aggregate of individua could not exist, and, once existing, could not cease to exist, we might say, did they not hold the principle and fact of negation in them. And yet, let me repeat, this negation is itself rendered possible by the fact of Being immanent in the negation. It is a "not" *within* the Absolute: it is a *posited* negation.

This is the supreme contradiction in finite thought : it is the system within which we exist : it is The Real for man ; and he must make the best of it.

What we call Matter, then, is more than an illusory manifestation of universal Mind ; more than a parallel or concomitant of mind ; more than a metaphor. These words and phrases serve well enough to emphasise, by way of contrast, being and mind as logical *prius* and root-reality of the concrete presentation. But they seem to drag matter at the heels of mind, so to speak, and to give it a position of nothingness with which it will not be content. We forget that the negation has its source and sustainer in Being. It is a necessary moment in the Absolute as we have it—necessary to make the finite possible and is very far from being an empty show, a shadow on the wall. *It is the first moment in the cosmic actualising of God*, and it is of infinite significance in our system. This dependent independence, which we call Nature and Man, is at the same time the symbolic utterance of the Divine Nature. It is Absolute Being displayed in Time and Space under the conditions on which that display was alone possible.

A true synthesis thus yields us the two moments—the Noumenal and the Negation in the phenomenal as together constituting concrete Reality. If we exclude the former, we fall into the mechanical materialism of a hard, necessary and relentless nature, which, yet, has the strange power of throwing out from itself the peculiar illusion of self-conscious mind as a kind of summer lightning, and which is essentially non-significant in the scheme of things. True, this mind has the remarkable characteristic of knowing what “matter”

is doing, accompanied by the illusion that it, as an individual, is over against matter and has the function of self-regulation. These illusions, however, are all in the interest of the big matter-machine which goes crashing and crushing on its way to an apotheosis of conflagration, in which the iron of its remorseless wheels will be tempered for a fresh run.

• If, again, we exclude the phenomenal as negation and deny it its rights, we find ourselves involved in monistic Pantheism in which all forms, shapes, and individualities are, not the reflection or “othering” of a Divine One (though they have been so called), but the very *modus essendi* of that One. The earth and the fulness thereof, along with the mind of man, are only the Being and dialectic of Absolute Mind made visible to Itself, and to all other consciousnesses in their degree : they are not symbols but the *express self* of Being and the dialectic—constitutive of it. The One is externalised as space and time and as individuals (conscious, unconscious and self-conscious), merely “for the glory” of the One, that is to say, as its manner of being : and we ourselves but repeat, as finite minds, the movements in and of Sole Being ; and are, consequently, but passing shows. This monism is, doubtless, a truer record of our experience than the phenomenalistic ; but it does not satisfy the conditions of the problem. For, if we thus omit the “not” in the absolute synthesis and fail to recognise the negation of Universal Being in the externalisation, and the consequent re-active and active energy of sense-presentates as a system of individuals, we then have simply mind or dialectic put in the place of matter and energy : all we gain is the substitution of mind-mechanism for matter-mechanism.

There can in that case be no explanation, which is not illusory, of the individuality of atom or man. For individuality lies in the resistance to a universal movement, and the negation of the One of Being is the form of individuality generally. A One which is conceived *as* the "Many" and a process in the Many cancels the individuality of things; nay, it would appear to cancel also its own Sole Oneness by being converted into an aggregate of particulars.

The world of our experience, then, is given to sentience as a *beënt negation* in the modes of quantity, motion, quality, degree, and so forth. It is a *Realitas*-phenomenon just as it lies there before us in this our own sphere of the universal and divine movement.

It would appear that we have only been putting into words a very simple position: we have been using the term "phenomenon" in its ordinary and popular sense; for the word contains in it the thought of shapes and forms as the "appearance" of that which has neither shape nor form. It is a *beënt appearance*—and therefore Reality. That sunset is the manner of the Divine existence on this man-plane of Universal Being, and yet it contains the negation of that Being; and I, a man, see it as it veritably is on this plane.

Although in the metaphysical account of "matter" we seem to have saved ourselves from Pantheism, the position is not wholly satisfactory; for negation and phenomenon might be the mere emanation—flux and reflux of Absolute Being. If the world be an emanation from Absolute Being as Monistic Pantheism would have it, Absolute Being is *as* things, and not merely *in* things that have a quasi-independence. And so far as

reflection on the data of the attitudinal plane of mind is concerned, it might be so. And if it be so, the Absolute Whole may just as well be a Democritic accident or a blind Force for all man cares. On the highest plane of subjective mind we shall look for some better solution.

Meanwhile, I hold by the unseen universals which I believe are given to me on the planes of feeling and attuition, *viz.*, Absolute Unconditioned Being as immanent in the phenomenal diverse; and Negation as the method whereby a finite world is possible.¹

¹ All this while, let it be remembered, we are considering the attitudinal plane of mind, and see nothing but being and diverse appearances that contain being: there is as yet neither will, nor cause and effect, nor purpose, nor law, nor reason in any form.

MEDITATION VII.

OBJECT AND SUBJECT AS "RELATED": (a) Natural Realism—the point of view, (b) Relatedness and Relativity; (c) Body of Mind and Phenomenal Continuity; (d) Disparateness of Subject and Object, (e) Ideologism; (f) Repetition of point of view; (g) Unifying by the Attuent Consciousness; (h) Absolute Knowledge, (i) Attuition of the Object as relations.

(a) NATURAL REALISM.

OF this there can be no doubt—that mind *on the attitudinal plane* makes a definite pronouncement as to the dualism of subject and object—the externality and independence of finite phenomenal plurals. Not independent in the sense in which the naive mind regards them, for as we have seen there is only one reality—one independent Being, sole and universal, sustaining and guaranteeing the substantiality of an infinite universe of individuals. Let us now look more closely at subject-object in their relatedness.

The finite subject as a sentient entity (we have seen) receives and reflexes, and *eo actu* absorbs or assimilates, an object as an external independent reality, *i.e.*, independent of the subject and of all other objects. I say *eo actu*, for the recipient subject—attitudinal consciousness, is not passive. It could not reflex and absorb, if it were purely passive. For the growth of the real in

the animal and attitudinal mind is by way of activity, assimilation, absorption, association; but this activity is not the activity of spontaneity which is the note of reason alone. Mere organic activity is not spontaneity. Even animal desire moving towards the object of its satisfaction is not spontaneity: it is appetite, or, at best, orectivity or conation. The word "spontaneity" is to be reserved for pure Will (*see sequel*). The result of activity in the animal, and in man in so far as attitudinal, is a dynamical result—a resultant of mental and nerve reflexes in and through the said conscious subject, but not *by* it.

The conscious subject is thus the last and highest term in a one system, and to the extent of its potency and range, receives and affirms the non-subject precisely as it exists "for-itself" there outside, in so far as it sees it clearly and distinctly. It matters not to my argument by what movements, signs and indications, physiological and psychological, the object identifies itself with the subject as its content. These are trivial considerations.

The point of view, then, from which I advocate Natural Realism is this: The general presentation to consciousness is a whole of inter-related diverse entities which find their truth *in the last term of a continuous and unbroken system*; that is to say, as presented to conscious subject which makes its appearance, in the evolution of the world-organism, for the mere purpose (so to speak) of gathering up the universal record into itself as that record is *therein* written: man himself being the concluding chapter of that record—the individual into whom the whole is poured.

The above I believe to be the naïve presumption of finite mind; and it is "natural realism" as I render it

to myself. It is also dualism (or pluralism),—not a dualism of antagonism and separation of subject and object, but a dualism which takes account of both as factors in a *one* whole of system-subject-object.

And yet, while the object exists as I see it out there, I do not see it as it exists in those total relations which may be called its absoluteness. For I am on a certain plane of mind ; in other words within a system which is only a circle within the infinite and absolute sphere of Absolute Being as creative. The formula consequently is, “The thing is as I see it,” not “I see the thing as it is”.

It may be said the above dogmatic utterance is merely a theory of objectivity, not of external reality, of duality not of dualism : to which I answer that presentates external and independent of subject are *given* in sentience (and, thereafter, affirmed in reason-percipient), and further, that they are given as beënt and as negating subject and all else. Each is a “for-itself”. The primary centralisation in consciousness is a synthesis of *negating* object and subject.

(b) RELATEDNESS AND RELATIVITY.

The datum in Sense is there, I say, as an existent reality. The “for-itself being” of the object *there* is precisely its being *here* in and for me. It does not receive its modality from subject, any more than my conscious subject, in so far as it is a real entity, depends for its entitative reality on the object. And yet, it is in and through the conscious subject, as the last term of a series of relations, that the external system has its truth (or completed being) revealed for itself as well as in and for me. The object, in short, completes itself as a reality in me through a series of processes outside my body and inside my body ; but *it*

is not itself a "relation" either in its totality or its parts; much less is it "relative" in the banal sense.

Each individual thing sustains its own reality as an individuum through its positive and negative relations, inner (*i.e.*, within the complex thing or object) and outer (*i.e.*, to other things and to the system of which it is a part). The relations do not constitute it. It is through the affirmation in and of a "specific thing" that the relations of this or that "thing" are determined. And just as each thing has, for its aim, itself and not another thing, so the object, generally, has for its aim itself as a reality and not any other thing, in proceeding to "relate itself" to, or rather let us say, to *become for*, finite mind. The subject as attitudinal contributes nothing save the potentiality of recipience and the synchronous reflexion of the receipt back into the field of non-subject, whence it came. The shapes or *modi* of the content of the subject are the shapes and *modi* of the object as given to subject and absorbed by it. It is just at this crisis that the object attains its full phenomenal "reality". In reaching the conscious subject, the object fulfils *itself* for itself, and for subject. It *names* itself in Sense. But meanwhile the conscious subject is not a blank sheet of paper; it is a potency within which sleep all the categories of the sensible universe awaiting the call of the non-subject. All is in phenomenal and ontological continuity. Knowledge of the Absolute, that is to say, Absolute Knowledge in the sense of our being conscious of the ultimate of the *realitas-phenomenon* as that has relations in the Absolute Whole and its roots in Absolute Being, is impossible for man: but absolute knowledge in the sense of true knowledge, *within a system and of that system*, is his right and privilege. In short, he may have an absolute

knowledge of the related system within which he is ; and, consequently, the datum, as reflexed, is truly *that system* as it exists on this mind-plane of the Absolute Whole.

(c) THE BODY OF MIND AND PHENOMENAL CONTINUITY.

It is obvious enough that the conscious subject is involved in a phenomenal body which is to the subject an object-thing, like anything else. It is aware of that body and of the relations of other bodies to it. The related external, then, by which I mean the total system, is a system of *which my body is a part*. My body is in *physical continuity* with the rest of nature and falls within its processes. All my experiences, in so far as they are feelings in outer or inner sense, are given in and through this body. The conscious subject (which is Universal Mind that has reached the stage of individualising itself) evolves reason or the dialectic on the top of this world of sensibility as we shall afterwards see ; but it is limited as regards its "matter" by its receptivity ; except in so far as it is matter to itself, and in so far as the dialectic process may admit it to fresh "matter". In short, the conscious subject, *as merely attitudinal*, is itself a part of the natural system within which it finds itself. Its range is determined ; and, as determined, it is limited quantitatively and qualitatively, by the body, and to that which body delivers to it in consciousness. The potentialities of recipience and re-flexion in the subject are, however, equal to the task of absorbing all possible presentations within the system which are necessary to its fulfilment as a subject entity. Finite mind at this stage may be described as dynamical potency reflected into itself ; but yet it is equal to its position in The Absolute Whole.

What I mean by "the Real" is the total sentient content—all that a man feels or can feel, be it stars, or sunsets, or a pain in his own bodily system. For example, I see a cloud. That is to say, I am conscious of an object at a distance which is extended, localised, configurated, coloured and of a certain mass. That object reaches my body after a process, or rather an infinite number of processes, in external nature, and, having got as far as my body, passes into it, the said body being in *continuity with the system*, and itself *of* the system. Being *here* is in continuity with Being *there*; and, after countless further processes within the body, the external object reaches certain nerve (physical) terminals, and at this point it flashes into subject as consciousness, not of a sensation or idea, but of an "object" (the cloud). "How" this happens, nobody knows or ever (I suppose) will know. We only can mark the essential characters of the operation as recipience and re-flexion in and through an individual finite mind. The process does not invalidate the cloud in the sky or in any way tamper with it. On the contrary, the process exists *for the very purpose* of presenting that cloud as I see it, to subject as conscious. The cloud exists externally and independently just as it appears in consciousness. We talk of the "relation" of subject and object, but we are under the influence of the spatial condition of Sense, and also ignore our own body, when we so speak. For while the object is the cloud out *there*, the object to conscious subject is always the resultant of a physical process in the nerve terminals: and this *so*, that even the more precise word "relatedness" is not applicable to the transition of this phenomenal resultant into subject and its re-flexion into the external,

save in a popular way of speaking. The object *turns over* into subject which, as feeling, re-acts and appropriates. That is all. It is the phenomenal resultant that is the Real of Sense. The cloud, then, is just there as I see it—colour and all: Why not? What is wrong with it? I am *within* the related system—both as a body and as a conscious subject, and the facts and acts *within this system* exist as they appear to exist. The (so-called) secondary qualities of objects are as much “my Real” as Space and Time are. When physics has said its last word about that cloud as a dynamical system of molecules and vibrations, that too I shall be aware of only as “related” to conscious subject; and it will be as much “relative” as the cloud in all its summer beauty as seen by the eye of child or poet: that is to say not “relative” at all.

This, after all, it may be said, is also a doctrine of relativity. Not so; it affirms only the relatedness involved in the existence of two which become one. And I possess the objective truth as that exists *within a system*—my system; and moreover, this system just as I see it is a veritable factor or moment in the externalised life of Absolute Being. The *system contains me*. I do not like to say subject is object and object is subject lest I should be misunderstood; but, in truth, the subject, in so far as it is a Real and not a mere entitative potency, is a Real by virtue of the object as reflected into it; and the object, again, attains to its fulness and completion in the system to which we both belong only in the subject. There is more than an equation: there is an identity in difference. Any other doctrine is based on an untenable dualism which splits the world of experience into two halves that may, or may not, fit.

In brief, Man is the "Absolute" of his own system; or, to put it otherwise, he sees the reality and truth of his plane of universal being, as soon as he sees clearly and distinctly. Conceive a spiral stair—one round of which man occupies. Its base is in the infinite of unconditioned Being, its summit is lost in the infinite of the externalised finite. Man's position yields to him the truth and reality and fact of his own round; yields, moreover, the basal thought of absoluto-infinite Being out of which all comes, and also legitimate deductions as to that which disappears in the ascending spirals which are lost in the infinite. Neither in its infinite depth of origin nor in its infinite height of consummation is there any breach of continuity in the Divine externalisation. All is One.

As physical investigations penetrate further and further into the *realitas-phenomenon* and reveal the antecedent processes, in terms of the quantitative relations of mass and motion, that terminate in the presentation to sense, they at the same time go further away from the real. For the real is truly to be found in the *final presentation* to subject: it is in *that crisis* that the thing gathers up all its causal conditions and prior processes (etheric, dynamic, or what not) and offers itself to us in all the fulness and richness of its phenomenal individuality. It is at this point that the bony skeleton of abstract mathematico-physical explanation is clothed with flesh and blood and *lives*: it is this that touches the emotions of the human breast, and gives birth in poetry and the other arts to the highest utterances of genius regarding our complex experiences. Even suppose, accordingly, that the rich qualitative result in presentation can be reduced to quantitative terms whether

in dynamics or in mind-categories, it would matter little. But it can not be wholly so reduced. There is á something, then, that defies analysis and belongs to the sphere of Being, Feeling and Emotion rather than to mathematics or logic.

As to the "Related System," let us note in passing that attitudinal consciousness is, of course, aware of no system, but only of indefinite (not infinite) expanse and of diverse separate objects in a relation of locality, concomitance and consecution. It is Reason or the Dialectic that subsequently ascertains that the total object—the infinite multiplicity, is not merely aggregated plurality but a system: that is to say, that things, while they exist for themselves, yet do so as positive differentiates and in and through their positive and negative relations to all else, and finally, as grounded in eternal Cause and held in a One.

(d) DISPARATENESS OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT.

The "matter" of object and the "matter" of subject-mind are disparate, it is said; and the question is asked, "How can anything come within consciousness which is essentially different from consciousness?" This is an inheritance from Descartes. May I not meet this with another question, "Who has a right to say that the phenomenal manifestations of universal mind are 'essentially different' from finite mind?" The question, as put, assumes, and is directed against, a crass individualistic atomic dualism as holding the field. But it does not hold the field with thinking men. Let us try to realise that the divine externalisation *includes* man, that he is part of it and involved in it. In one aspect of his nature man cannot give himself too much

importance ; from another point of view he can't give himself too little. There would be no difficulty, I presume, in Universal Mind rolling into finite mind and filling it with its fulness. In the feeling of Being, in the dialectic, in ideals as the truth of reals, it already does so. Why should a difficulty arise when the said Mind externalises itself in quantity, motion, quality, and the finite mind also finds itself to be externalised (in its body) by the same universal Mind as also a concrete of quantity, motion and quality ? That concrete which is "not-me" and this concrete which is "me" understand each other perfectly : the former rolls into the latter. There is no disparateness ; I cannot find it. Why should it not be as I say ? The universal mind and all its phenomenal forms—its modality, are me and mine ; and I and mine are within the universal mind and its modes and forms. But all the while the NEGATION in the cosmic process—necessary to there being externalisation and individua at all—constitutes me "myself," and that tree "itself," and *not* the universal mind, but opposed to it. Assuredly, God's totality is made up of positive and negative in one concrete. Consequently I *am* the universal mind and I am *not* the universal mind at one and the same moment. Not only is this the form of the finite subject, but it is the form of God Himself when He finitises His essential nature in a world.

"The knowledge of things," Professor Caird says, "must mean that the mind finds itself in them, or, in some way, that the difference between them and mind is dissolved." Precisely so ; the object turns over into the subject, flows into the subject, "becomes" for the subject as a specific entitative potency within the

whole, not as standing in antagonism to the whole on the opposite shore of the stream. Both events take place: finite mind finds itself in the object and the object "finds itself in" finite mind, and they are quite at home with each other.

(e) IDEOLOGISM.

How is it that subjective "idealism" arises to vex the schools? Because, on *reflection*, a man finds that he is conscious of what is *not* himself, and yet that all experience is within himself and his own skull. But is it not similarly manifest that in being conscious of what he calls "ideas" he is conscious of what is *not* himself? How can consciousness be except of objects—of that which is not the conscious subject? Every "idea-representation" is as much a non-ego as the sun or moon. Thus is the subjective ideologist driven to say not merely, "I cannot be immediately aware of object and objectivity," but "I cannot be immediately aware of myself or my (so-called) 'manifestations'": in short, awareness or consciousness contains its own impossibility.

Attitudinal mind is not sentient of an "impression" or an "idea," a "representation" or an "affection," or (we may here add) of a "state":¹ it is sentient of

¹ Note, also, in passing, that if the proposition be that conscious mind can know only its present ideas, how do we meet the fact that in being conscious of a *present* memory it affirms a *past* idea. It is conscious of that which transcends its present state. My *present* consciousness may be merely a mental coruscation which flashes out and dies; but a coruscation which continues in it a past coruscation must be a curiosity.

I omit here a Meditation on subjective idealism because it is polemical and long, and also because the subject is sufficiently treated in Professor A. S. Pringle-Pattison's *Scottish Philosophy*, especially in the chapter on "Relativity"

object alone—immediately sentient. The above expressions are crude imaginations to which the human mind resorts, under the influence of its spatial conditions, in order to explain a synthesis of two in a one. It calls this a “relation,” which word connotes “relativity”; and thus finite mind is for ever cut off from the truth of things.

It appears to me that it is ideologues of every kind, not the Natural Realist, who over-emphasise dualism and pluralism, and then have to find their way out of their self-constituted difficulty by some device or other.

(f) REPETITION OF THE POINT OF VIEW.

If we set aside crude Dualism and rise to the conception of the Absolute Whole as a system, we shall see that Being as exhibited in the categories of the non-conscious finds itself passing into conscious mind on its sentient plane. That is to say, these categories become aware of themselves—feel themselves in and *through* conscious minds; and that, immediately. In and through Feeling they *complete* themselves, they reach the goal of their activity, they reveal themselves to sentient individuals and also to themselves (so to speak). It is a denial of “system” to affirm that the mere passing of the whole of presentation into sentient creatures can introduce a flaw in the one continuous process. It is to cut the system into two and to convert what we call knowledge into guess work. And in fact, it never occurs to “attitudinal” mind to suggest a flaw: it lives in happy union with all nature. Nature as it exists is not kept out of my individual sentience because sentience is in and through an organised separate “body”. Quite the contrary. Nature is itself

“body”. And sentient subject could have no relations with it except through body.

Go outside the whole system and look on it with the calm neutral eye of some god, and what do you see? A vast complex of related individuals and of innumerable activities held together somehow in a system. You will also behold a certain unitary point in that system—man, a wonderful creature in whom exist *potentially* all the categories of the whole, and who can gather the various whole up and reflex it back into the system, while appropriating it as the real content of his own specific being. You see that the whole now becomes split, for it becomes an object or presentation to *one of the contained parts* of the organic whole, which part has *then* to be called conscious subject. You have come across a new and most interesting fact in the vast and strange world which you are contemplating. But you see no breach of continuity—nothing save the reflexion of the whole in one mirroring point within it. It certainly would not occur to the spectator, who beheld the system with his god-like intelligence, that the said system, in so far as it reached this minute mirroring point, played havoc with itself and was other in the consciousness factor than it was in and for itself. In brief, you *behold Natura becoming conscious in and through its highest product*. It does not break away from itself.

In other words: The Whole, *i.e.*, Naturá, in the cosmic sense as including mind in man as well as the phenomenal, is an interwoven system. Man is not standing apart over against the system looking at it to see what it is *for him*, but is himself within the system and part of it. His body is within the nature-system and

in continuity with it: there is no breach—no hard and fast separation; only an antithesis. His mind also is, as we shall see, within the mind-system and in continuity with it: there is no breach. Further, as will appear as we go on, the whole is a mind-matter system as a One Concrete.

This position is in perfect accord with our preceding analysis of the primal actualisation in consciousness; and the conclusion is that object *turns over* into feeling-subject, and, by virtue of this continuity, it exists as “thing” independently of the subject precisely as it exists as object to and in the subject. *Consciousness provides the last explanatory term of the presentation.* Save in a conscious subject, the object cannot fulfil itself—cannot find its own objective cosmic significance. The full reality of the manifold external is to be found here. The world without conscious subject is a world waiting for its meaning—an uncompleted circle waiting to be closed. This fulfilled real of the object, moreover, constitutes the real or body of attitudinal subject. Colour, sound, smell, roughness and smoothness, weight, figure, heat and cold, are all, when clearly and distinctly perceived, as real in the system within which man exists as Space, Motion and Time. The object, including man’s body, is thus “related” to the conscious subject; but if we insist on calling this a “relative” relatedness then we should have to add, “Relativity is the Absolute, *i.e.*, the truth of the object in itself and for itself”. Thought teaches us that pluralism, and the synthesised opposition of subject and negating object is God’s method of externalisation.

What, then, is the “sense-thing”? The answer is,

the thing is the object as given in all its modes. The existence of an object at all in consciousness depends on its modes. "But," you say, "some of these modes are not in the object: red, *e.g.*, is in the subject not in the object save quantitatively." "I affirm this" (you may go on to say) "not because of the fact of relatedness, for the feeling of redness is, I grant, no more the issue of a relation than quantity or motion, but because of the fact of the existence of a pathic feeling in connection with redness which I cannot think as *in* so much matter. It is absurd." But suppose I reply that the quantitatively (or dynamically) explained redness cannot reveal itself as the cosmic reality which it *actually is* save in and through a pathic consciousness, which is the last term of the cosmic colour-energy, am I not justified then in throwing it back into the object as its cosmic fully expressed reality? I do not thereby "interpret" it,—I merely give it the benefit of its own fulfilled character. Colour demands *me* for its own purposes.¹ Colour and I are fellow-creatures in the same related system, helping each other's full reality out. There is no chasm between us—no dualism in the crude sense. To affirm such a dualism as gives us an aggregate of things calling to each other from deep to deep is a fundamental misapprehension; nay, it is the very negation of philosophy which must ever seek One. The secret physical processes whereby Space, Motion, Quality, Relation, are effected, would, if known, leave these resultants of the cosmic energy and process where it found them. Their full reality and meaning is precisely in their final presentation to the naive consciousness.

¹ See also p. 114.

It may be plausibly said that this monistic dualism is not dualism at all; but only the duality and plurality of hard and universally admitted fact—an infinitely diverse, but this in a one-universal Identity. I accept this. But this is looking at plurality from a universal point of view,—not at the specific question of the finite subject in its relation to object. What I am here, first of all, concerned for is the diversities, the pluralities. Each exists “for itself”. Secondly, I am concerned *for myself* as one of the pluralities endowed with consciousness of the other pluralities. Am I conscious of them *as they exist*, or is my conscious individuality invented for the purpose of receiving and subverting them as realities by transforming them into relativities and so negating their truth? Am I hopelessly cut off from the Universal?

(g) UNIFYING BY THE ATTUENT CONSCIOUSNESS.

It may not be irrelevant here to advert to that theory of the relation of subject and object which says that consciousness “unifies” the series of presentations.

To speak of consciousness *per se* is to speak of an abstraction. The one universal fact of Being forbids. Conscious subject is a “being” or entity; and this entity is Being determined after a certain fashion. The “form” or essence of this determined entity is simply consciousness; but consciousness is asleep until the non-conscious presentation awakes it. There is a common ground for a stone and a conscious entity, *viz.*, Being and (as we shall further see) the Objective Dialectic. A stone is Being determined after a certain fashion; a conscious entity is Being determined in another fashion. One function of the former is to be felt and known; the function of

the latter is to feel and know. The determined qualities of the former repeat themselves in the latter as recipient and re-flexive, and attain therein their *completed* meaning as in the objective existent world; in other words, in this human "moment" of the Absolute life-process: they are not "unified"; they enter into a permanent one subject: that is all. To say they are "unified" is to anticipate the activity of reason (the subjective dialectic), and to ignore the fact that the *realitas-phenomenon* fulfils itself on the plane of Attuition. They are unified in and for the sentient subject, not *by* it. There is nothing in the subject-entity at this stage, save the potency of recipience, re-flexion and appropriation. This subject-entity is such that its form of consciousness is equal to all demands on it within a certain sphere of cosmic evolution; and it is equal to all possible presentations in that sphere by the very fact that it is the consciousness factor. Thus the matter or real of the subject-entity, as a reflexive recipient, is the content of the "given". The given is immediate, and forms the tissue of subject as conscious.

Accordingly, when I say that every sentient organism is a subject-entity—a for-itself being, I claim for the organism no more than I claim for everything else, *i.e.*, it is Being determined, or a determined being. I say nothing of soul-substance. The conscious entity is a *synoptic* reflexive-activity, just as in the higher reason-form it is a *synthetic* active-activity; but inasmuch as it must be "determined" being, I legitimately, and not merely for shortness, call it "entity". The determination of Being is differencing; and each "determinate," therefore, has its own specific nature and function. The specific function, or essence, of the subject-entity is

consciousness which is equal, I have said, to all demands on it within the limits of its possibilities. This is true of animals as of man. Even were this not the fact, every psychology must assume it as a postulate. Suppose then that we say that what is a necessary postulate in all theory of mind is a cosmic fact, and try to advance, resting on this foundation.

But, since a mere series cannot support itself, does not subject-entity as conscious unify presentations? I cannot see that the essence or form of an entity, which is at the stage of mere sentience, can actively unify anything. The unification of diverse presentates is already an accomplished fact outside the conscious entity which, as itself a permanent "one," holds them in that one. But this is all that it can do. It—"a one"—receives, reacts and assimilates the given complex as it is given. I suddenly look up and behold a stag on the top of a cliff between me and the sky. Three objects (besides many others which doubtless sink into vague feeling and make no sign) are presented in a whole of relation, but I do not mix up the colour of the sky with the antler of the stag or the shape of the cliff. Why not? Simply because they are not mixed up out there in the cosmic system which is pressing in on me from every side. A merely sentient consciousness stops at sentience: it *feels* and reflexes and appropriates and can get no further—far enough, however, to serve its own purposes of life. It is reflexive synopsis not unifying synthesis. „

I have emphasised this attitudinal and animal stage of subjective mind as a *moment* of man-mind. Beyond this he cannot go without breaking through the sphere

of mere reflexive feeling into the higher moment of mind which I call *Will*-reason, because its possibility and root is pure Will; and the form of this Will is the subjective dialectic whereby presentations truly are "unified" and subsumed into the "one" of self-conscious subject-entity. It appears to me that until this distinction is accepted, the question of "unifying" will puzzle the Empirist and the Idealist alike. Up to a certain point, all that the Empirist finds (with the help of association by contiguity and similarity and difference) is true; but beyond this he cannot go without passing into a higher plane of mind which disturbs his equanimity and subverts his mechanical psychology.

On that higher plane he may encounter that kind of Idealist who, on his side, would attempt the explanation even of the sentient record by dialectic activity. All in vain. Being and Dialectic is *in* all presentation; but subjective finite mind must accept presentation of inner and outer feeling as given and immediate. Sentient subject can add nothing to the content of an object in so far as it is given: it can only reflex and appropriate the content already there.

(h) ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE.

The man-system, though not The Absolute in the large sense in which it is the present fashion to use that word, is yet The Absolute within a certain circle, or on a certain plane. If the "becoming" for a conscious subject is merely the last term in and through which the object fulfils itself as a sensible, then the "given" light, colour, space, motion, are all equally in the Absolute system; they are *there* as well as *here*. The "*here*" is *part of a one Totality of*

system within which and of which the finite subject is. The object exists truly in this system as I see it ; my awareness of it is absolute : it is true truth I *sense*. What the object is in and to reason we do not yet at this "moment," and on this plane, of subjective mind see, and what it is as an absolute, *i.e.*, in its totality of relations and significance (as, let us say, in the mind of a creative God or as a unit which is one with the cosmic Whole), we do not know and can never know. But none the less, the object as in the sentient consciousness is the True, the Absolute—that is to say, it is the Truth of God in one of the ever-evolving moments of His immeasurable Being, to which moment the attuent animal and rational man belong—within which they are. There is no "relativity" as within the system : *it is the system itself that is relative to the Absolute Whole.*

To anticipate : As regards "knowledge" generally (let me say) I cannot break through my circle ; but the finite dialectic, whereby alone I am a man and not a beast, enables me, nay, compels me, as we shall soon see, to affirm the Absolute Whole and to apprehend an Infinite Ground and an Infinite Beyond. This the animal cannot do, because he is not the pure dialectic. My business as an investigator is to know the Real—this moment of the Absolute Life—as given to me, with all its necessary implicates and complicates. *Truly* to know it, not merely to receive it as a confused and aggregated phenomenal presentation as an animal does, but to find *all* that it yields, and to affirm of that which is beyond and outside my circle only what the facts within the circle contain, and consequently compel me to affirm. For it is clear that the revelation of the

incomprehensible and immeasurable Absolute on the plane of one of Its (or His) moments must, *so für*, *contain* The True in its universality. The "related," then, is the Absolute so far as *given*. Man is, as I have said, The Absolute of his own system. But inasmuch as this human Absolute is only a "moment" in the infinite process and revelation, it is relativity in so far as the whole system of and within which man exists is relative to a vast, immeasurable, and unknown Totality. Within my own circle there is objective truth. If I ever rise to a higher plane of mind, I shall find that it contains, must contain, the lower which it will illumine and not cancel.

I am, accordingly, very far, as a natural realist, from saying, as an eminent American idealist seems to say, and many others have said, that "beyond all our experience there is something wholly unlike our experience, the 'thing in itself'". My experience tells me all that there is to be known of the object, when I finally *complete* my experience in the concept of the Actual (*see sequel*). In this *sphere* of the divine process—the man-sphere—there is nothing more to be known about an object than my *completed* experience yields or may yield. By the "transcendence" of the object, the natural-realist, like myself, simply means that the planetary system is not created in his sensations for the first time, nor constructed by his egoistic categories: nor has he anything to do with the "thing-in-itself".

If all that is meant be that "beyond my experience" that brick or stone wall has a meaning and significance which finite mind cannot compass, the proposition is a commonplace. The knowledge of it, however, can be completed as a truth in this sphere of The Absolute.

What completed knowledge is will appear when we have spoken of the Dialectic. If the absolute objective idealist means merely to say that what I, a finite conscious subject, feel and know can ultimately be conceived of only as existing in an Infinite Absolute Consciousness in which I am in some way involved, although only as a *finite* consciousness, I shall not care to quarrel with him.

In brief, the universe within which we are factors is a ONE of Being and Dialectic, as well as of phenomenal, process ; but so that object finds its fulfilment, reality, and truth in subject conscious and self-conscious, and subject finds its fulfilment and reality in object. Only in so far as man lives in the object (including, since he is *self*-conscious, himself as object) does he live at all. This is his "reality and actuality": without this, he is merely an entitative potentiality. And, again, only in so far as the object finds itself in subject (conscious and self-conscious) does it attain to its own true meaning and its own full reality as *Object*, and consequently as "thing". What is the object but a specific "being" announcing itself to me another specific "being" by means of its distinctive characters in Quantity, Quality, etc., which are its inner truth in phenomenal terms ?

In attuition the subject, as passive activity, assimilates the object as object of sense: as reason-activity the subject *knows* the object ; but it finds on reflection that the object itself, and from the first, contains its "known" characters as well as its "sensed" characters. The *cognitio* and *cognitum* are one. Subjective mind is a passage through which the objective universe marches

with majestic tread, it itself being within that objective universe—final term and last experience—true mirror of the mighty whole. Is man an irrelevance in the great divine argument we call The Universe, or is he not truly within it, of it, for it, by it?¹

(i) ATTUITION OF THE OBJECT AS RELATIONS.

We must, I think, carefully distinguish the precise nature of the record of the object which each plane of mind yields. For example, sense receives what is existent as it exists, to the extent of its potency. It senses *a*, and when we, from a reflective standpoint, say that it recognises the identity of *a* with *a* when it recurs in presentation, we must beware of confounding different planes of mind and crediting the lower with the activities of the higher. Sense feels *a* and when *a* recurs has a same *feeling*; and that is all. So in feeling the difference between *a* and *b* it merely *feels* the difference: it is not aware of any "relation" between them, but merely of a difference: it does not even feel "that they are different": the differences are sensed and reflexed as reals: that is all.

It is on the higher plane of thought that we affirm relation between *a* and *b*; and this because we first have to isolate things one from another in order clearly to perceive them, and then we have to find a word which denotes the "real" intercommunion of the phenomena which we have, under a formal or logical necessity, separated. Relation is an inadequate word,

¹In past pages and in what follows, I find it impossible to exhibit the characteristics of the lower plane of mind without reference to what is subsequently dealt with under Dialectic.

because it presumes an isolation and gap which never *really* existed.

Meanwhile Sense does not "know" relations, it merely "feels" likeness and difference.

If sensates yield, the Real, so far as Sense can go, still more do "percepts" of single wholes yield the Real; so with individual concepts and general concepts, if only we take care to make note of the steps by which these are formed by the Dialectic, and attribute no more to them as objective reality than the particulars on which they rest justify. "Cat," for example, is not a real: it is the symbol of a completed process which affirms certain likenesses as exclusively predicable of a large number of living objects. The fact of these likenesses among a series of particulars is, however, real. Why, it may be asked, should the dialectic have to go through the dismemberment of its experience in order to reach truth? An important question. In passing, let us note that a sensate of a total—the object-thing in sense, so far from being empty, is so full that the thought of men through the ages will never exhaust it. A complete unfolding of the implicit as well as the explicit in the given of Sense would yield an absolute synthesis of experience.

There are those who speak as if the world were, first of all, an infinite pluralism of hard and isolated individua, and as if then, to make a world possible, a new activity called "relation" were introduced as a kind of *Deus ex machina* to weave the individua into a cosmos. They, it seems to me, hypostasise the fact and word "relation". The true point of view (as I hope to show) is that each individuum, even the (so-called) atom, contains, as a "determined somewhat," its own relations actual and possible (see *Essence and Primordial Actuals*). Through

the operation of the activities of *each*, according to its nature, in reciprocity with all else, the interplay and harmony and oneness of the whole are assured. Each ultimate individuum has not its separate and peculiar god : it is an individuum in and through the Universal. And *yet*, each ultimate has its own centre and potency of recipience and activity, and can fulfil these only through the fulfilment of itself in all else. Each thing is, in this sense, its own "other". There is, in the general nature of its function and its method of realising itself, no difference between a primordial actual and the complex actual which we call Man. The whole passes into each, and each passes into the whole to the extent of its inner potency ; and thus there is constituted a harmonious world of fact and of experience. All is mind and its modal display. The primordial monad is, as we shall see, mind and modality ; the Absolute Whole is Mind and Modality ; and all is in communion with all else.

There are planes of existence and planes of mind. The molecule, the plant, the sentient animal soon exhaust their potencies and the relations by which they live. They take and give all of The Absolute, in which and of which they are, that it is possible for them to give and take. But man is all that they are ; and, over and above, knows and affirms ; nay, as a dialectic, coordinates and interprets the whole in and for himself, and then finds that, great as he is, The Absolute is greater than he, and that he is compelled to affirm infinity in every affirmation. Thus this finite-infinite creature encounters contradiction in its thought, *i.e.*, in reason or the dialectic, when it begins to deal with the phenomenal given concrete of attuition.

In fine : The relatedness of subject and object, like the relatedness of all else each to each and to the whole, is neither tenable in thought nor possible in fact, if all entities are not one in Being, one in Continuity. How could differences and oppositions form part of *one* system if they were not at root determinations of *one* and the same Being which is always Itself—One in the Many? And yet, dualism (and not merely duality) as contained in pluralism is the correct term because of the element of Negation, as we have seen and shall again see, which makes an individuum and a world possible. The fundamental scheme would appear to be a Monistic Dualism or Pluralism—a Many which is The One and not The One, a One which is The Many and not The Many—a fundamental contradiction. This is precisely our world.

And yet, all that man knows, in so far as he truly knows, is God's knowing, God's truth—the truth of and in The Absolute. And the sum and summit of his knowing is God Himself—Absolute Being as in an infinitely finite world, where he works out His purposes through the atom, the animal and the man, revealing to each all of Himself that each can take. Even for the atom and the worm what an interesting function! for man what profound meaning, what an exalted position! And, strange to say, the chief source of man's greatness lies not in this, but, as we shall see, in his limitations; for it is these very limitations that give him the Infinite and Absolute as transcendent, while yet immanent, and predict a higher plane of life in which he will more and more share the riches of Eternal Being. Meanwhile, the God whom he knows as immanent is all of The Absolute

which it is possible for him to know—and Him, man, standing erect and in no fawning spirit, hails as his Lord and Comrade.

Note.—To universal scepticism as to sense and knowledge, I have given no heed; it has so frequently been put out of court. If dogmatic, it is manifestly suicidal to say that “it is certain that nothing is certain,” from which follows that the proposition “it is certain” is itself uncertain. To the milder Academic scepticism which would seem to allow degrees of probability only, the remark of Hume is conclusive which is in substance this, that if all our knowledge is only probability, then our affirmation that this is so has also itself only probability. In brief, thought cannot prove thought invalid without, *ipso facto*, proving its affirmation of invalidity also invalid.

MEDITATION VIII.

THE GIVEN: The content of the Sense-Object in presentation and Attuition—The Given or Immediate, Space, Motion and Time—Secondary Qualities or Proper Sensibles—The greater Objective Reality of Common Sensibles—In what sense Proper Sensibles are Objectively Real—Categories of Attuition or The Given. *Notes* (1) and (2).

NATURAL Realism, I understand, says that Sense-experience presents to me an external world: that is to say, a universe existing, in the modes of Space, Motion, etc., independently of all finite minds, all which modes or phenomena normal conscious subject receives immediately, and sees truly when it sees clearly and distinctly. But to see the external non-subject clearly and distinctly is to see that the material, independent object-world is neither material nor independent. No analysis of experience can yield substantial matter as a given; and the whole course of this argument ought to show that even a self-conscious being is not an independent existence: much less, then, is a stone or a star.

Let us now look more closely at the specific content of the object in attuition. That content is Absolute Being (we have found) writing on finite sentient mind its own modality, and this it is which sentient mind passivo-actively deals with and assimilates. Consequently, when the sentient mind rises to Reason or

Dialectic, it will find that the object as given in consciousness contains implicit all that man can ever know it to be as a *Real*; nay further, it will find the whole of the Dialectic in it. But Subjective Dialectic *as such*, has nothing to do with the object as such or the possibility of an object *in and for* mind at the sentient stage. That question, I consider, has been settled *for* reason in the facts of attuition and on the lower plane of mind. Reason can, of course, question these facts and hold centuries of high debate over them until, at last, it works its way back to the *naïveté* of the primæval man.¹ On the other hand, save for the subjective dialectic, the *realitas* phenomenon could never be for a consciousness more than a non-rational object—a Real not an Actual (*vide seq.*): nor would necessary and synthetic, as opposed to contingent, truths be possible for a merely conscious subject.

I am here engaged in empirically building up for myself *subjective* experience as a matter of fact, in order to reach thereby an Objective Whole of system; in other words, Knowledge or Truth. And the "object" in attuition would appear already to contain all I am in search of. I would call it attuit rather than sensate, because it is the complex elements of an object *given as co-ordinated* into a total (as it exists out there) in and for the subject. When this attuit or non-rational

¹ The brilliant Ferrier says that things and the senses cannot transmit cognitions to the mind. We see here a good example of the confusion that besets the whole question. We are not talking of "cognitions" but of attuitions. It is because, when we begin to reflect, we find the *whole* mind already in evidence that we fail to see that there are "moments" or planes of mind each of which must be distinguished.

(quoad subjective mind) object in sentience is rationalised, it is a rationalised attuit (also as it exists out there); in other words, it is known: it is the "Notion," the "Actual"; as we shall in the sequel see.

I have already said that when I speak of the conscious subject as a subject-entity (or monad if this term is preferred), I do not picture to myself a *tabula rasa*, although I have called it empty. This would be an absurd position. I do not "picture" anything. I have in my thought an "individual being" with potencies of a specific kind (of which being or entity I am non-mediate-ly conscious as ground of a possible experience), by virtue of which potencies it may be said already to possess the whole world of sense-recipient. A potency is not an activity, and yet it is not dead. It is a sleeping activity, but even in its sleep it dreams, for it has a tendency or impulse (unconscious desire or appetition) in certain specific directions and after a specific manner. It is also a unity, otherwise there could be no difference for it, and no recipient "one" for given difference; but it does not actively *unify*; it accepts what is given. Thus it is that the specific characters of our consciousnesses are the specific characters of the "Other" or the Object. The former do not merely correspond to the latter: they *are* the latter as fulfilled in a world which is a "system"; and in which, consequently, sentient mind and nature are in organic continuity. Consciousness does not interpret: it merely feels and reveals—reveals the reality or truth of the given as it is in the system.

And as to the object given: The existent reality-phenomenon with all its implicates is not only "object" but "thing": there is no other "thing" than precisely

that. As to what the "thing" is, then, as *datum* outside the conscious subject and as synopsis or attuit in the subject, there can, it appears to me, be no question. It is the final delivery of cosmic forces and facts at the door of a sentient reality, at which point "thing" suddenly "turns over" into feeling, is *mine* as reflexed by me, and constitutes the "real" of me as a conscious subject. True, conscious "subject" as an abstract and "object" as an abstract may be of no account; but a determined entity which has the potentiality of receiving what is not itself, and a non-subject which feeds the potential entity, are realities in the cosmic system, with the one common basis of Being; and also (as we shall soon see) of Dialectic.

The cosmic system then (so far as our experience goes) *completes itself* in a conscious subject as a sentient first of all; and, finally, in that subject as rational or as dialectic. Again, the conscious subject is introduced, evolved (or thrown up) into an already existing related system as a unitary entitative factor in it and in organic continuity with it, for the purpose of receiving it, and of working out its own life in and through the system. Further, *both* conscious subject and the phenomenal content of subject are themselves not only *of* this related system, but *within* it, and cannot get out of it. Finally, the universal externalised concrete which embraces the totality of subject and object is a harmonious system fulfilling its life-aim, whatever that may be. Things are not at sixes and sevens.

It is true that the Dualist, in the past, has emphasised the opposition of subject and object into antagonism. There has been a cleft between subject and non-subject. But there is no gap, no cleft. This is the very point

which I, as a natural realist, dualist, and pluralist, wish to make. "There is an objective mind-and-matter continuity, which *contains* the subject—a monism which divides itself that it may explicate itself, fulfil itself, and show itself to itself. In other words, Natura in its highest effort evolves a creature to feel it, to know it, to love it, and to return again in contemplation to the Source of the Whole.¹ We call the *external system* in its relation to a subject the "total object"; and, as opposed to an inner or internal, we call it outer or external. But the "Universal Object" (as seen from the outside by some supramundane being), *i.e.* "Natura" in the large sense, includes me, the subject, in organic continuity with the external object, just as much as if I grew out of the soil like a tree. All is continuous and all is one. And the *modus existendi* of the object, so far from being affected by the existence of a subject, is seen to find its consummation and completion in that subject and to name itself, so to speak, in that subject.

What now is received—What is the Given and immediate? *Extension* or *Space* to begin with. The conscious subject on the attitudinal plane *receives* Extension in its first contact with the external, and reflexes what it so senses as uniform unbroken indefinite Quantity. But space or extension is not phenomenon alone: it is Being extended—*realitas-phenomenon*.

The attuent subject waits to have relative locality, and, consequently, space as containing the discrete as well as the continuous, forced on it by the occurrence of

¹ The word Natura is here used in the sense of the total externalisation of Absolute Being.

diverse objects and motions in the one homogeneous extension. Indefinite Quantity broken up by diverse quanta, which yet remain as within the continuity of Quantity generally, is the attuent experience—all which it senses, but does not “perceive”; for percipience is the rudimentary act of the subjective dialectic alone.

The object of inchoate subject or “Pure Feeling” is (we saw) Being unconditioned: and now within the sphere of the conditioned as phenomenal, the object of primordial “Sense” is, similarly, unconditioned Quantity, undifferentiated Extension. That is to say, indefinite “Being” as indefinite “Extension”—a concrete—a *realitas-phenomenon*. I cannot see that quanta as localised, figured, tri-dimensional, solid and having bulk or mass are logically derivable from Extension as given, and as subsequently affirmed by reason. They, however, certainly presuppose it as a logical and real prius.

Extension¹ or Space is a “universal” in attuition; and when reason subsequently reflects, it finds it to be a universal that is “necessary” to there being an Outer at all; *i.e.*, it is involved in the very fact of outerness. Externality *is as* Space. I do not see that I can get below this. Just as Being is the necessary universal of *all* actual and possible existence, so Space is the necessary universal of all phenomenal existence. In fact, Space is the mode of Outness for God and man alike:

¹ “Extension,” I think, is now often used simply for diffused quantity, and “space” for tri-dimensional extension, but the distinction does not touch my general argument. The psychological history of our perceptions of Space, distance, solidity, colour, etc., do not here concern us here. By the Given I mean the resultant of infinite processes—the resultant only.

it is the condition of the possibility of an external object, *i.e.*, that which is non-subject. To say that space is external is merely to say that space is space. We vainly try to put it otherwise. "Every object as outer is spaced or extended": this is an identical proposition. I *receive* this fact. Kant ought to have said (perhaps he did), the form of sense-intuition is non-subject *as* externality, and we call this by the apt name "Space," with all the implicates of that word. So it appears to me: the universal form of the sensible is Externality which is Space; but we *receive* it and *reflex* it; we do not impose it. The "externality" is effected in the subject on the sentient plane by a process of reflex action. How else can I get an "out" for what is sensed only as "in"—a "there" for the "here"?

Abstract absolute Space is an intellectual creation, of great utility it may be, forced on us by the dialectic activity, but not to be found in sentient or (strictly) percipient consciousness, or anywhere, as a Real. We may even, under the exigencies of a system, speak of metaphysical space not yet concreted into the space we see. So we might speak of the metaphysical qualitative. I set aside these things as abstractions transformed into shadowy entities; further, as superfluous for the explanation of experience; and, finally, as not explaining it. I take the concrete whole as I have it in presentation, and I cling to it. I attune space; and that is all. It is not so correct to call this universal a "necessary," as a "synthetic condition," of all sentience; and this because it is a synthetic condition of a possible universe of phenomenal things passing into sentient subject, which is *within* that universe and ultimately homogeneous with it. (By which I do

not mean to say that mind is also space ; if it were so, it could no more sense Space¹ than one stone can sense another.)

Not only quantity universal is space, but the things presented to me are quanta, and as such are spaced and external and tri-dimensional. They have measure. I find also localisation, configuration, solidity, bulk, mass, with weight and resistance, as I bring myself into touch with objects, all revealed as external and given ; but they are not, of course, given without the necessary experience : this is a psychological question.

Motion and Time.—Motion of objects is given ; and, even if all objects were at rest, there would be motion so long as there was a succession in a conscious subject turning from one object to another. Motion involves Rest : they are correlatives which implicate each other.

Motion from one point of space to another, or of one object and then another across the field of vision, involves one-after-the-otherness. This yields Objective Time ; and the *attuent* mind receives this as a universal fact, but not as a synthetic necessary—not, that is to

¹ I am speaking of Euclidean Space : to speak of space in any other sense is not my business. I have to do with the given. Natural realism refuses to yield to the doctrine of “relativity,” even in presence of the averment that space as we know it—Euclidean space—is not the last word concerning the universal conditions of an extended External. My precise position is that the facts of experience yield us a system of things, that I am in and of this system, and that while one evolutionary step more might give me, for all I know, a different kind of spatial experience—this different experience would include this present experience while raising and illuminating it. All I can immediately, clearly and distinctly perceive, and all I can truly think, is the truth of God on this stage of His evolution ; and for ever therefore a truth *in* God.

say, as the condition of there being an external world at all. Subjective Time, on the attuent plane of mind, is a sensing of the motion of objects accompanied by a *feeling* of continuity of, or in, the sensing subject. Objectively, Time is a one-after-the-other in the continuity of Universal Being. The continuity of Being is to be called "During": and it is the fact and opposition of phenomenal flux that reveals, or mediates, Being as During permanent ground. Hence Objective Time is a discrete continuum, and we have to speak of it in terms of Space. It is not a necessary; but only a universal fact in all attuent experience. Time as a "necessary" belongs to the Reason plane, and arises out of the fact that I cannot affirm anything save as a point or "now," with a before and after as implicit content of "now". Sentience generally can only *feel*, as a "universal" with a vague accompaniment of underlying continuity, what reason subsequently *affirms* as also a necessary.

It is to be noted that Time, as a given, is not "one-after-the-otherness". This is an abstraction. Time, as given, is a "one 'thing' or 'event' after another in a Continuum".

In what sense the speculative physicist may ultimately express Space and Motion as primal phenomena, it matters not. What we have to do with is the resultant of cosmic forces in the crisis of encountering sentient subject—the presentation as a fulfilled real.

I have been speaking of the quantitative characters of the sense-object. They are given to us: all we are aware of is extension and the resistance of external objects to us and to each other, and a succession or change in these objects. Natural realism does not

affirm substantial matter, but merely that there is a *natura rerum* independently of the finite subject; but which it can meanwhile "sense" and (finally) "know," to the extent of its potency, just as that *natura* exists in the creative externalisation of Absolute Being. The *natura rerum* is an externalisation which reveals God to us on a certain plane of eternal Being, and tells us what He is here and now.

Secondary Qualities or Proper Sensibles.—We further find that objects present themselves to us through the avenues of sight and hearing and touch as suffused with light and colour, as odorous, sonorous and sapid, and as hot or cold, rough and smooth. These differ from the other properties as being qualitative; and their degree, which runs from 0 to a maximum of intensity, is *quantitative* degree.

Hence the distinction (come down from Leucippus) into primary and secondary qualities—not very felicitous terms, it seems to me. Perhaps a better distinction would be into quantitative or "common sensibles" (this latter is Aristotle's phrase) and qualitative or "proper sensibles". By whatever name called, they have constituted difficulties in the way of all speculative construction except where they have been sagaciously evaded. I do not wish to evade them; although I am deeply sensible of the difficulty of finding language which will commend my point of view to others.

A subject (as we have seen) emerging into consciousness through the object "becoming" in and for it, reflexes back into the outer *all* the properties of the object without distinction; in so far, that is to say,

as the potency in it permits, for there are qualities which we do not either feel or perceive, but ascertain inferentially. In the proper or qualitative sensibles, however, the body is stirred with a certain physical excitement, and this *physical* disturbance, reproduced in *feeling*, is returned, under the universal impulse of re-flexion, to the object itself. But nobody means to say that the vibrating air hears a sound, the sugar tastes sugariness or the rose smells sweetness, or the fire feels heat, or iron feels hardness. The loose use of words and the want of causative verbs in language have led to confusion of thought. Through these qualitative affections we ascertain certain peculiar characters of the quantitative external which, but for the subjective qualitative feeling, would never have been the object of physical investigation at all. Now these qualitative characters are there in the object, after eliminating the subjective *pathic* element in the sensation. All save this pathic element is in the object. Science, I am well aware, reduces the qualitative reality to the quantitative reality. But this can only mean that the quantitative equivalent of the sensed real is given; and this is an abstraction. When I say that a hyacinth is blue, I am right in so far as I mean to say that the hyacinth, relatively to itself and other things, has blueness, *i.e.* is qualitatively and really blue. There may be a physical explanation of blueness; but blueness as felt in my consciousness and affirmed of the hyacinth belongs to the hyacinth as much as to me. The physical conditions await consciousness to reveal their final reality to mind; and their final reality to mind is their final reality in and for the object. The hyacinth and I are citizens of the same world. I say with perfect confidence: "You are

blue within this system to which we both belong". I seem to see this quite clearly; but it may not be clear to others.

Certain sentient creatures have no sense of colour, I believe. Be it so: they have their own way of understanding their world. But on my plane of mind the world attains to its fuller meaning. Is the beauty and truth of creation to be measured by a beetle?

In short, the external object has certain properties or inherent energies which are so subtle that it cannot reveal them to me save in such a way as to evoke a certain tonicity of feeling. The more subtle characters of the object cannot, in short, be conveyed quantitatively in sensation, but only qualitatively or pathically. The purely quantitative, or common, sensibles that reach the subject with the minimum or zero of pathic concomitant—the indifference of consciousness *qua* consciousness, give us the skeleton of the external world. These things exist and subsist in our system and give us, I say, the skeleton of nature. Light, colour, sound, on the other hand, give us the tone or feeling, so to speak, in and of the external world; and, as tone or feeling they can be conveyed to the subject only tonically or pathically. Universal *mind* quantifies and qualifies itself as a world, and it is only finite *mind* that can be the finite terminal and meaning of the non-subject: only in mind can it reveal its concrete fulness.

Are these proper sensibles, then, in any special sense, "relative" merely (sentientium phantasmata as Hobbes calls them)? I cannot see that they are to be called "relative" in the banal sense, any more than space and motion are "relative". They all *alike* exist as "related" to conscious subject and are all *alike* real objects. They

are all cosmic deliverances to me through body. They are not; it will be said, implicit in the very notion of object in general; but mere abstract object, I have already said, is an abstraction and nil: nay more, an object as spaced and timed and moved might possibly exist without these qualities for all I know; but they are borne on or in the object as characteristics, which go to constitute these objects in their external totality here and now, but which could not be communicated to conscious subject save in and through the pathic excitement of that subject. Again, I would say without a sentient subject these qualities might exist in nature; but not in their full meaning: for the mind-term and terminal is the meaning in terms of the potency range of each sentient. The same remark, however, applies to space and motion. The external completes its own meaning and truth of reality in a subject. To be in and for consciousness is the final "moment" of an infinite phenomenal series. Quantity and quality seem to me to stand or fall together as non-subject realities.

When I am offered a quantitative dynamic explanation of colour or light or odour or taste or sound as objective reality, I still am entitled to say that the quantitative relations of particles and motions are *such* in the external thing that they cannot convey themselves to a sentient subject save as qualities. The outside has passed into what I must distinguish as Quantitative Quality. And this quality *as in me* is the *true significance of the Quantitative process*. We may be able to express the quantitative event mathematically, but its true meaning—its reality, is in its final deliverance to sentience: it is sentience in dynamical terms. Any other doctrine appears to me to be an untenable

dualism and relativity; I am *within* a cosmic system and the final and crowning movement in the organic whole is to be found in sentience—a beënt phenomenal “becoming” for a subject which is also a beënt phenomenal, inasmuch as it is a body.

(I do not know, but I would ask: Is it not possible for the mathematical physicist to work out quantitatively the shape of a leaf or a pyramid? If so, his hieroglyphics would not be the truth and reality of the shapes.)

I feel compelled to face this question (if only to induce others to face it) at the risk of being considered crude. A certain complex series of vibrations reach my conscious subject through my brain and convey a sonata. Music, then, is what those vibrations *are*, when there are present the conditions of transition into a conscious subject, which (mark) is *their* terminal or completion as “existence” and *tells* what they are over and above a mere quantitative dance of particles. They are, as music, part of my world and of God’s world. The dance *out there* is rhythmic or musical. Music is *there* in the cosmic system known to me, as well as *here* in me; but it awaits me to realise *its own* truth in the system. The quantitative conditions of music the physicist can tell me; but they are only the *quantitative* conditions of music, not music; any more than the quantitative conditions of a rose is a rose, or of colour is colour. All these things are Absolute Being, revealing as much of its riches as is possible in this sphere of the Universal, and getting its true character-fulfilment and name in the subject-mind. The truth of our system, in brief, is in the actualisation—the synthesis of Object and Subject. And yet these are two, not one. Object

in becoming for Subject attains its own meaning while giving to the latter its real content.

If I might indulge in rhetoric I would even say: The natural world of flowers and stars might be regarded as waiting patiently for the emergence in the system of a conscious entity that they might fully realise themselves. The said consciousness, however, *adds* nothing to what they truly are, save the awareness in feeling of what they *truly* are. And you might even imagine a dim thrill of joy in the star world when a conscious subject first beheld them in their reality, and again when Copernicus and Newton revealed their ordered motions. The stars then sing together. Any other view is, to my mind, crude Dualism.

We see, then, a distinction between common and proper sensibles. The former reach my subject quite neutral and indifferent as to feeling-tone: the latter reach my subject by means of feeling-tone; and further, inasmuch as they are mediated for me through a finer adaptation of nerves, they are less stable and more subject to degree than Space or Motion. Hence, in fact, the difference in degree which makes them "proper". But these proper sensibles with the pathic element eliminated, are in no sense more "relative" than the common sensibles. Were all finite subjects abolished, the music and colour of nature would still be there as truly as quantity and motion are (neither more nor less); but until they completed themselves in a sentient subject, their true significance and fulness of meaning would not *be*. Even Space (Quantity) and Motion may have such a genesis as not to be space and motion in the sense in which the subject sees them. But, whatever the genesis,

space *is* what we see it to be as the terminal of an infinite cosmic process *within a certain system* in and of which we are. Everything is related; but the relatedness of the parts of a system, and which makes a system possible, does not invalidate the truth of the related system and the parts of it to a conscious subject which *is itself in and of that system*. Man has absolute knowledge: that is to say, he has knowledge which is truth—the truth of God within a bounded system.

As *between bodies* there is relativity of course as when we talk of size and weight and hardness with a certain standard in view; but my *consciousness of that relativity is not also relative*;—relative to the given fact of this relativity!

Though pathically experienced, light, colour, sound, taste, odour are, accordingly, not “relative,” but objectively real, in the system. It is for me a conscious subject in which they fulfil themselves to say what they are—to *name* them; or to put it otherwise, they seek and find their truth in the subject and name themselves. Every object is subject-object; every subject is, as regards content, object-subject. Quantity and quality and relation as “become” in and for the subject are the final truth of the object within this system to which we belong, and in which we live and die. There is, in short, a universal one system into which we are born and of which we are an integral and organic part.

Abolish the conscious subject and what would it all be? The question is futile. All is in a consciousness. What we have in experience must always be subject-object—the content of subject and the reality of object. Moreover, such a question is suggested by a crude dualism which is untenable. There are not two; but only a

one cosmic Actuality finding its highest term in Man; and yet there are two—veritable object and veritable subject. This is monistic Dualism.

If you ask, further, how would the object look to a conscious being on a higher plane, the answer is that I have nothing to deal with save subject in object, object in subject on *this* plane of universal mind; and you might as well ask, "Given an Absolute consciousness, how does a stone or a star look to It?" It is an Absolute synthesis I am searching for—not a synthesis of the Absolute. The sentient subject, nay, the all potent Ego itself, are within the whole of movement, not outside it.

The greater Objective reality of Common Sensibles.—It is doubtless true that we instinctively assign a greater objectivity and reality to space and motion than to the other properties of the complex sense-object, and, accordingly, it has been held that while primary qualities or common sensibles are external and independent, proper sensibles are the result of a relation or "affection". This apparent greater objectivity is explained, I think, by two facts: (1) The fact that we are not subjectively stimulated by space and motion in the same way as we are by proper sensibles; (2) That space and motion are felt and perceived to be the logical presupposition of all other possible properties. And not only logically, but really, first; for it is not necessary to doubt that the sensible world is a synthesis built up after a certain logical or dialectic order. Thus Space and Motion are fundamental synthetic universals: but, so far as the sentient subject is concerned, they are received and reflexed just as all other characters of the external are received.

. Each thing is a "for-itself" individual related to all else, but its relations are not "relative" relations. Sentient and rational beings are not to be torn from their real context. You will say, "What! exist for themselves independently of finite minds?" Yes; this is the primordial proclamation; and their relatedness to finite mind is like the relatedness of all things, one to another, *in a system*: they are not "relative". True, what is hot to-day is cold to me to-morrow, and so on: *things* are *inter se* relatively hot or cold, big or little, heavy or light; but this concerns the relative relations of things external to me and among each other, my body being one of those "things". This is not the question; but rather, Is the consciousness of the relations and relativities among things itself also a relative consciousness? Is knowledge a relativity of relativities or a truth of relativities?

But the reality of the given object does not consist in its being sensed; but in its being a determination of Being translated into Quantity, Quality, etc.

If I might make a suggestion, it would be that all characteristics that cannot be resolved into the *relation of bodies* are to be called primary—the body of the conscious individual being one of the terms.

To prevent misunderstanding, I would interpose a few words. It is exceedingly difficult to deal with one moment in the concrete total of Experience without using words that anticipate the other moments. I have been speaking all along of the attitudinal, but I have had constantly to anticipate the rational in order to make my meaning clear; I am speaking of sensing for example, and I may have had to introduce the word perception which is a rational act. To attuition a related system is presented—a system of *diversa*. The relations of things as in attuition are, however, merely relations in Space and Time and Motion as *felt*; the fact "that *there is* relation" has no place in an attuent subject. When the subjective dialectic comes

on the scene, it demands much more than this. Again, in attuition I am conscious of each diverse presentate as a fused total or synopsis merely. I do not concern myself about the parts, or about what is implicit in the object, and yet all is already *there* which any physic or metaphysic can ever discover. As an attuent organism, however, the instinct to persevere in my own *esse* directs me to a specific quality in the total before me: *e.g.*, a particular quality or part in the fused whole affects me specially if I am a raven, and another affects me specially if I am a dog, because these characters respectively have a certain affinity to my organism or its wants or, it may be, more than one quality may touch me to vivid consciousness *one after the other*. The total synopsis remains: it is *all* there, and, as a dog, I do not confound a bone with a brick nor a horse with a man, and this because the identity of each presentation is *sensed* as a synoptic whole; and a bone is to a dog, in so far as it is not a mere synoptic single and whole, merely a specific odour *plus* the vague synoptic whole. This specific separating of a certain quality in the total is an anticipation of the higher rational moment of mind—Percipience. When perception, however, comes on the scene it goes forth to seize, after first separating, the fused parts; its final purpose being to re-constitute what was only an attitudinal “total” (synopsis) in a “unity” or synthesis by means of a series of judgments; percipience itself being judgment. When, in a series of judgments, I proceed to elicit the predicates of the thing before me—its (so-called) *a posteriori* characters, I am by a process of analysis or division seeking for a synthesis of the many in the unity before me. The object in its sense-totality is to begin with a mere *sensed*—a this “being” or that “being”: my analysis reveals *a, b, c*, etc., till we have the full synthesis of the attut or synopsis as aggregated parts—finally (as the sequel will show) the synthesis of the Actual. Man constantly behaves like an attuent animal and names things prematurely by their salient predicate or predicates, and all his subsequent judgments about them are—the completion of a process of judgment instinctively, and often unwisely, begun. When he functions the second act of the dialectic, *viz.*, Concipience, he merely *aggregates* what he has separated. He again “perceives” the totality and, in doing so, perceives specifically what interests him, all the rest of the qualities in the synopsis still remaining in attuent sentience as a vague fused total only.

But because he has a sense-concept or aggregation of the parts, he does not know the “thing”; he is merely on his way. He has still

to complete the building-up of the single whole . a step-by-step process is inevitable and involves the continued abstraction of elements in the complex content of experience . But it is only the whole that is the "Actual"—and the consciousness of the Actual is alone knowledge . We do not need to go back to Plato and Aristotle to learn that neither sensation (attuition) nor the primal act of the dialectic in man, *viz.*, percipience, can give knowledge . With the real before us in sense, even when aided by rational percipience, we are only on the way to knowledge . *These are only moments in that ultimate synthesis of a thing and of the Whole which constitutes knowledge or Truth.* The ultimate synthesis alone is knowledge, and this involves essence, idea, cause, in short the whole dialectic, as we shall see.

My way of looking at experience may, perhaps, be called Monism; for there is no monist who does not accept subject-object. On the contrary, it is Dualism, for I contend for subject-"thing" and object-"thing": it is Pluralism *because* each individual is a "for-itself" working out its own existence from its own centre and responsible (so to speak) to itself. Negation and individuation secure this. This fact is not to be slurred over. I do not hold the reality of that tree in the hollow of the hand of my "experience" of it: nor does God for that matter. It is not desirable to half shut one's eyes in the presence of a real diversity and leave all in the monistic haze of a dubious and perilous existence. Each thing (as we shall in the sequel find) is a contradiction—a one which is at the same time the "other". The pluralistic presentation is a system of interdependence and of dependent independence—a One of Being and system in a various Many of veritable individua.

It is possible that it may also be said that the dualism maintained in these pages is simply the ordinary crass dualism. If so, then I have failed to make myself

understood. To believe in the total disparateness of *res cogitans* and *res extensa* is in my opinion to give up ultimate philosophy.

In short, the dynamic movements, from the first syllable of time, by which the present show of things is effected are beyond our cognition; but the final result is precisely the Given as it is given. The character of the phenomenon and the name of the phenomenon are in the sentience of it; so far as sentience can go.

One word more: According to the analysis of experience so far as we have gone, the external object is given as immediate in attuition. That our first sense-experiences are of the indefinite does not affect the question. Diverse complexes force themselves on the subject just as they exist externally and independently of the subject in relations of space, time, etc. The complex single totals are *there*, "becoming" for me as attuent, and awaiting the advent of reason for the full *cognition* of them as they exist. To make the externality of any object dependent on a process of reflective thought of any kind is contrary to obvious fact—for a worm and a mouse are sentient of an outer and of particular outers. I speak of the *realitas-phenomenon*—the real as appearing to sentient subject. But the "cognitive" truth of its static and dynamic relations can never be sensed, although feeling (in its larger meaning) enters into cognition also. Reason, as cognitive activity, subsequently raises the real into the actual; but even then our knowledge of what is before us cannot be exhaustive.

And let me recall: All qualities, including both

primary and secondary, do not in themselves or in their combination constitute phenomenal reality save as *Being*. Apart from this, they are mere disjointed adjectives. And the same remark applies to mind as sentient or attuent. The so-called "modes" of the subject are merely the modes of the object received, reflexed, and assimilated. Any other event in sentient subject is the result of the dynamic relations of the given modes—the dynamic of Association (attraction and cohesion), or, to speak generally, of a psychical mechanism and chemism. As a matter of fact, the adjectives are the manner or mode (*a posteriori* categories) in which Being and Mind-universal can alone represent its implicit and complicit content *explicitly* to itself: and, whereas man is himself part of this representation and within it, his individualised being (actuality as a monad) can have intercourse with the One of universal Being through these said categories of Recipience in which he as part of the externalisation is immersed. [Complete intercourse is only on the higher dialectic plane of mind.] These representations of The One are not *in se* and *per se ultimate* realities any more than the expression of my countenance or the words of my mouth are *me*. As abstract we have seen they are *negation* of the universal Being-Mind, and in themselves nought—non-being: but as concrete they are the *affirmation* and vehicle of universal Being-mind. The phenomenal is the sign of the thing signified, but a worthless sign and indeed nil, except in so far as the thing signified is *in* it. If I am to see the truth of creation, I must look at it as a concrete and cease hypostatising abstractions. All the quantitative and qualitative endowment of each presentate is Being-Mind revealing its inner nature as modes which are

itself, and yet the negation of itself. We generalise these and call them categories or predicaments.

Universal Being can live only in that which, as different and finite, is its own negation—a negation inherent in its Modality; and yet not a blank or abstract negation, but a negation that is itself sustained in and through Being. This is the fundamental contradiction of experience—the One of Affirmation in the Many of Negation. Each finite thing, and the totality of the finite, is a “Yes-No”; and yet it is not strictly a contradiction, for the No and Yes both *are* in each thing.

The finite subject repeats this method of the Universal. The One of universal Being finds *itself* in the Many of Negation, and the finite subject, again, is evoked into reality by the Many that negates it—a Many which finds its finite terminal and meaning as *realitas*-phenomenon in the one of finite sentient subject.

By *a posteriori* categories, I mean the universal predicaments of things as *Given*. They are within the sphere of Attuition, although it is only the higher plane of mind that can discriminate and affirm them. On the attuent plane, they are only sensed.

THE CATEGORIES OF ATTUITION OR THE PREDICAMENTS OF THE GIVEN.

(The *quid facti* or The Given as discriminated and generalised by Reason.)

We receive as Universals and affirm :—
BEING as Ground and Reality.

AS PHENOMENAL.

I. Quantity in general, *i.e.*, Extension, Space.

- II. Quality, *i.e.*, Quantity *qualified* into single individua by size, figure, colour, and so forth. Diverse (complex) individua or "ones"—Quanta. (Kind seems to fall under Quality as derivative or subordinate.) Diverse unitary quanta (reflected into continuity) yield Number.
- III. Rest and Motion of individua; *i.e.* of the above qualified quanta.
- IV. Relation of the individua :—
- (a) In respect of quantity—the greater and less ;
and the locality—or the *Where*.
 - (b) In respect of quality or the How—Degree.
 - (c) In respect of co-existence and successions
of motion or change. This latter involves Time-sequence, and the *When*.

These are the categories of the great Datum ; but they make no pretence to be exhaustive or adequately formulated : nor for the purposes of my argument is this necessary. The animal has them in sentience, not in knowing ; in consciousness, not in self-consciousness ; and as particulars not as universals,—save in a vague incipient way (universals of sense-imagination). The dynamical inter-relation of these synoptic objects and their space and time relations repeat themselves in the dynamism of the sentient or attuent subject as (so-called) Laws of Association, and so yield further (what may be called secondary) matter to the subject,—matter which, constantly misled by false associations, is itself for the most part untrue and misleading.

It may be said that these categories of the Given imply intellection. In a sense they do ; for both the feeling and attitudinal stages of mind are moments of intelligising. But they constitute the sentient and dynamical

and chemical moments of mind only, in all of which there is reflex activity and assimilation: they do not yield "perceptions" (which cannot be *given*) but only what I have called "attuits". Percipience, on the contrary, is a pure act, and is the first moment in that higher plane of mind which gives an entirely new aspect to Experience.

Along with the suggestions and phenomena of inner feeling, these predicables sum up the "matter" of our experience. By inner sense we mean all that our organism throws into consciousness—appetite, desire, pleasure, pain,—in short, Feeling in all its intra-organic modes. All that is not subjective dialectic is as matter to form: it is *realitas-phenomenon*; it is on the mind plane of attuition and reflexive activity. The attuitual result, notwithstanding, suffices to enable an animal to adapt itself to its environment by *feeling* its way. From the point of view of knowledge these feelings are confused and inadequate perceptions; or more correctly, not perceptions at all, but attuits.

These fundamental data, it seems to me, are, as data, wholly inexplicable. We must accept and make the best of them. We register them: that is all. It is with these data, as operated on by a helpless psychical mechanism, that (as we go on to show) the free subjective dialectic deals and for which it finds a constituting ground and connective significance. They sum up the world of experience as a crude Synopsis, not as a Synthesis; still less as an Organism. In so far as there *seems* to be a synthesis, it is a "given" external connexion passing into a recipient and reflexive one permanent subject—mirrored in it: not affirmed. Reason is not yet there.

Berkeley truly says (and all others with him), Sense *knows* nothing. What "knowing" is will shortly appear. On the other hand, Sense (in its highest form of Attuition) is "aware" of a great deal; the "given" is the material of knowledge; the attitudinal stage is a moment in the total of knowledge—the evolution of subject-object. And that moment of the given and recipient is not an awareness of a confused and chaotic manifold, but of diverse singles related in Time and Space. These single complex things give their categories along with themselves, but they become for "knowledge" only through that activity of will-reason which we are about to speak of. For example, the given of attuition gives sequence, nay, also a "sense" of invariable sequence, but it cannot give Cause. The Causality of the Ideological school (Hume, Condillac, etc.) is, if consistent, such causality as the attitudinal moment of mind yields, and that is all,—consecution in Space and Time hardened by repetition—not connection. It is not possible for any man to redargue Hume, if he keeps himself on the level of the attitudinal moment of mind and fails to see the function and significance of the higher.

We now may begin to see that Absolute Being externalises itself as universal Subject-Object. *Within* the said externalisation we have subject-object as finite; and just as the universal Object has no meaning save as efflux of the Universal Subject, so the finite object can alone find its meaning—its final term, in finite subject. When we speak of the Universal Subject, we may say Object *is* projected Subject; when we speak of finite subject we may say subject *is* (inverted) object.

Our experience is never object, but always subject-object in this sense that subject is necessary to awareness of object, and, further, that the truth of the object is in subject as its final term.

To repeat the point of view already set forth: The Given can only be the externalisation of Absolute Being—its modality—"becoming" in and for a finite mind on the sentient plane of that mind: finite mind being within the One Whole.

Note (1).—Method in the Evolution of Finite Mind

There is doubtless an Order—nay more, a method (*i.e.* rational order, and that means order with purpose or end), in the evolution of finite subjective mind from indefinite Pure Feeling upwards. In a rough way I have exhibited the steps in the introduction to my *Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta*. There is a method of "Feeling" up to Sentience and Attuition as well as a method of Pure Reason. It certainly concerns no one to doubt this. Now, if we had a method of Sense in its full logical evolution, as well as the method of Reason or subjective dialectic, we should have the whole of subjective mind as it evolved from Feeling of Being, through the stage of the dialectic, to that kind of supra-rational Feeling which we call Intuition. This would be a completed Man-epistemology. Would it also be a doctrine of Being as well as of Knowing? I cannot but think it would, and that it must. But note, even then it would be a doctrine of BEING and *its* life explained as a system of evolving categories (so-called); of Being, always of Being. The system would, of course, exhibit the entrance of the Dialectic as the formal of Being-activity—a free Will-dialectic. Such a system, however, would start from Being-universal reflected into a finite Being: it would presume this: unless it did, it could not find a beginning.

Would every step then be Reality? If the whole of experience be presented as a *dialectic* of categories, it could not be Reality without a new definition of the words Dialectic, Formal, Reason, Thinking, Knowing. My position compels me to say that the ascending concretising steps would be an evolution of Being, an upheaval and out-turning of the implicit of Being—sole ground-Reality; the dialectic itself,

when it appeared, being itself within Reality and, indeed, involved in the evolution-movements of Being from the first, though entering the system of finite minds explicitly only at a certain point—the point of the Man-emergence. I say the Dialectic would be in the upward movements of Being from the beginning, just as every step would be implicitly the sum of steps and a one concrete whole into which the sequence of Time did not enter. The externalised display, which we call the finite world of Nature and Man, would then be a temporal repetition of the eternal unfolding, always unfolded, of Absolute Being which sought, for the sake of its own completion, a finite life.

Meanwhile let us remember All is One evolving itself into differences which are real differences.

Note (2).—Space, Motion, and Time as within the Sentient Sphere.

Space, Time, Motion, are “given” to us empirically as ultimates and immediates, — universals (or conditions) of all possible experience. Any attempt to define them can only mean an attempt to bring into relief what we truly mean by the words. Where men imagine that they have done more than this, they have, in truth, uttered identical propositions,—the thing they are defining is assumed in the very words that go to the definition. To endeavour, however, to trace psychologically the processes whereby subjective mind becomes aware of these immediates is interesting. This may help us to bring into relief what is actually contained in the words.

Apart from such inquiry, however, let us say: Time, as a subjective experience, arises out of the experienced fact of the succession of movements outside us, or the succession of movements in the conscious subject. It is clear enough, however, that *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, etc., could never yield successiveness to the subject but for the synthesis of the discrete (one after-the-otherness) with the continuum of the conscious subject as a being. And so of outside successive movement or objective Time: mere movement is not Time, but a succession of movements (*a* following after *b*, etc., with an interval). Objective Time is, accordingly, the synthesis of the discrete of following events in a continuum of Being or Permanence. (So also in the sequence of Cause and Effect.) Being, until it is broken up by finite appearances and events, is itself During or Ever-going-on-ness. Being as During, in short, is the continuum in which events as finite discreta manifest

and fulfil themselves. It is the succession of the discreta that brings into consciousness Duration—the antithesis; or, rather, I should say this: Being, the first and universal experience of a conscious subject, reveals the attribute of Oneness in presence of the Many; of non-finiteness or the Unconditioned in presence of the Conditioned or diverse finite, of During which is a prolonged continuum in presence of the finite “one after-the-otherness” of Time. Its attributes are thrown back into it by its own finitised modality. Time, apart from the above definition, seems to me to be merely an abstraction.

So with Space. To talk of things “in space” is convenient—but, it seems to me, inaccurate; for there is only Space presented to me as Being extended, and things (beings) spaced or extended. Within the sentient sphere Space is given as a concrete, *viz.*, “Being extended” or as Quantity. Empty space is nothing; and abstract Quantity is outside the sentient sphere. The primal mode of Quantity must be such as (theoretically at least) comes within the possibility of being sensed. It must be *realitas-phenomenon*.

MEDITATION IX.

EVOLUTION OF THE SUBJECTIVE DIALECTIC: (*a*) Transition from Attuition to Knowledge—the Real to the Actual. (*b*) Will and the Rudimentary Act of the Subjective Dialectic, *viz.*, Percipience. (*c*) The Form of Percipience is the form of the Subjective Dialectic. *Notes* (1), (2) and (3).

ALL philosophy centres round Man. It purports to be the answer to the questions he alone can put. Its business is to interpret him and appoint him his place in the universe. And there are only two possible ultimate philosophies. That which brings man and all things under what is called the scientific conception—a one of causal process, mechanistic, irresistible, fateful; nor does it matter one straw whether the “stuff” of the whole is matter-stuff or mind-stuff, or whether its process be set forth in materialistic, mathematical, or dialectic terms. Pantheism and Pan-Hylism are, if strictly understood, ultimately the same. Idealism propounded under the scientific conception (*e.g.* Spinozism) is at root mechanism. The alternative philosophy is the philosophy of freedom, the philosophy of spirit. In this alone can the ideal, the ethical, the spiritual—nay, even God Himself, as other than an unconscious process, find a place; and in this alone is there satisfaction for the common consciousness and the sore needs of mankind.

(a) TRANSITION FROM ATTUITION TO KNOWLEDGE FROM
THE REAL TO THE ACTUAL.

We have got the Real in so far as Feeling and Sense in its highest form can give it, and we have now to complete it for ourselves through the activity of pure Thought (the Dialectic).

The interpretation of Experience means, as we have seen, the interpretation of object as unfolding itself in subject. But Man has two experiences—the attitudinal experience in which object is given to him as a synopsis, more or less clear, charged with Being; and the higher rational or dialectic experience in which the same object is affirmed not merely as a beent thing of sense, but as holding all the implicates whereby it is finally known. This latter experience depends on the emergence of the Dialectic in the subject; by which name we mean Reason in its widest comprehension. So endowed, man grips the object, and, in gripping, reveals its essential characters, giving to the whole that coherence for knowledge which it *already has* as object in the Absolute.

There are planes of subjective mind—moments in the comprehension of experience; and, up to the stage of attuition inclusive, there is no “thought” in any strict sense of that word, and consequently no “knowledge”. The consciousness of Being and of the diverse shapes and motions of the external in space and time relations, more or less inexact, and the psychic interplay of these, suffice for the adaptation of each creature to its environment according to its degree in the scale of Being; and they constitute the whole mental record. All is reflected into and reflexed out of the entitative sentient potency, which

is itself in and of the whole, and in continuity, phenomenal and ontological, with it. This entitative feeling-potency does not contain the "modes" of sense, save in the meaning that the object "becomes" for it as the object is in and for itself, in so far as mere sentience admits of the in-itselfness (which is the for-itselfness) of the object being revealed. The object thus becomes the content or real of the subject; which subject again is *not* the object (any more than a tree is a stone), and yet *is* the object as regards its filling or content. Through and by means of identification with the object, subject grows to the fulness of its feeling-subjectivity, *viz.* Attuition.

We pass now from the Immediate in Attuition to Knowing—from the empirical subject to the transcendental synthesising Activity—from consciousness to self-consciousness in which Ego is involved. This transcendental activity is the Formal in experience. But it makes its appearance *for* the Real and as immanent in the Real, without which it would be only an abstract, and wholly in the air. I say it is immanent *in* the Real—a factual element in every object, without which the Real would be chaos. Just as a sentient experience is a continuing of the realitas-phenomenon into a subject capable of receiving it, and to the extent to which it is capable; so the dialectic or formal is a mere continuing of Objective Dialectic into the same subject with a view to complete the record of a *true* experience in the said subject. The dialectic does not come down on the attitudinal record like a *Deus ex machina*: it emerges out of the attitudinal subject for the purpose of subsuming it and revealing the truth of its content. The new movement carries the lower movement and all

its content in its bosom. Attuition and the Dialectic have the same "object": we cannot cut the mind of man into two; mind merely evolves itself into a higher plane: that which was passivo-active is now sublated into the activo-active. The Dialectic, already *in* the presented synopsis, now becomes alive in Man as the in and for itself of this new creature: that is all.

Now, the primal act (speaking logically) of the new movement, which is a *Will* movement, is the projection and seizing of the empirical or attitudinal subject as object and, in the affirmation of that, affirming a consciousness of the conscious subject. This pure act yields the flash and fact of Ego. Thereby also it constitutes the total mind a duality; but not a dualism.

In short, we now rise above that stage of conscious being in which man is a mere reflexive and recipient mind-entity—recipient and reflexive of the real of inner and outer Feeling, and ascend that Pisgah mount of mind, where man surveys his world-estate, and whence he advances to take possession of it and to bend it to his uses. Mind, at the summit of its attitudinal moment, receives an ordered world as a "given": it is a real-rational that is given; but the relations of things are merely a *felt* relation in Time and Space. Until reason or dialectic emerges, mind cannot "perceive" and "affirm" an ordered system. So far as the subject is concerned, things hang very loosely together in a mere synopsis of sense and imagination and association—all guaranteed as to their reality by the fact of immanent Being. Not knowledge, but only synopsis, is generated in attuition. There is, as yet, no thought and no knowledge. Reason—the subjective dialectic, now

appears and sists itself with much majesty in the High Court of Appeal, and illumines all by yielding the thought-implicates of all attuitional experience. (*Note 3*, p. 156.)

The "synthetic unity of apperception" by itself could not give us a caused or grounded, much less a teleological experience. It merely receives, and holds in one, various experiences—a unity which might, for that matter, be an inner discord. Unifying is the work, as will in the sequel be apparent, of the first moment only of the subjective Dialectic, *viz.*, a synthesis which holds differences together. But the whole dialectic as a one movement goes further than this, and not only synthesises, but takes up, all experience as causal and teleological.

Whence do we get our conviction of the regularity of nature? First of all from custom and association, Hume would say, and then stops here. In so stopping, he stops, I consider, at the attuitional plane of mind. A dog will return to the lane where he has once found bones in the full expectation of finding them again. Why should he not? There is no reason why what has happened once should not happen again, nay always: it would be extraordinary if it did not. So "feels" the dog, and looks puzzled at the absence of the expected bones. A man in a similar relation to some unexpected change, asks, "What did this, and why?" So with the regularity of nature: things must always happen as they did at first, unless there be a cause or sufficient reason why not. This is on the presumption that man's way of unifying is a causal and teleological way. The teleologico-causal synthesis of ex-

perience is not merely a postulate or hypothesis : it is the very form of reason itself. Attuitional experience receives things, as already organised, in so far as a sentient subject can receive and assimilate them ; but on the higher plane, it is *I* that think them, *I* that dialecticise them (as myself Dialectic) ; and yet, subjective dialectic is only the cosmic way whereby the dialectic of things reaches me : that is to say, through my own active dialectic. How else could it do it ? And this dialectic yields the universal and necessary teleologico-causal Predicate : nay, it is itself in the totality of its movement precisely that.

Note.—By “subjective” dialectic I mean the subject as now having evolved the potency of the dialectic.

The Actual. To attuitional mind, then, all is *given* : by mind as will-reason all is *taken*. To what is given immediately in inner and outer sense we have assigned the term “Real”—Being and its modality ; that is to say, Universal Being displaying itself in and through its phenomenal and dependent characters—all reflected into us, and re-flexed out of us in accordance with a cosmic law : but we have not yet got the *Actual*. It is the Actual, however, which, starting from the primary “actualisation” in a conscious subject, we are all the while in search of. We have frequently assumed it, because it has been impossible to avoid using the language of reason and anticipating its emergence, when speaking of the lower moments of subjective mind. The term has, however, been always employed by me (I believe) as denoting the concrete actualised resultant in a *rational* subject. Its distinction from the Real is now to be considered. My experience of an object

as real (realitas-phenomenon) belongs to the sphere of attuition: I have now to search for the implicates of my experience of the object as it floats within the sphere of the next and highest moment of subjective mind.

In short, I am now asking what makes *Knowledge*, as distinct from *Attuition*, possible? And the answer is, Reason itself as a pure and simple one dialectic movement, evolved in and out of attuent subject as a new potency—*out of* Natura in which it already is: not at all descending on a confused manifold. The new movement is immanent in subject as attuent and carries the record of attuition with it. It emerges for the mere purpose of dealing with the attuent given, and revealing many things not patent to sense. Matter and Form are thus not relegated to different worlds. But in the evolution of finite mind, the Dialectic or Formal, *always present*, becomes a “for itself” in an individual only at a certain stage.

The moments where-through subjective mind advances to the fulness of its being are also the moments in the object wherein and whereby it advances to its completion as a *thing known*. They are all in the Object. Knowing and being coalesce in the highest synthesis which is the Truth. To speak of their identity is misleading; but yet they are truly an identity in difference held within a universal One of Being and Dialectic.

The Dialectic is not generated out of an abstract Ego: Ego is itself generated (as I have said)¹ by the Dialectic—the new transcendental movement—

¹I would refer here specially to the analysis in the concluding Meditation on Death and Immortality.

Will-reason : and this dialectic, all the while, has been immanent in attuition. I have not to grope about for the Category of Substance ; mind already has it in Feeling, and now mind on the higher plane perceives and affirms it : nor have I to search for a Category of Ground or of End or of Organism. This Will-Dialectic will itself be found to be a one organic movement, yet holding all the (so-called) *a priori* categories in its own form.

The subjective "dialectic" is no more constitutive of the form of things than subjective "sense" is of the *realitas-phenomenon*. The tide of universal Being and Dialectic flows into the mind of man and becomes "for him" as an individual. And he finds the truth of the Real and Actual only in so far as he is a true re-flexion of the Universal. All is in the Object : God is there revealing Himself. But the finite mind can grasp the given of sense and of reason, *i.e.*, Reason in the matter of Sense, only in successive movements or steps.

The above is an anticipation of our argument. I will now enter into more detail, and I cannot do better than quote from a previous book.

(b) WILL AND THE RUDIMENTARY ACT OF THE SUBJECTIVE DIALECTIC, *VIZ.*, PERCIPIENCE.¹

1. In the most advanced stage of sensation which I name "attuition" (the characteristic of the higher forms of the brute-creation) not only has consciousness of the external, as a whole, emerged from the condition of confusion in which the lower stages of sensation may be supposed to leave it, but total objects, *e.g.*, tree, stone, etc., are received as separate one from the other. A

¹ Quoted from *Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta*, 2nd ed., p. 33.

tree-stump, a boy, and a wheelbarrow are all separate and diverse object-totalities to a dog, and further observation will quickly satisfy us that the impressions which are received from these objects by the dog are probably as numerous as those received by the infant-man. The aggregate of sensations which constitutes the object, *a* for the dog, is clearly demarked on his sensorium and consciousness from the aggregate which constitutes *b*. So with the infant. Now this is a most important advance of mind. For it means, in so far as we can venture to interpret it, that attuition (the mental condition of the higher animals) is the instinctive and reflex (not active and rational) *co-ordination* of particular sensations, yielding thereby a consciousness of the collective totality of various sensible qualities as constituting the object which is, for the time being, present. It is not, however, the consciousness of those various qualities, separately one from another, which in their co-ordinated co-existence constitute the object in sense. The *total* objects are separated *for* Recipience one from the other *as totals*, but the various qualities of each object are not so separated. These various sensible properties or qualities, however, in so far as they are sensible, may be, and frequently are, *in succession*, attutied one after the other, as characteristic of a single total object of attuition, and as belonging to one and the same object, and not to another. This, however, is wholly dependent in the case of both animals and infants on the *salience* of the said qualities—the prominence of the qualities to the eye or other sense,—the obtrusiveness or the force with which they *imprint themselves on the Receptivity*; and, further, on their adaptation to the organic needs of the animal. But the various properties

of the external totality are not seen to be *co-existent yet separate* elements in making up the phenomenal object which for the time is the whole or aggregate in attuition. Attentive observation of the mental condition of dogs and infants bears out this conclusion; while apart from such observation, it is manifest that the consciousness of certain properties as co-existent in any object of attuition, and yet separate one from the other, implies (as we shall shortly see) a higher mental energy.

2. In attuition then the objective sense-totalities are reflexed as separated one from the other, but the co-existent properties resident in each separate totality (though these may be objects of attuition one after the other or in succession, and thus, by means of association, be dimly connected with the totality) are not attuited as *together and yet separate*. The attuition of an object is in brief a clear, but not a distinct, consciousness. Individual objects are not mixed in confusion; the outline or delineation of each single "whole" is clear, or approximately so; the elements which constitute each, however, are yet, in their mutual relations, confused and blurred; and yet a passivo-active co-ordination is busy and successful.

3. Note that even in this comparatively advanced mind-plane of attuition, the conscious subject has not yet delivered itself from the dominion of objects, although it is aware of the separation of one object from another. All that it senses, and all that it attuites, occupy the receptive individuality to the suppression of individuality itself. They conceal and overpower, without extinguishing, it. Totalities of attuition separate and define themselves *on* the subject and *for*

it; they are not separated or defined from each other *by* the subject, save in the restricted sense of the reflex action of the sensorium or basis of feeling.

Individuality, indeed, is as yet crushed by the weight of the external object, so to speak: the animal is little more than a machine set in motion by the outer or inner sense—a more or less clear mirror, it is true, of phenomenal nature, yet itself also a part, though a conscious part, of the system of nature. Will or Free-will are, at this stage, notions wholly inapplicable. We have reflex action and Conation, but not Will.

Note.—The manifestations of consciousness would seem to grow with the growing physical basis of life and consciousness, and to degenerate and die with it. This physical basis, be it nerve or something of which nerve itself is merely the body or vehicle, would appear to be the condition of the existence of consciousness and limits its quantity and quality. The case of ants and other insects, however, seems to show that the range and character of attitudinal intelligence does not depend on the quantity, but on the quality, complexity, and adaptation of this physical basis.

4. I may now (even at the risk of repetition) define Attuition to be the reflex co-ordination of elements of sensation as an image or synopsis of a total: it is a synthesis *in* and *for* the conscious subject: strictly speaking a synopsis only.

5. When we next in our survey of life take note of conscious mind in its onward and upward progress, we find that a fresh movement has carried the recipient and reflexive subject into the midst of what is, in truth, a very remarkable series of phenomena. The subject-individual has passed out of and beyond itself; it has passed beyond the mere *reflex* co-ordination of *data*; it has overleapt the stage of passivo-active receptivity;

it has disencumbered itself of the load of that which is not itself; it has become freely active. The phenomena, quiescent (quantity, form, colour, solidity, etc.), or movent and sequent, which characterise the outward, are now not merely attuitionally received, reflexly co-ordinated, and dealt with by an unselfconscious psychical mechanism; but, by a spontaneous inner movement of the conscious subject, they are arrested in their irregular and devious courses, and *actively* distinguished and consciously co-ordinated. A Force advances out of what has been hitherto mere receptive attitudinal individuality, and prehends or seizes the presentation, holding it close to itself and contemplating it. This Force is Will. Mind now proclaims itself as Reason or Dialectic.

6. No new being, no new individuality, has been here created. The subject-individuality exists in the dog as in the man: but in the latter, a rebellious movement has taken place against the outer which has ended in victory. No new "substance," let me repeat, now comes within our ken, as is too commonly assumed; an assumption which vitiates metaphysics-proper, as well as psychology and ethics. However long we hold in contemplation this new fact in the progressive life of mind, it presents itself to us, at last as at first, as a movement initiated in, and effected by, the subject itself whereby subject affirms subject and becomes a self or ego. It is transmuted into ego. Less than this it is not; more than this it is not. In other words, while the receptivity of attuition is rightly denominated passive activity, impressions being co-ordinated by mere reflex action, we have now to deal with active activity. Nay

more, it is *pure* activity. For observe, it has in its primordial movement no content. It is, in other words, Will : or, if we choose to indulge in tautology, Free Will.

We thus at once see that the essence or essential differentiation of Reason from animal consciousness is Spontaneity, Freedom, independence of all else.

Animal Conation is determined by the desire dominant for the time-being.

7. Further, in so far as this Will has any stimulus, that stimulus is to be found wholly in itself,—in the Form of End which lies concealed in the fact of movement. As kinetic movement, it contains and projects *end* as its terminus and proceeds towards it in a specific way.

In animal Conation the subject is being dragged towards the satisfaction of desire in some object. It has a terminus of movement, but not an “End”. Although we have in such Conation a prediction and analogue of what is characteristic of the higher plane of mind, a willed purpose is not even implicit in it. Herein lies the distinction which makes a spiritual philosophy possible.

8. What then is the “end”—the final cause (not the mere terminus) of this primary and rudimentary kinetic movement? It is a *Percept*. And what I desire to emphasise is, that the “particular” end is not, and cannot be, in the movement, as such, in its initiation ; otherwise it would begin where it ended, which, besides being contrary to phenomenological fact, is absurd. On this primary fact, then, of pure intelligence, not of moral or pathological motive, I ultimately rest Will as free and autonomous.

9. There is contained in the primary fact of Will, (1) Kinetic-energy, and (2) The pure or empty Form of End. The behaviour of this formal Will-dialectic, when it deals with materials, will shortly appear.

10. In consequence of this sudden advance of the subject from within outward, the phenomenal object is then and there subordinated to the subject. The individual intelligence is no longer under the dominion of objects, living only in them, and swayed hither and thither by them. It seizes them one by one at pleasure, and under the stimulus of its own inborn formal power, *affirms* the existence of each. That is to say, the conscious subject not only attuites one object as differing from another, but also as *opposed to itself* (the subject), as negating itself; and thereupon subsumes it under itself—relates it to the unity of its own conscious self in the act of affirmation. Hitherto, the subject has beheld objects, *sensing* their outness; now, it beholds them *qua* objective, as *not-self*, and proceeds to take possession of them. It sees them in the antithesis of subject and object; and is thus empowered, not merely to affirm (what has as yet been only *felt*) that they are not-self or “object,” but also to affirm what has already been only vaguely attuited, *viz.*, that they are themselves, and not other things. This isolation of the object and the reduction of it to the subject is, speaking generally, Percipience or Perception—a pure act.

(c) THE FORM OF PERCIPIENCE IS THE FORM OF THE
SUBJECTIVE DIALECTIC.

What is the specific way of procedure to the End?

1. Attuition is, observe, already conscious of an

“other” or not-self as object, although it cannot possibly affirm it. It is conscious of an outside α , be it space generally (a *totum objectivum*) or some particular figured object of attuition such as a tree or stone.

Percipience has this datum of attuition [which I call the sensate] to deal with ready to hand, and its Form of procedure is this: (1) Kinetic movement of Will against a presentate (already in attuition as not the subject, *i.e.*, as an object). (2) This presentate is either A, B, C, or D, etc. (3) It is not B, C, or D. (4) *Therefore*. (5) *A is A*. This conclusion as to the being and identity of A is the satisfaction of the pure empty Form of End, which is in the bosom of the conscious-subject when it evolves or functions *Will*; and that end is, as we see, a Percept. The object is already in antagonism with the subject, and, now, in accordance with the above process, it is at once prehended and subsumed under it, that is, it is known or perceived; and instantaneously thereafter, or rather we should say, *therein* affirmed.

2. Thus, in entering this new sphere of conscious mind, which new sphere is here identified with Perception, I find that I enter it enveloped in the forms of—(1) End; (2) Excluded Middle; (3) Contradiction; (4) Sufficient Reason; (5) Particular Being as an Identity (with its consequent affirmation in the form of a proposition). These Forms (or Laws of Will-movement) are simply the explicit expression of what is implicit in this new advance of consciousness—this wholly inexplicable spontaneity, this *actus purus*, this Will which lies at the root of the whole, and makes Reason possible—is, in fact, along with its form, Reason.

3. Let it be carefully noted, however, that prior to the subject-evolved act of perceiving there existed a sub-selfconscious, *i.e.*, a conscious attitudinal state in which the object A wrote *itself* on my receptivity—affirmed *itself*, as it were, on me the subject. Its shape, its being, its threeness the subject *felt* or sensed and reflexed ; but that was all.

4. Simply to seize orprehend the object would not yield perception of it. Having arrested and isolated the individual "thing," a chasm would still exist between the object and knowledge of it, were it not for the final movement of Will, which places the prehended object in the one of conscious subject out of which the new energy emerged. In attuition, the *object* falls *on* the one of conscious subject, and is there, by a co-ordinating reflex action, dealt with and projected outside, and is a sensate; in percipience, on the other hand, Will prehends the object as there outside (as already a sensate), and, bringing it back, relates it to the one of consciousness, and, by this subsumption into itself, takes possession, perceives, knows : the sensate is now a Percept.

5. Thus, beginning with attuition which merely receives the external with more or less of reflex co-ordination, the subject, as now Will, moves, after a certain manner, to a completion of that simplest act of intelligence which is Percipience : a vital and all-important act, however ; for to perceive is to judge or know. We are by Percipience launched into the sphere of Reason.

6. Nor is this yet all : for, as we have seen, there at once arises in the moment of prehension or completed

percipience, the inevitable impulse to externalise the fact of percipience by a vocal or other sign. "We are compelled to "affirm" A (the percept)=A, or A is A. This is vocal affirmation, the sign and seal of the completed perception, the propounding or proposition of a prior judgment.

The vocal or other sign of affirmation carries with it (as itself an externalisation of the inner of consciousness) not merely the affirmation of the being of A, and of A as equal to itself, but further the being of A as *external* to me : A is *there*, as opposed to me who am *here*. The original consciousness of a "somewhat" opposed to, or set over against, my consciousness at the stage of attuition, forced into relief my own separate "hereness" as a "feeling"; and now finally, in the last moment of percipience—subsumption into the one of consciousness—the subject affirms (what, however, has been already *sensed* in attuition) the externality and independence of the percept : for the thought-affirmation is not merely "A is A," but "A is A" *there*, not here (which "here" is me).

7. Thus, as the negating object before the birth of Will stimulates the potential basis of Feeling into Subject, or single homogeneous feeling entity, so now the perception and affirmation of the object, as "itself there," involves the perception and affirmation of the subject "here," and as equal to itself : self-identity. I understand Hume to say that there is, in impressions, nothing but impressions sole and single and no consciousness of "*being*" apart from these. But the record of æsthetic consciousness is not so simple : as I have shown, it contains the *feeling* of being and (reflexly)

thereness. And this *feeling* the dialectic process ends by *affirming*. The process of dialectic which so ends contains [fully stated] the following moments :—

8. *Initiation of Reason.*

- (1) The Kinetic initiating movement which we call pure Will. (a) Formal (empty) End lies implicit in this initiation of movement.

Modus of the Reason-Movement: Mediation or Ground.

- (2) The moment or form of the Excluded Middle.
- (3) The moment or form of Negation or Contradiction.
- (4) The moment or form of Sufficient Reason.
 - (a) Implicit in this mediating process is (real) End. The mediating process is thus in its totality teleologico-causal.

Transition.

- (5) Prehending, and relating the content of the issue of the preceding moments to the unity of conscious subject : subsumption.

The Issue.

- (6) The affirmation of the Being of the object as a determined somewhat : "A determined so and not otherwise".
 - (a) The law of Identity is in this act yielded.
- (7) The affirmation of the externality and independence of the object as not only "that," but also "there".

These moments constitute the fabric of Reason : they are all implicit in the prime and primal activity of mind

which we call Percipience ; Sense is impotent to yield them.¹

9. Percipience, again, "Tree=Tree" or Tree is Tree, is *Judgment*: to be distinguished, however, from judgments commonly so called such as "the tree is green," as being an identical and so far forth an analytic, in opposition to a synthetic or ampliative judgment. All judgments are in the moment of Negation or of Identity.

10. When we say that this free act of intelligence is Perception or Knowledge, we merely employ different words to denote the same thing. For Perception and Knowledge, when rightly understood, are in their essential nature identical terms [perception being only the first moment in the total process, while containing the form of the whole].

11. Affirmation is again (as has been already said) merely the last term of the moments of percipience when they take the concrete form of a verbal proposition as externalised thought ; and this we call utterance or Speech. Speech is a prolongation of the free potency of will-perception into externalisation. It thus may be regarded as an impulse (quite outside the possibility of explanation) to re-create sensuously, in articulate sounds, the world of sensations after they have passed through, or been reduced to, the unity of consciousness as percepts. The result is really *vox et præ-terea nihil*—a sound of which the significance lies in the prior percept. Speech—the instinct of physical articulation follows in the wake of thought : and at all stages

¹Thus the independent being of plurals yielded on the plane of Attuition is now affirmed in the first act of the Dialectic.

of experience we feel that nothing is a safe acquisition till the perception, conception, and so forth, is externalised by us in definite and appropriated sounds.

12. Now, it is precisely this act of Will with its form of End, transforming the animal attitudinal intelligence into human percipient intelligence, which proclaims that the boundary of the non-rational has been overstepped, and that the subject has become, once for all, rational. Will is thus seen to be, in its initiation, the root, and in its form, the essence, of Reason; and Will in its primal act is ground and possibility of Knowing. Will, I say, in its formal movement is Reason, and in its *real* end is the realisation for itself of the idea, as we shall hereafter see.

13. Percipience is of the simple and singular; but, as we have seen, it is not itself simple: it is a dialectic process containing various moments. Its issue also contains implicit in it the affirmation of the being and "there-ness" of the percept. The "now" is also implicit, as will appear hereafter. The affirmations are, however, affirmations of *data* of feeling or recipience.

14. The attitudinal (or animal) subject functioning pure Will, and so seizing itself as well as other things, is the subject becoming aware of the subject. Thus, Self-consciousness, Ego, Self or Personality is constituted or evolved. What the Subject is, and again what the Self *is*, no man can explain, any more than he can carry his head in his mouth. All that can be done is to watch the latter in the throes of birth and name what we see.

15. "Self," or Ego, at whose heart lies Will as condition of its possibility, and *precisely because Will is in it*, now directs itself as a spiritual dynamic with endless activity, upon the infinite field of sensation and attuition presented to it, and through affirmation transforms attuits into percepts, attitudinal consciousness into knowledge or cognition. The activity is endless, because Will is pure activity; its essence *is* activity; or rather it *is* pure activity.¹

16. Further, the emergence of this new potency, Will, gives me possession of a new recept—a recept of a pure activity and of all the forms of that activity. I become conscious of an initiating energy and its processes.

17. Such is the primary synthesis of object with subject as Will-reason. But reason is not content with this primary synthesis. It resumes its attack on the perceived presentation again and again with a view to fuller knowledge.

18. This new power—the power of imposing self on, and subsuming into self, the presentations of sensation and attuition (inner and outer), enables a man to affirm of each presentation in succession that it is itself, and not merely not another, but also not the others—which others it has eliminated (or suppressed). The distinctness with which these several properties are discerned depends on the *intensiveness* with which the special

¹ Let me say here that I am not speaking of the units in attuition which constitute the matter of a simple percept, but with the resultant percept itself—a colour or total figure, etc. Of the units, we, as yet, know nothing: in so far as it is possible to know anything, it can only be by means of a subsequent and purposed analysis.

force, which is root of Reason, is applied. From the first that force is a free, spontaneous movement, but the intensity and energy of its application vary in accordance with physical and sensuous obstructions and with the gradual growth of motives to know. Most men take, all their lives, such a semi-passive survey of the properties of successive objects as amounts to little more than attuition. The objective phenomena which to the eye of sense constitute the "thing" have doubtless in the course of this passive experience been appropriated by the conscious subject, but they are not *known*; that is, the conscious subject as "Will" has not subsumed them, and they fade from the memory. Nay, so transcendent is the power of Will over nature, that not merely is the prehension or seizing of the external phenomenon dependent on its activity, but by fixing itself on one or two phenomena it can, for the time, annihilate the consciousness of all else. Self is otherwise engaged, and the whole realm of nature strives in vain for a hearing. Self has chosen to shut it out, and to reduce its whole capacity for recipience to a unit.

19. Such is the nature and such the potency of this wonderful central force, which some regard as a passive sensorium, a reed moved by every wind that blows, a sheet of white paper, one phenomenon in an infinite series of invariable or (it may be) determining sequents!

20. When the subject, making itself its object, by an act of Will constitutes Ego it proclaims its freedom. Its limitation is then itself alone and within itself. But its freedom has already been vindicated. It is only as

a sentient and attitudinal subject that it is the slave of the other, of that which is *not* it.¹

Note (1).—If I sometimes speak of Will as Reason it will be understood that I use the initiatory moment of the whole for the whole. Reason is Will-potency *plus* the form of its process. The issue of the process relatively to the individual subject is Ego. There is no such thing as an abstract entity called Will. The correct name is Will-reason.

Note (2).—The word "thing" is inapplicable to the determination of universal Being which we call conscious entity, much more to that conscious entity when evolved into a self-conscious entity. As we shall see in the sequel, "thing" as a term can be applied only to the concrete determinate—the idea in its phenomenal garb. None the less is there an "entity" which is *not* one of its own fleeting series of phenomena. The idea is the "form" or "soul" of the organic body and is a reality. If not, let some prophet say, in intelligible terms, what it *is*. Universal Mind is determined into a definite sentient and active "somewhat"; and this individual mind contains in itself its own possibility of relations to the Universal object.

Note (3).—We are sometimes told that "thought" enters into the deliverances of mere sense as such. If so, it would seem to follow that thought as such is merely a higher form of Sense. If pure thought be the characteristic of mind, only when it evolves itself into a subjective dialectic, it cannot prior to this "mould" the record of sense. But recognising, as we do, planes of mind and continuity in all creation, we *ipso facto* recognise even in Feeling and still more in Sensation those beginnings which predict the pure activity of Thought. In the sensation of "*blue*" there is no thought, but in the perception of it there is the whole of the dialectic. The process of percipience is, however, foreshadowed in Sense; for in sensing the difference of blue from red, sentience may appear to affirm a universal, *viz.*, Colour, and to affirm moreover differences and oppositions in Sensates. But, in truth, Sense neither discriminates, distinguishes, nor affirms: it only *feels* and reflexes difference *forced* on it by objects, and in so far as there is a universal, it is a dim, vague and merely *felt* universal. It is in this way and to this extent that Sense predicts and anticipates the pure activity of the dialectic. And, accordingly, it is not incorrect to say that the dialectic (or thought) is *immanent* in Sense in its highest mode of Attuition.

¹ The quotation from a former treatise ends here. If any reader really cares to understand the argument of this book, he will not, I hope, resent repetitions, if they help me to a lucid exposition.

MEDITATION X.

THE DIALECTIC PROCESS AS SPECIFICALLY WILL-MOVEMENT: (*a*) Self-Consciousness—Ego. (*b*) Growth of Self-Consciousness generally. (*c*) Range of Percipience as Dialectic, Dialectic Percepts are Ultimates. (*d*) Will as Root of the Subjective Dialectic—Free Will. (*e*) Further Considerations.

If mind arrested itself at attuition, it would not question its immediate experience of either inner or outer feeling. It would then remain in a passive and godlike equilibrium, except in so far as it was involved in the promptings and disturbances of organic desires.¹ The experience we should have gained would have yielded to mind as attuent, nothing but diverse shapes, vague co-existences and sequences in space and time, and more or less vivid relations of our organism to the satisfaction of its needs. Subject and object would be one in an important practical sense; for, although felt, they would not be distinguished and could not be separately affirmed. Mind would live in and through the object in contented tranquillity, reposing in the great binding fact of Being. As sentient, it is lost in the object alone: it is only on the higher plane of the Dialectic that the relation of subject and object becomes a question.

¹ It is not surprising that the Egyptians worshipped a cow: that animal seems to me a fine embodiment of the most recent definitions of "The Absolute".

On this plane, a new event proclaims itself, as we have seen. This all recognise, and call the new event or fact evolved in the cosmic system, Reason ; and then assign the name Man to the creature in whom it appears : appears as supreme and governing, as constitutive of Man as Man, and constitutive, therefore, of the possibility and character of his peculiar experience.

What precisely is it ? Watch its genesis. Assuredly an activity ; which, to distinguish it from the movement or conation of a merely attuent organism in search of the satisfaction of desire, we call pure activity. It is Will. This activity first seeks to affirm and complete its attitudinal experience ; but, when it has once started on its career, why not be content with the more exact discrimination and reduction to self of the sensates of attuition as *realitas-phenomenon*, and leave all else ? The answer is, Because it brings with it—nay, it *is*—a dialectic or *organising* activity. It brings no fresh *matter* of experience into consciousness except itself ; and this is always the same.

This new dynamic of mind we call “formal” because it is not itself the “matter” on which it directs itself : it can be so only by duplicating itself. We also say that, as formal, it is *a priori*, inasmuch as it is not a datum of recipience. As formal, what then is its *essential* Form as furnishing *a priori* forms generally ? What does it contribute to our experience as question and answer ? What does this eye of reason see to which the eye of sense is blind ? What process does it move through that it may truly see ? These are vital questions.

We call this Will-reason the subjective dialectic : it is the method of “knowing” experience, the movement

whereby the "sensing" of experience is superseded—not abolished, but sublated. It is not put on the top of attitudinal empirical mind, but evolves itself out of it and never leaves it. And this "knowing" of experience is simply the reduction of experience to the demands of the Dialectic itself which insists on living its own life, and on now playing the supreme cosmic rôle. It is necessary to the constituting of the unity, coherence and wholeness of experience: it insists on doing so.

Henceforth, accordingly, all our judgments are the analysis of complexes presented to attuition. We analyse the synopsis with a view to synthesis; for we are now more than intelligising animals: we are more than attitudinal mind adapting itself to its environment and dynamically assimilating experience through unself-conscious psychical and dynamical movements. The subject, as conscious mind, exhausts itself within the sphere of merely animal potentiality: whereas man is, further, *self*-conscious. Let us again consider what the higher plane of subjective mind means, how it arises, what it implies, and its manner of dealing with the given real of attuition, outer and inner.

(a) *Self-Consciousness—Ego.*

And first, I would consider the genesis of *self*-consciousness. By this we mean that the conscious subject becomes conscious of itself as its own object. The subject is not a datum to conscious subject (as external objects or inner feelings are data to a conscious subject), but is itself constituted by subject a datum or object to and for itself. There, surely, is an intense activity, an all-potent energy here. When we think of it, it never

fails to impress us as an astonishing evolution of the great cosmic process within the specific being which we call Man. And if we dwell on it long enough, it fills us not only with wonder, but with a kind of fear. We contemplate with mysterious awe this new being, which is yet ourselves, and seems to be constituted by a free act within ourselves. It *must* mean much: it *must* mean everything for us. And if we look more closely to ascertain, if perchance we may, what is the essential characteristic of the new cosmic fact, we find that it is an evolutionary movement in and of the already existing conscious subject (or entity) itself, whereby it goes forth, under an impulse of pure formal activity with End implicit, to seize and divide all presentations, breaking up wholes that are merely "associated" dynamically, separating total complexes and the parts of each from one another in order to raise the attitudinal synopsis to a synthesis, and so to transmute a mere total into a unity.

But first of all (logically speaking), subject must divide itself from itself. In the very crisis of the reflexing of a feeling in mere attitudinal consciousness stirred from without, we found an automatic reflexive externalising of the receipt as "object"; which object at the same moment returned, as sensate, into the subject. The subject was, in its turn, thereby implicitly affirmed, *i.e.*, evoked as subject: *implicitly* affirmed, I say, for, as a matter of fact, it is only dimly *felt*; as by animals. So now, in the crisis of subject projecting *itself* as object to itself, the subject (now *there* to thought) returns into itself as its own object. We are evidently lifted here far above the plane of reflexive mind-action: the movement in and of the

subject is an act emerging out of itself, uncaused,¹ or, rather, *causa sui*.

This pure act, as distinguished from the passivo-active or reflexive, I call WILL. There is no other name for it. It lifts me above attitudinal experience: *it is the possibility of me*. Will (Boulesis) means free pure activity; and to speak of "free" will is a tautology. It is precisely here that we encounter Free Will in the man-organism; not in moral choice. If it is not here, in the primary act of *knowing*, it is nowhere; and man is then a dynamic organism, and nothing more. The motive force of action on the attitudinal plane, on the other hand, is, inasmuch as it is not *subject-originated*, to be distinguished as Conation or "volition" (Thelema): it is not free, because it is determined by the dominant inner affection or external force that, for the time, occupies the area of the subject. To call it Volition, however, considering how this word is constantly applied, is misleading. Let us rather call it Orectivity or Conation—a movement from within the organism which is a reflex of the desired object; although it may also arise as an organic straining caused by a vaguely felt want. Animals, and we, while on the animal or attitudinal plane, are conscious automata; and if my interpretation of the higher plane be false, we men are animals, but without their consolations and happy limitations.

We are now, then, evidently in presence of the most wonderful event within the experience of man. *And that event is just Man*. The conscious subject does not get itself split up into two halves, like a protoplasmic

¹ Relatively to the organism man and the larger organism within which he is, *viz.*, Nature.

cell. There arises in the very heart of it a *nisus*, force, or energy, whereby subject throws the whole of itself out from subject and, *eo actu*, recovers itself as object into itself, while all the while it has never left itself. This energy emerging out of subject constitutes subject an "object". It is the purest kind of knowledge. The whole is projected, while yet the whole remains as it was, and the projected whole doubles back on the whole that remains, and, at the very crisis of return, there flashes out the consciousness of "subject" as now transformed into a "self" or "ego". Such appears to be the genesis of Ego. What was formerly merely a *feeling* of subject in antithesis to presented objects is now a *perception* of subject by subject. Formerly, I was a "subject-conscious," now I am conscious of my "subject-conscious". I am a double consciousness and always continue double—two natures constituting one person. There is a self-analytic process, and the synthesis of the moments of that process is *Ego*. Till yesterday the formula was "am"; to-day it is "I am". The conscious individual, in brief, is now a self-identical person. What is this movement, this mysterious *nisus* that breaks one into two while it yet remains one, and synthesises the two identities into a new and third complex identity—Ego? It is Will; and if there be a pure act anywhere within the Absolute Whole, it is precisely here; or nowhere. What has hitherto been the *feeling* of self-sameness is now the *perception* and (consequent) *affirmation* of self-sameness—*i.e.*, Personal Identity. The Kantian uses the term "experience" in too narrow a sense: we are now in presence of the supreme experience. Mind conditioned now becomes mind conditioning. It is creative and in the image of God.

I have been giving the natural history of a wonderful event which is the sole firm foundation of all true idealism in philosophy. Some would seem to rest their idealism on the ruins of the phenomenal. Others are satisfied with the proposition "All is Thought". But how do you get this proposition? What *is* Thought? Under such a conception, *I* may be a mere instrument whereby Universal Thought thinks—a passing phase of an eternal consciousness. I would quite as soon be a helpless resultant of the conflict of atoms. *My* position in the cosmos would be the same,—a vehicle for the processes of something not myself. It appears to me that the only basis of an idealism that is spiritualism is to be found in the analysis of the spirit of man—an analysis that tells us that man is above natural processes, and, as transcendental Ego, is master of his fate. If the criticism of knowing does not reveal a pure Will-movement whose form is a dialectic emerging out of the attitudinal or empirical subject, there is no basis for objective idealism which is not mere hypothesis and arbitrary dogma. To my mind, it appears that the only alternative to the doctrine set forth here is a dynamic or geometrical absolute system — either of atoms, or mind, or mind-stuff; it matters not a rush which. I am not an idealist because I label everything "mind". The best outcome of this idealism is *Deus* as *Natura*, *Natura* as *Deus*; and who cares by which name the Whole is designated?

Moreover, the principle of what I consider to be true and genuine idealism is not a one conception, nor a tissue of conceptions, which would crush all the contents of experience within the walls of formal categories; but, by its doctrine of attuition and of Being, it compre-

hends, in its fullest sense, the world of feeling and the real in all its variety and affluence as *ab initio* 'given' to self-consciousness, and not in it or of it; and, further, by the necessity of its origin and nature it is living, moving, ever-progressing Spirit.

(b) *Growth of Self-Consciousness generally.*

Man is an organism that evolves itself, like all other organisms, in Time. There is a graduated order in attaining to the full reach of himself. He does not become clearly and distinctly self-conscious all at once: there are degrees of consciousness, and there are also degrees of self-consciousness. He begins by absorbing the sensate or attuit—the object *already* in attuition but thrown back into space as object (or “thing-there”)—a process with which he, as specific *man*, has nothing to do. It is done in him and for him; but, now, actively discriminating it from other sensates by negating them, he, as Will, brings the sensate, as presented, a second time into sentient consciousness. The “relate” is thus a second time related to mind by this act proceeding from within the subject: it is *re*-duced into the conscious subject (where it had already found itself as a sensate), and, in the crisis of that re-duction, it is *perceived* and thereupon affirmed; or, rather, the crisis of that re-duction is percipience and consequent affirmation or judgment. Then as to the subject: the dim *feeling* of subject is now lifted up into the *sensation* of the subject—an awareness of a reality “*here*” as well as a something “*there*”. This is the first stage of self-consciousness in the child, and goes on repeating itself for long in the growing mind, until, finally, much concrete repetition stirs the subject to recognise itself in its very abstractness—to

discriminate or separate itself from its own activity and all objects of that activity ; and, at that precise crisis, subject prehends and perceives pure subject as such, and affirms it. Self-identity or Ego is now explicitly established. In Time, I say, this is the order ; but the primary acts of prehending and perceiving and affirming outer objects by reducing them to the subject, as distinguished from the mere sensing of them—the re-duc-ing, in brief, of the sensate a second time to sentient consciousness, in the act of percipience, rests ultimately on an implicit consciousness of subject in its abstractness as object. For, how could I re-duce a sensate into the subject without *implicitly*, and therein, affirming the subject ? Hence we say that *self*-consciousness is the logical prius of the possibility of discriminating, prehending, perceiving and affirming any object whatsoever, as distinguished from the sensing or attuiting of it. And self-consciousness, when it is explicit, is the constituting of self by self through a nusus within the subject, which is Will. If I deny this, I find myself left in the hand of cosmic forces which are not myself. Self is an illusion. Individuality I may have ; selfhood not. I remain a mere aggregate of feelings, associations, and reflexive activities within a universal mechanical monistic process.

To speak of an empirical self-consciousness is a contradiction. There is an attuitional consciousness which is empirical ; but in self-consciousness we rise to another plane of Absolute Being evolving Itself as finite mind.

(c) *Range of Will as Percipience. Dialectic Percepts are Ultimates.*

At this point, it is important to recur to our definition of the percipience, as distinguished from the

attuition, of an object, and as primal function of the subjective dialectic. Percipience is the active discrimination of a fact in consciousness from all else, and its *re-duction* to the subject. Thus percipience is not merely of the outer, but of the whole realm of inner feeling ; nor is it limited by this, but it discriminates and perceives the *non-sensible implicates* of the sensible object as *given* to it in the reason-act of subsuming that object. The Infinite, the objective dialectic, the idea, the teleologico-causal, the ideal of this or that or of the Whole, are all the progeny of the Dialectic. But these implicates are dialectically given as ultimates, as ground, and cannot turn round on themselves and re-think themselves as objects to themselves. This would be to sensualise them. The seeing of these ultimate categories is the point of arrestment for human thought ; and they go, as we shall see in the sequel, to constitute the moments in the Notion "God," who is thus a more assured possession of the human mind than anything else save its assurance of itself.

(d) *Will as Root of the Subjective Dialectic—Free Will.*

The inner *nisus*, whereby subject "perceives" object and finally perceives itself as object, is to be called Will, I have said. By what other name shall we name it ? "Through absolute freedom," says Fichte, "not by a transition, but by a leap do we raise ourselves to rationality" : Will is the spring-board of Reason.

This native energy, this *actus purus*, is in itself wholly inexplicable ; it moves towards its primary ends—*vi.*, percepts—after a dialectic form ; and Will in this its dialectic process, constitutes what we call Finite Reason

Self-consciousness is the subject *willing* to seize *itself*, and, *eo actu*, raising subject into Ego. In ordinary percipience, we affirm an object as itself and not any other : in the percipience of self we affirm the subject as itself and *not objects*—not the phenomenal world of presentation.

Will, in the sense of arbitrary freedom of indifference, is not yet banished either from philosophy or from popular thinking. It is supposed to descend on this or that motive of action “of its own free will”. This blind Will is now, I suppose, expelled from philosophy. Again, it is said, Will is “determined,” inasmuch as it is always consequent on a judgment or act of reason : and, inasmuch as the matter and activity of reason are themselves determined outside pure Will, Will and its actuation are manifestly determined by that which is *not* our essential self. Thus we get a kind of mediated mechanicalism and fatalism. Will is simply intellect or reason, it has also been said, and with a great show of truth ; but, all the while, reason and reasoning are regarded as a spiritual machine. The truth, I think, lies in our elucidation of the moments of mind. Will is not subsequent to, or consequent on, reason. It is itself root of reason. As Will, it wills Will ; and, instinct with purpose, it moves to an end after a certain manner, and this is the whole essence of reason—the whole pure subjective dialectic—the sum of the *a priori*. Thus, Will always moves to its end by way of reason (of which it itself is first moment) and fulfils itself in its affirmed end, and in externalising the end in the act of “Willing” or “Volition,” the Will that initiated is still present, and is satisfied. Will, for example, always active as reason (not *in* reason, for it is itself first moment of

reason) establishes this or that judgment, which remains with us as maxim and motive. Thus, a man called on to act, wills in accordance with the already ascertained judgment as motive. In doing so, he renews swiftly and almost sub-consciously the process of ascertaining that judgment, and carries forward into the actualisation of "willing" the Will that initiated the process wheréby the judgment was originally affirmed. Thus it is that the actualised "willing" or volition of to-day may have been initiated as Will ten years ago. We are always free, in so far as we act in accordance with a principle that we ourselves have freely affirmed.

I will say no more about this subject-generated act of Will here save to point out that it contravenes the doctrine of Spinoza which says: "That alone is free which exists by the necessity of its own nature and of which the action is determined by itself alone". Now, the whole world exists as a sum of individualities, and each individuality has its "own nature," from the atom upwards. Each thing is "for itself" and seeks its own fulfilment according to the "necessities" of its own nature. A stone, a star, a mollusc, a dog, a man, all alike do so; but *with a difference*. Mind in each of these objects is subject to certain conditions and "laws" of existence (which so-called laws express its idea or essence), and each fulfils itself according to the necessities of its own existence—its inner and outer relations as determined *in* it and *for* it. In Man,—the new and starting product of the movement of the Eternal in Time,—the "necessity of his own nature" is precisely freedom in relation to all else that exists: his essence is just free activity. The Spinozistic expression ought perhaps to

be: "That alone is free which exists *according to* (the necessity of) its own nature and of which the action is determined by itself alone". The necessity or essence of man's nature is free activity; and he is a "man"—a personality, as distinguished from a mere individuality, only in so far as all his acts are determined by this free activity—knowing acts as well as doing acts. It may be said that every atom or monad is free; but man differs in this, that he propounds his own ends and constitutes himself. The essence or idea of man, in brief, is precisely this Will-nisus and its implicit dialectic; and to this central fact the interpretation of all experience must conform or confess its impotence. Man finds his fulfilment only in accordance with the necessities of his own essential nature—the prime necessity being free activity controlling and co-ordinating all data of experience: that is to say, the whole realm of attuition—the inner and outer world of sense. From the point of view of The Absolute, man's essence is, of course, a necessary and determined *fact*; but the essence being once constituted, it has to work from its own centre of freedom as the very essence of its essence, and to exercise supremacy over all other finite things within its orb of dominion, including its own attitudinal and empirical subject. In this necessity lies the moral "*ought*"; and what I *ought* to do in any particular case is that which free-functioning reason affirms to be the law, or essence, or truth—the "*must*" of the situation.

Accordingly, whatever the Absolute Being or "The Absolute" may be, so far from our being under compulsion to regard Him (or It) as an irresponsible mechanism who or which must by the necessity of his

or its nature wind up his world, including all possible individual activities, like a clock, and then let it run down, we are forced to regard it as the source of freedom in the creature man. Within the vast Orb of the Absolute there is freedom in the form of finite reason. This involves a contradiction only if we first posit a one all-embracing necessary process which excludes the possibility of free finite activities; and thus, in face of fact, beg the whole question.

I do not affect a knowledge of Absolute Being. The simple fact that the man-sphere is relative to the whole Orb of Being, makes a synthesis of the Absolute impossible; and yet we forget that in such questions as that which we have just been considering, when we demand to know the "relations" of the Absoluto-infinite Will to the finite will, we are gratuitously positing the possibility of absolute knowledge of The Absolute. So with many other unsolvables. Does any man believe that we can so transcend the limits of our finite spirits as to solve (*par exemple*) *beyond all question* the mystery of evil, pain, and death? All our solutions are mere glozings, save when we frankly accept our world as a world of contradictions in which final solutions are pointed to and predicted, but assuredly not effected. If we cannot answer such questions, what is all our toil over The Absolute worth? We have been sometimes told, for example, by way of explanation of Death as extinction, that The Absolute cares only for the type and is regardless of the individual! This is all very well for The Absolute, but what is that to me? Huxley well says, somewhere, that it can be little consolation to the primæval horse struggling distressfully for a precarious existence in some dismal swamp, to

know that ten million years after he is dead, his evolved descendant will win the Derby. But while all synthesis of the Absolute, I repeat, is impossible save as a faith, an absolute synthesis of our own orb is possible; and within that I assuredly find the free energising of the Subject (now to be called Ego) as central and dominant fact—essence of the creature man. Somehow or other this is reconciled in the universal scheme with the “necessary nature” of The Absolute. By what right do I preclude such a possibility? What right have I to say that the nature of The Absolute is a necessary nature? What do I mean by a “necessary” nature, and so on? If I only mean that God is not contingent in the sense of being dependent on some other which is prius, the term is in its place; but let me keep to this meaning. His *world* however comprehends Contingency.

Man, let us conclude, is a *Will*-dialectic or *Will*-reason.

(e) *Further Considerations.*

A few further considerations in confirmation of our position that Will is root (or, let us say, nerve) of Reason are worth stating.

1. We have been told that Free Will is in the necessariness of Reason. What, now, does this precisely mean? The necessariness of reason means its “necessary nature,” and the necessary nature is simply its nature; and nothing more. But if Reason be a mere mechanism of thinking, a category-machine, its freedom can only mean that, as a threshing machine is fed by the sheaves and separates the grain from chaff and straw, so reason is fed by the “real” of sense and mechanically works the grain, *i.e.*, the meaning of

experience out of the raw material. But where is freedom here? The "real" is, doubtless, the helpless matter, and reason dominates it; but it does so *as a machine*, and while thus far supreme over the real, it is, *quoad* itself, a piece of mechanism once for all wound up, and now running down in response to the applied stimulus of sense. Or it may be likened to a fermenting vat. It is only when we apprehend Reason, or the subjective dialectic, as a Will-movement, an *actus purus* in its initiation, that we can say that Freedom is in the nature (or necessariness) of reason.

2. Ethically, again, freedom is in Law, we are rightly told. But how can law, which enslaves, give freedom? *Only* because Law is the affirmation of Truth or Ethical End by reason, and Reason is a "free" energy searching for moral ends, just as it searches for the truth of nature.

3. Further, a true explanation always carries with it the explanation of false explanations, which yet tenaciously survive; and we see in our theory of reason the meaning and the justification of the untenable "liberty of indifference"; for there actually exists in us the free movement hither and thither of Will (as first moment of the subjective dialectic), ever restlessly seeking an end which shall be motive-idea of its activity; just as on the sentient plane there is the incipient organic straining which we call "desire". But "liberty of indifference" is wholly untenable: even wilful willing in contradiction of that which is affirmed by ourselves to be right and true, is the substitution of the barren individualism of self for objective moral end.

4. Men speak of the function of reason as being the *search* for truth, or the idea. How can reason *search*, if it be a mere thought-mechanism? It can only

mechanically grind up what is given to it by some other agency.

5. Also, men are said to "strive after an ideal," whether as artists, ethicists, or as statesmen. How can they be said to strive, unless the specific man-function is at root a *will*-movement, in whose very form is End implicit—an incessant and eternal stimulus? Evidently, the motive force in all rational activity, whether in the field of abstract thought or ethical purpose, is in a dialectic which is primarily a will-movement. In Will alone is to be found the explanation of the ever-onward and upward reason-activity of man and the possibility of progress. How else find the rational *impulse*? Is the purposing of man a blind response to an *appulse*? Whence aspiration, intellectual or ethical? If man be Will in his essence, this interpretation of him defines him as a free activity seeking ideal ends, pointing ever to the infinite and unattainable. No other way of looking at man can yield this ethical result.

6. How, indeed, could ideals of knowledge or conduct be formed save by Will with Form of End implicit ever pushing on—ininitely pushing on? In pursuing Truth I predict Absolute Truth; in pursuing Goodness, I predict Absolute Goodness; in pursuing the Beautiful, I predict Absolute Beauty. How explain these contents of reason, if reason be a kind of mechanism and not a living dynamic with Form of End *in gremio* and the infinite at the heart of each finite conclusion? Were it not for this infinite pushing on, the finite judgments of the "understanding" would be our limit, and content us just because of their self-sufficing limitation. Herein we see one distinction between "understanding" and reason. The former is satisfied

with finite judgments : only the Infinite satisfies the latter.

7. What is Attention (otherwise inexplicable) but a sustained act of Will under the stimulus of end sought ? The so-called attention in an animal is mere detention by an object.

8. The subjective dialectic *must* take up all matter of experience in itself ; this is Thought. And this it is that gives validity to all our knowledge as reasoned knowledge, and is thus also the apprehension of Objective Reason in things. But further, it contains in it the Oneness of the Whole, because we must, under the necessity of the form of the Dialectic, take up the total actual and possible as permeated and sustained by the One Thought—the Dialectic Movement, of which the phenomenal many is the show. [At the same time it has to be noted that outside and prior to the emergence of the Dialectic, we have forced on us the One in the empirical fact of Universal Being as bed of all particulars. Thus, in the lower stages of mind no less than in the pure dialectic activity, we find The One in which all things rest and out of which they all emerge.]

9. This divine man-reason (divine because it is the Dialectic of Absolute Being as creative emerging in Its finite mind-evolution) can be used as a mere tool for judgments of the co-existent and sequent and serve the admirable purpose of distinct percipience, exact concipience, generalisation, and a coherent co-ordination of facts, whether of the external world or subjective mind. This is Reason or the Dialectic *as understanding*. Now, we are told by the positivist to stop at this point of mind-movement. But man cannot stop here if he would. He cannot rest content with knowledge which is a mere conjunction of

separates, a mere aggregation and arrangement of units. The infinite, which lies in the ever-onward and upward energy of Will, impels him to comprehend all experience as Universal Being and Reason ; as a many in which there is interfused that which reconciles all difference. In the objective world, Objective Being and Reason are seen face to face with subjective reason ; and, impelled still further, subjective reason beholds subject and object as *within* one Absolute Whole. This is the reason-stage of subjective mind, and is the final act of the dialectic in so far as thought is distinct and determinate. It is the conception of immanent operative God in all.

We may well be satisfied with this stupendous consummation of Will reason in us ; but the mind of man does not halt even here. It arose out of the indeterminate : it must pass again into the indeterminate and unconditioned ; and this it does in the apprehension of Absolute Being by finite mind as it stands, still straining, on the utmost verge of Reason. Will-reason cannot otherwise be satisfied. Even in this life there awaits us the supra-rational Intuition of The Absolute, as we may in the sequel see.

MEDITATION XI.

SUBJECTIVE DIALECTIC AND THE *A PRIORI*.—*A priori* Categories or Synthetic Predicates : (a) The Form of the One Movement is Teleologico-Causal. (b) The First Affirmation. (c) Function of the Dialectic generally. (d) The Dialectic not imposed on Experience. (e) Continuity of the Absolute System ; Knowledge and the Objective Dialectic. (f) The Dialectic as Teleologico-Causal. (g) Unifying Process of the Dialectic. (h) The Attuit and the Notion. (i) Absolute Knowledge. (j) Is Man as the Subjective Dialectic a mere Organ in the Absolute Whole ? (k) The Absolute Whole as a One Whole. (l) Will-Dialectic an Evolution. (m) Deductive Explanation of Experience Impossible. (n) In what sense the Object is Subject.

I HAVE been emphasising the word "Will" : I would now emphasise the word "Dialectic".

We have found Being with its system of predicates—its modality in inner and outer sense, which, as *given* to the conscious subject, we call *a posteriori* categories. These categories are not imposed by mind : they are simply the universal predicaments of the given modes of object, and, *therefore*, modes of the recipient and reflexing subject—both subject and object belonging to the same system.

All is One in Being—a difference in identity. The feeling of Being in us is the sympathetic touch of kinship and community arising out of difference. It is as correct to say that Being is given to the object by the subject, as that it is given to the subject by the object.

It is neither and both. But this is only The Real. we now seek the Actual—the object as “known”; and therefore, the Notion. And the Actual is the Real informed and transformed by the dialectic. There is no chasm in the infinite process which we call the Universe, between the Real of Sense and the Formal of Reason. The empirical subject in generating Will and Ego carries itself and all its content with it. The attitudinal is not dropped off as if it were old clothes: it is more alive than ever. I say “more” alive, for the categories of sense are not dead: they are the modality of Mind-universal, just as the categories of reason are the form and interpretation of that modality—the reason-element in the concrete presentation. Might we not say that what the created subject receives in sense are, in the Absolute Being, self-originated or creative sensation yielding the matter of its activity? Thought-Forms (the dialectic or thought-determination) do not constitute reality for us, but only reveal Reason in reality and raise it to Actuality. Reality is Being and its sense-manifestation: the Actual is the Real as dialectically determined.

I have given the process of all possible Percipience—the first functioning of the Dialectic—and in that I find the whole dialectic. Let me now sum up the categories as at once subjective and objective and immanent in all experience.

A PRIORI CATEGORIES OR SYNTHETIC PREDICATES.

- I. Being-universal (absoluto-infinite and unconditioned, and ground of all possible determination).

- II. Will or Kinetic Nisus with Form of End implicit.
- III. Possibility—The Excluded Middle.
- IV. Negation of all else (Formal Cause).
- V. Sufficient Reason or Causal Ground—the Determining-so (Formative Cause).
- VI. Determined-so-ness of Being—the Determinate.
- VII. Identity of a thing with itself: and thus the achievement of
- VIII. End or Purpose (Final Cause) already contained in VI. (and in every moment).

The Realitas-phenomenon thus dialecticised is The Actual; or (from the subjective point of view) the Notion.

If objective dialectic, *i.e.*, the thought-movement of Absolute Being is to be sought for, it can only be found in the subjective dialectic. Either thus; *or* it must be gathered from phenomenal processes.

The above dialectic is the Logic of Being as creative: and it is the Logic of the mind of man simply *because* it is the Logic of things. It is Reason; and, in its contact with matter of thought, it yields the ordinary formal Logic.

Derivative Categories.—(a) The Causal Nexus;

(b) The Concept of Organism.

The Causal Nexus of *a b* is a derivative category: it rests first on the universal *a priori* Predicate or Category of Causal or Mediating Ground (IV. and V.) as now operating within a phenomenal series and demanding that *b* be mediated or caused; and secondly, on the category of Identity which determines the “particular” synthesis *a b* as a necessary nexus.

As to *Organism*: The dialectic form is organic. What

is merely the teleological moment (End or Purpose) as regards the "singular" percept, becomes the notion of Organism when there is a phenomenal complex in presentation.

It would seem to follow from the above that the Principle of Identity is not the first "Law of thought" Will, in search of a percept or judgment, proceeds after a certain manner, and that manner is in certain moments or pulses. The movement is a one concrete, but there is a logical order in the moments. Will-initiation contains and predicts End (formally) and the final moment of percipience is $A = A$ (principle of Identity). The principles of Excluded middle and Contradiction are its logical *priora*.

(a) *The Form of the One Movement is Teleologico-Causal.*

Thus the Subject, as dialectic movement, in its very first and initiatory contact with matter of sense (inner and outer), takes hold of matter after its own form of activity, which is a form of Mediation and End. In other words, it *necessarily* takes up or subsumes each thing as kinetically and formally and formatively caused—as being what it is (and not something else) by virtue of a rational cosmic process seeking End. In this purely dialectic movement (*i.e.* Will in its dialectic process) we discern, as content, the above moments, and these are the *a priori* categories. [What have been called innate ideas are merely the form of the dialectic in contact with matter of inner or outer sense.]

(b) *The First Affirmation*

To suppose that the highest moment of finite mind, in interpreting the object, garbles, or in any way

palters with it, is preposterous. It merely affirms what is already there. You cannot wipe out the given in the name and for the glory of that which exists to know it. In the very first percept of an "other" in sense (a sensate) we have the judgment "*That Is There*". The object is identical with itself—"That"—it *exists* in the system of experience: "*Is*"=it exists independently of me: "*There*"=it exists as externality. And, in the same act, there is brought into greater clearness the Ego that affirms. Thus Will-Reason puts its seal on the record of attuition.

(c) *Function of the Dialectic generally.*

Each single whole and the total of actual and possible existence is now necessarily apprehended and comprehended as kinetically initiated, mediately seeking an end, and attaining its end. The whole movement is teleologico-causal. Even a rudimentary percept, as distinct from the attitudinal sensate, is itself (as we have seen) so taken up by the will-dialectic; so, and not otherwise: for percipience is itself the dialectic process in its elementary activity and contains in it (as moments) the *a priori* categories; and these always remain the same, though with increasing complexities of material to deal with as the recipient subject accumulates its store of reality or the Given. What is given is always a complex; and the act of percipience is the discrimination of the parts, but always with sub-reference to the complex totality in presentation. Percipience itself is always *de singulis*. The next functioning of the dialectic is the synthesising of parts, and this synthesis is the individual concept—an analytico-synthetic result. This is what, I suppose, is meant by the differences of a thing falling apart in the form of a conscious distinction inside their unity.

(d) The Dialectic not imposed on Experience

The *a priori* dialectic—which, for the sake of brevity, may now be summed up as a movement in four prime moments, *viz.*, as Will or Kinetic initiation, with empty form of End implicit: Mediating Process: Determining-so: End attained or The Determinate, is not imposed by Ego on the universal matter of recipience—the “Object-thing”. The dialectic *finds itself there*. *The Subject can take experience up into itself only so, and not otherwise.* Except as gripping the concrete, the Dialectic is for subjective mind non-existent save as an abstract and would never enter consciousness at all. It is the Formal in the concrete.

If this Dialectic be what I say it is, there is no need of a Critique of Judgment or of Practical Reason as complements of the one Dialectic. In all matter of thought inner or outer the movement is the same, and gives us an affirmed beent, caused, organic, purposed world, and (as we shall see) also Law of Conduct—the Categorical Imperative. The inevitableness of the consciousness of the Infinite and of Ideals is also explained (see Meditation on The Infinite) by the nature of the percipient act.

This free movement out of the empirical subject carries the empirical subject with it as I have said; but is itself, as pure activity, transcendental. It is outside the series of Time and Space. It is not determined in its relation to the finite: on the contrary, it determines.

Knowing, then, is, like the divine creative act itself, a mediating activity. The consciousness of “knowing” may be said to be, in a sense, immediate; but it is an immediate knowledge of that which is, in its essence and character, mediating relatively to all other immediacy. It is an immediate awareness of mediacy. The dialectic is given in

immediate experience, but only as constitutive and formative of that experience: and, further, it is itself, as already in the Universal Object, a reflection into the subject—the highest evolution of Infinite Mind as finite mind.

(e) *Continuity of the Absolute System: Knowledge and the Objective Dialectic.*

To repeat on this new plane of Mind our previous conclusion: Man is within a system, not outside it: he is the highest term of the "Universal Object". The continuity of conscious subject and nature, which we found on the plane of the sentient and attitudinal, is not now ruptured. In the supreme result of the cosmic finite process which we are now considering, the now self-conscious man does not, as Will-reason, turn round on the lower or preliminary stages of that process and reduce *it* to a rational system. Experience, as given, already exists as a rational system, and man's function is to reduce it to a rational system *for himself*; and this is knowledge as distinct from attuition. Knowledge, then, as distinguished from sentience generally, is the reduction of the given to self and for self by Will through a dialectic process contained in Will. God has provided for the manifold and its coherence without the help of man. The view of the "object" vindicated in past Meditations, which regards it as true "for itself" *as it is in* man, secures that knowledge (say of the planetary system) is true "for itself" in being true for man. Its fulfilled reality is in a conscious subject; but only to the extent of the finite capacity of the subject:—Truth, that is to say, so far as it goes.

The universal Dialectic is now in Man as *for* Man, and when he "knows," he may be said merely to reflect the objective dialectic.

How is it, it might be asked, that man does not *sense* the dialectic of the presented world just as he senses its modality as summed in the *a posteriori* categories? Because it is manifestly impossible that the cosmic Reason can communicate itself to any conscious subject that is not itself a reason; just as Being cannot be communicated except to Being; or the modal shapes of sense to anything save that which has in it the potentialities of the sensible. Reason or dialectic is not the presentation, but the "formal" and unseen implicate of the presentation; and, cosmically and objectively, a pure *act* or energy. Only a mind, then, which has risen above sensation and evolved in itself the pure *act* of reason can find reason anywhere; in other words, could be in intercommunion with Universal Reason. Man is such a pure formal activity. Only free activity can be aware of free activity, and the very condition of its finding it is that it shall be itself freely active; nay, within limits, creative. The whole of the datum is doubtless at *first sight* a chaos; but why? Because man is a reason and makes large demands. It is not a chaos to the dog who takes what he finds. Man also takes what he finds; but he *further* finds the reason-process in the universe, because he himself is a conscious reason-process and *in organic continuity with the Whole*. Reason is objective, and man is within it. At best, and at the end of the long day, he will not have put his reason into the universe, but only found his reason there. He will have rationalised the whole *for himself* as knowledge: that is all; and he will have thus fulfilled his function by satisfying the needs of his essence,—fulfilled the "necessity of his nature" as a Knower and Doer.

It is not, then, only as Modality that the object "becomes for" (turns over into) subject, but also as Dialectic. Thus the object as "Real" now becomes for consciousness the object as "Actual". We may say that Natura has now at last become conscious of itself in its totality of Being, phenomenon and dialectic through Man as a totality, he himself being all the while an integral part of the Whole—a factor within it, not outside it, as crude dualism would have it. The "object" of experience now reveals its final implicates; and I am now not merely "conscious" of it as a Real, but "self-conscious" of it as a dialecticised Real—an Actual.

(f) *The Dialectic as Teleologico-Causal.*

This transcendental movement of the Will-Dialectic—this free energising in and out of the empirical subject, is manifestly, in its totality and unity, the Causal Notion, in the true sense of Cause. And the true sense of Cause is revealed by the will-movement to be in three moments, *viz.*, kinetic; mediating ground; and end or telos. The Causal Notion is thus a teleological notion: and nine-tenths of the debate on this question of Cause is due to the abstraction of one or other of its three elements which, all the while, are inseparable moments of a one movement. Even a particular percept itself, unimportant as it apparently is, we take up under the Causal Notion; and all subsequent acts of reason are causal, because the pure act of the self-conscious subject itself is *itself* the Teleologico-Causal Form. It is thus that I must, whether I will or not, subsume the universe of things.

But in so taking up data, I do not, as I have already said, impose cause on an existent chaos—my attitudinal

experience : I merely find the Causal Notion there in things. . All Science finds it in things ; and occupies itself with revealing it as in things. The Teleologico-Causal is objective, not subjective alone ; and it is subjective because it already is in the Total—the Absolute Whole of externalisation including Man.

•It is common to *assume* the causal in the universe (in one or other of its moments—kinetic, mediating ground or teleological), but in this act of *assuming*, a leap is taken out of the subjective into the objective. The above analysis, on the contrary, shows that we necessarily *take up* the objective *as so*, *i.e.*, as containing the causal notion or Reason. The subjective dialectic is not in the air. The *matter* of thought is found to be moulded thus and not otherwise. Thus we see the objectivity of the subjective causal notion : we do not arbitrarily affirm it. If End, it may be said, is a necessary “moment” in the one Dialectic process, it would follow that what we call the causal antecedent in nature is determined by what has not yet happened, *viz.*, the End. Precisely so ; metaphysically speaking, I cannot abstract the moments in a one concrete of movement save for logical purposes : they involve each other.

Note.—A distinction may be made between the reason for affirming a proposition and the cause of an existent thing ; but they both fall under the same general category of “Ground”.

(g) *Unifying Process of the Dialectic.*

By the help of the new movement, we are now able to apply ourselves to the vague unclassified data of attitudinal association, and to constitute these, for ourselves, not only as being a system related in Time and Space (*a posteriori* categories), but, still further, as a

system of dialectic whereby it is seen that the data of sense are not only in and of Being, but *inreasoned*, by the inner dialectic of nature, into what we see. (The various functionings of the Dialectic in contact with matter will be spoken of in the sequel.)

The Will-movement starts with Percipience which is *de singulis*; and having "perceived" totals as single totals, it restlessly proceeds to discriminate the elements in these totals with a view to a true synthesis of them—all knowing being analytico-synthetic in its mode of procedure. The "hæcceity" of the total is followed by the affirmation of the "hæcceity" of the elements of the Total down to the atom (so-called), and out of these the will-dialectic constructs, or rather reconstructs, the total as now a unity. Each element is as much an entity as the complex total is an entity—neither more nor less; and a difficulty at once emerges as to the possibility of a real relation between the parts and the whole. A complex thing (and everything is complex) is what it is by virtue of its unified relates. As to this I would say: First of all, the animal or attitudinal moment of mind is not concerned with rational relations. It is aware of a quantitative and qualitative side-by-sideness and sequence in space. There is thus a *felt* relation, but not a known relation, *i.e.*, a consciousness that there is relation. In like manner, a single total is to attuition a single total, nothing more—a synopsis not a unity. It is the energy of the Will-dialectic which under the inner stimulus of the Form of End takes hold of (perceives, prehends) a total as a unity of parts; and this whether the total be a quantitative aggregate (*e.g.*, a heap of bricks) or a qualitative organic unity. Each constituent part of the *qualitative*

unity certainly yields up, in the interest of the one organism, its own entitative individuality; but each has an individuality to yield up. The parts retain their own individual reality, while contributing *themselves* to a higher unity. If each did not remain a "*for itself*," while at the same time losing itself in a higher, it is manifest that the organism could not be effected. I cannot see *how* all this comes about *phenomenally*; but it is *de facto* there before me, and *de ratione* I can explain. It is guaranteed by the form of the dialectic. The community which I can detect is the community of Being and the Dialectic as a One in the diverse. This satisfies me. "Existence" is not possible save as a system of contraries which are sometimes apparent contradictions. I shall point out, however, in the sequel, that each thing or "this" contains the potency of its own relations positive and negative. The "atom" (so-called) is not dead.

(h) *The Attuit and the Notion.*

Mind has, for its function, consciousness of a Real which is *not* the individual mind. Passing over subtle distinctions in the evolution of finite mind we find it, at the highest stage of sensation, attuiting single "wholes" and, content with this, asking no questions. Thereupon the subjective dialectic emerges and, separating and affirming the parts of each whole, perceives these parts in their separateness and affirms them of the complex "whole". Will here grasps the parts in a colligated unity, and the attuitual synopsis is now a synthesis. It next mediates the whole through the parts, as a teleologico-causal One. The synthetic unity is now a synthetic "One" — a dialecticised whole. Reason

is now satisfied. The "thing" is now fully dialecticised, and (as so entertained subjectively) may be called the "Notion" of the thing. The further movement of reason—the dialectic synthesis of the sum of experience, the universe—is not a new "moment" of mind, but merely a quantitative extension of the notion of a "thing" into the notion of the Whole of things—an absolute synthesis. Not only the particular, then, but also the aggregated Totality is seen to be not merely a Real, but an Actual—a Notion; it is raised from the attuit to the notion.

The whole of the subjective dialectic is thus a *one* movement in many "moments," and its purpose in so functioning is the taking to itself, or the subsuming, of the particular and of the absolute Whole as its own fulfilment and completion. This is Knowing, and the result is Knowledge.

Is it Absolute Knowledge?

(i) *Absolute Knowledge.*

We have been told, and with great appearance of truth I freely grant, that only mind as self-conscious, *i.e.*, as aware of itself and its processes, has "absolute" knowledge—absolute as compared with all other grades or kinds of knowledge. But on what ground do I call such self-knowledge absolute? On this (and on no possible other), that the given object is not separate from the percipient subject, but is one with it. This, doubtless, is the highest kind of knowledge as regards object-matter because it has to do with the ground of all knowledge—mind and its processes; but I fail to see that it is *more* to be called knowledge, and therefore more absolute, than my consciousness of the sun or moon. The latter consciousness is immediate; and the fact that the object

is not me, the knower, does not affect the quality of the knowledge as such. I cannot (without an abuse of words) call knowledge of mind by mind alone absolute without making all other knowledge relative. "Highest" is not equivalent to "absolute". If all other knowledge is relative, we ask relative to what? If you say relatively lower in *kind* or degree than absolute knowledge, we grant it; but if you mean relative *as* knowledge or truth, we demur.

In the doctrine of "Absolute Knowledge," which I have cited, there is a latent and insidious dualism which rests on an inadequate analysis of subject-object. In short, absolute knowledge is simply awareness of the True, in any field of intellectual activity whatsoever. If, however, we are to speak of Absolute Knowledge as knowledge of "The Absolute," we must first define the word "absolute" in this connection: when we have done so, we shall find that absolute knowledge is beyond man.

(j) *Is Man as Subjective Dialectic a mere Organ in the Absolute Whole?*

If we now stand apart and contemplate the "Universal Object"—The Totality ("The Absolute" as I have used the expression) which includes man as part of the continuous and reasoned Whole—as chief factor and final term in the whole, and to which the whole has been working up (so to speak), we shall be unable to avoid the question to which I have formerly alluded, and partly answered, when speaking of Will and Freedom, *viz.*, "Since the dialectic enters into the conscious subject just as it enters into all other things, is the finite subject a mere

recipient and reflex of the universal dialectic as it is of attitudinal data?" The whole before me in presentation is now not only a *realitas-phenomenon* but also in-reasoned : it is now, in short, no longer merely the Real, but the Actual. The content of the object is now seen to be a content and context of dialectic as well as a revelation of Universal Being as a modal presentation. It would seem, accordingly, at first sight, that the objective dialectic was *carried into*, or reflected into, the finite subject as itself part of the objective system, and had simply become alive in and to an individual consciousness called man ; all other things, in which it also is, being unaware of it. And we might be influenced to the adoption of this view by our previous conclusion, *viz.*, that the finite dialectic did not impose itself on a chaos of experience, but rather found itself *in* that experience as implicated content of that experience.

But then, on the other hand, as a matter of fact, we have found that the conscious subject becomes aware of the dialectic in things, and *can become aware of it* only in so far as it *initiates*, in and for itself, that dialectic as the universal Form of things.

Sense receives, reflexes and assimilates passively the object as a given diverse co-existent and sequent which thus falls into identity with the subject. Did finite mind, in its further evolution, similarly receive and reflex the Dialectic, then Will or Kinetic efficient, Mediating ground and Telos or End would lose their specific character and vanish ; for these cannot be *received* as a datum. A phenomenal Real cannot suggest the Causal Predicate, a phenomenal sequent series cannot suggest the Causal Nexus, contiguity cannot give coherence, an accomplished fact in nature

or thought cannot suggest End to mere recipience, orderly co-existence and succession of parts in a total of presentation cannot suggest organism. Facts (or "ideas") are presented statically and sequentially; and that is all: they are sensates. We thus see that only to the *pure activity of finite reason as itself* Dialectic can the data of sense yield a dialectic or rational content; and so become a system. The specific function of Man in the Universal Object—the system of which he forms a part, is, in so far as he is a knower, to reveal, through *his own* emergent and self-initiated dialectic activity, the object to be the system *which it already is*.¹ Unless it emerged in him as "his own" he could not use it; if, in using it, he did not find it already in the object, the Absolute Whole would be cut into two.

The dialectic, then, is in the Whole including man, but in man it not merely rises to a consciousness of itself, in other words, is reflected into subject, but can so arise only *as reproduced* by subject in *its* free or pure activity as Will: and this because of its essential nature. It emerges out of the attitudinal subject clothed in the purple of command: it *is* Man as Spirit. It is only

¹ The fact of the subjective dialectic is a sufficient answer to Hume. The "causal nexus" *a b* I have elsewhere tried to explain. I would remark here, however, that I cannot see that identity in *rerum natura* (as has been suggested by some) explains the necessity of the causal nexus between *a* and *b*. Such an explanation simply comes to this that sense-percipient really sees not *a* and then *b*, but *a* and then *ab*. In the vast majority of causal judgments we perceive no identity of cause and effect, but only after reflective physical investigation, *e.g.*, in the case of striking a match. Moreover, even if we did, sense-perception as such would simply be conscious of *a* and then *ab*; but nothing could come of this for thought, save sequential conjunction. This would be to take us back to Hume.

now that conscious subject is spirit. The dialectic creates self-identity (*Ego*, "I am") when Will (the first moment) prehends and subsumes the attuent subject, and, *eo actu*, places the mind-organism of man above the rest of the system of experience as lord and master: while yet, all the while, in it and of it. There is no chasm between the self-sprung dialectic of man and the dialectic in nature, any more than between the sentience of man and the modality of nature. The objective dialectic passes into the conscious subject, and there reveals its true character as a pure other-determining and self-determining activity, transcending all its data and yet finding itself *already* in all its data. If there were no self-conscious dialectic in man, he could not *affirm* it in nature; if there were no dialectic in nature he could not *find* it there. Granting the active and formative dialectic in the objective scheme of things, how could it reach a finite consciousness, save in so far as that consciousness itself *actively* initiated it in and for itself? And this it does even in the rudimentary reason-act of Percipience.

There is no "sense" by which we can *receive* the dialectic in nature as we can receive facts of presentation; and yet, I may repeat, it is not subjective mind, subsuming all experience under the dialectic, that imposes itself on an unmeaning manifold. Subjective mind, as self-conscious dialectic, is in continuity with the universal dialectic which forces itself into the individual empirical subject as a free initiating energy; and this can be accomplished only by making it self-evolved. In all that exists or can exist there is Will, Mediating Ground, End: in man this becomes self-referent activity and puts him, alone of all beings, in a peculiar relation to

the "other"; it becomes alive to him in the subjective pure act itself. He is now Spirit, I say, and has a heavy task before him of which, as a merely attitudinal being, he was in happy ignorance. He is called upon to understand the world and himself: the finite creature has now, moreover, to accept the burden of the Infinite.

What we have to deal with, from first to last, is subject-object; but if the subject side of the synthesis be merely a passivo-active potency of assimilative re-flexion of the object as dialectic, as it is of given modality, evolution on to a higher plane of mind is a delusion: for in our mode of recognising the dialectic we should be brought back to sentience. However high our pretensions, we should be mere playthings of a creative Mover—pawns in his game. Man's grade of Being would be doubtless, even so, higher and more interesting than that of a mollusc, but not a bit better worth having: nay, when we consider his painful position in the whole, not so desirable as that of a mollusc.

The full significance of my seemingly crude beginning, where I insisted on the synthesis of subject-object as a synthesis of subject-thing and object-thing, is now, I hope, apparent. Absolute Being when it determines itself into finite mind—that which, although itself in and of the whole, has for its great aim the awareness and interpretation of the Whole—lifts the mind-entity up, stage after stage, from Pure Feeling to Pure Reason; and, as it grows, each stage gathers up the record which it is capable of gathering up, and presents the whole Datum, in the completion of the attitudinal or empirical plane, as the field of the pure activity of finite mind as Spirit. And, as Spirit, man's function is a high

one—to affirm God and freely to ally himself with the infinite process on its way to the fulfilment of the absolute idea—a way steep and rugged.

(k) *The Absolute Whole as a One Whole.*

It is surely not difficult to imagine our universe—the infinite Object, flowing out of some Eternal Fountain and unfolding, in the gradual evolution of nature and life and finite mind, all we see and all we are. This process includes man as its crown—a being capable of identifying himself with the Whole. As sentient, he is capable of reflexing back all that he receives into the external system, and then, as himself a dialectic, interpreting the dialectic in the system; the said subjective dialectic being all the while merely the dialectic of the system emerging in him as Will-reason. All is One. It is only when we separate man from the organised whole as if he, having descended from some alien world, were an onlooker in God's theatre, that our difficulties begin and questions arise as to subject and object, relation, and validity, to the disturbance of the naive acceptance of the system within which we are. We raise questions as to the Real, while the Real is all the while there. It is the presentation—the presentation as Being and as rooted in its source. There is no other Real anywhere to be found. And when he takes up this Real in its rational form, man further has the Actual within his grasp. He now “knows”. There is for man no other Actual anywhere. What would he have?

In the subject as merely conscious, the object governs the subject: in the same subject as self-conscious, Will-dialectic governs the governor. But even then, all is for the sake of Object: and *in and of this universal*

Object, when we look at it from a divine standpoint, I also am, and I have to find the truth of things in terms of myself in whom the nature and law of the universe is written by the finger of God. It is a possible conception that I, a self-conscious ego, may be a superfluous incident in the infinite cosmic process which we call the Universal Object or the Absolute; but I think it is far otherwise. The highest term of a system (even were it only one of God's many systems) which sums and contains the Whole, is the full revelation of the system and, therefore, necessary to God; and the finite being who is that term must have a solemn and majestic meaning.

(l) *Will-dialectic an Evolution.*

The pure activity of Reason, it will be seen, is not to be regarded as a new energy lying side by side, or placed above, attitudinal consciousness; but a new evolution of the conscious subject itself. It emerges out of the existent subject and carries the attitudinal consciousness and all the content of feeling, inner and outer, with it. It is immanent in subjective mind from the beginning,—nay, it is immanent in all nature and sums up the activities of *Natura*. There is, consequently, no difficulty in reason dealing with the record of intuition; for this record is a constituent part of itself as a “concrete one” of being. Self-consciousness, accordingly, is the subject conscious of itself through and by virtue of a subjective pure act—immanent in the subject and now explicit. It is not a new mechanism introduced *ab extra*. Its source and germ are in the attitudinal subject out of which it proceeds and in which it is generated; and the dim striving towards

this new evolution of mind may be even seen in animals—many of whom mimic it in anticipation. The conscious subject is lost in objects, vaguely *feeling* its anti-thesis to objects, but not capable of affirming itself as distinct from them, or them as distinct from it. By some mighty spiritual force, in presence of which the creation of a new planetary system is as nothing, conscious subject effects a diremption within itself. The segmentation is of such a kind that the whole is, in each segment and also in the synthesis of the two, expressed in the intuition (and symbolic word) Ego. And what is this diremptive energy save Will—universal Will individualised, which, generated in the mysterious depths of a subject as merely conscious, seizes subject itself, as it seizes all else within its reach, as object to itself. Supreme fact this, surely, in the cosmic evolution! The new potency—the Will-dialectic, is not evolved out of the subject but *in* the subject: each stage of finite mind from the protozoon upwards is God evolving Himself in and as finite mind.

(m) *Deductive Explanation Impossible.*

Are we now to set the data of Recipience or Feeling aside in the interests of the higher dialectic moment of Mind, and endeavour to explain the universe of experience out of the necessary form of self-consciousness, and so get that unity of all-explanation which is always the goal of thought? Vain attempt! In our first step we find ourselves involved in what is "given" to the Dialectic; our purpose is baulked by the whole realm of Feeling and Sense; and in our passion for unity we try to ignore these as of no account. No analysis of consciousness or of self-consciousness will yield anything

save in and through object; and if it be said that the object "there" is at the same time the subject "here," then I only add that our analysis must stop at this as Form and Fact. It is in the light of this Form and Fact that we have to interpret the object and make the universe our own. But the universe is *there*. The self-conscious Ego does not genetically construct its own data or make sentient consciousness possible: the world is, first and foremost and always, to us a world of Feeling, of Being, and of Modes.

(n) *Object is Subject.*

It formerly appeared that man as a sentient and attuent being is, as regards the content of mind, the object transmuted into feeling, and that the object constitutes what I have called the Real of the subject. Experience on the attuitional stage is not a *consciousness* of subject-object, but simply subject-object. The subject is suppressed and is not explicit in Sentience. The object fulfils itself in subject and is the Real in and to the subject; and yet there are two. It now further appears that, as a free active dialectic, man is the universal dialectic emerging in the attuent subject: consequently the object is here again the subject—constitutes the subject as no longer merely a Real as regards content, but as an Actual in respect of formal reason. And yet these are still numerically two, not merely one. Were therē only one, there could be no knowledge. There is a synthesis of two—veritably two—but it is an identity in difference. So with Subject and Object in the universal sense; that is to say, God and Natura.

A vast movement is going on: within this Man finds himself, and from it he cannot isolate himself. Were it

not for the subject-reference of consciousness and the self-reference of self-consciousness as Will yielding Ego, he would be swept along in the immeasurable and irresistible life of the Absolute Whole as a mere atom in a one all-comprehending movement.

We find also that man is an organism, connate in which are various feelings, desires and emotions which find their affinity and satisfaction in that which is not himself, and which yet the fact of the affinity shows to be, in a sense, himself. In his organism is gathered up and compacted the incipient unconscious feelings, desires and emotions of Natura, and these attain to their true character and meaning when they have been reflected into a being that feels and desires, receives and knows. The world, in short, is of one piece: Man sums it up, and in summing it up gives it its last term, its true meaning, first in sentient attuition and then in Dialectic. Man is the interpreter of his own world; and it is the veritable world of God—God as revealed, which he interprets, when he feels and knows himself and his content.

The universe, then, would seem to be an infinite series of individua moulded into shapes more and more complex, more and more various and subtle, by the impulse of the Divine Author seeking ever and infinitely for the full expression of Himself. Each successive complex carries its antecedent with it from the primatê of existence upwards, till a feeling-individuality appears which, as feeling and sentient, is equal to the infinite diversity of the world; and which, as further raised to self-identity and self-affirmation, reads and interprets the total record through the Form of this spiritual move-

ment. This final product—the sum of all that precedes it, is alone able to return to The One and contemplate the Many as the displayed activity of The One. Meanwhile man *feels* nothing but what is immediately given for content of feeling ; and he would *know* nothing save the given, were it not that the Dialectic as self-conscious knows itself. Thus far subject is object and object is subject ; but yet object is object and subject is subject, although there is only One Absolute Being-Life in both. Object as reflected into Subject—Subject-Object *is* The Absolute for man and the Truth of God, on this plane of His evolution.

MEDITATION XII.

FUNCTIONING ACTS OF THE MOMENTS OF THE DIALECTIC IN CONTACT WITH MATTER: The Object must be grasped through the Whole Movement of the Dialectic as a One Movement—This is impossible except through the parts—Hence the necessity for the prior moments of Percipience and Concipience. The Functionings of Percipience and Concipience are inadequate to the Object as being merely preliminary steps. The Object is grasped in the One dialectic movement.

WITHOUT emphasising minor moments, we now see that the presentate or attuit is taken up and dialectically affirmed as a willed and mediated concrete fulfilment of End or idea. Having gained for ourselves this universal Notion (which is the subjective dialectic in its most general expression) under which, and in terms of which, we *must* think the concrete individual and the concrete whole, we ought, so far as philosophic interpretation of experience is concerned, to be content; but we would further desire to see the process of the moments of dialectic in contact with “matter” and the bearing of this on certain problems.

The presentation is always a complex; and accordingly, if I am to comprehend the mediating ground and possibility of the fulfilled concrete End of the dialectic movement in any object of investigation, it is necessary to discriminate the parts of the complex: for only through its parts can I know a whole as an explained

and grounded whole. In fact, it is only through the ordering of subordinate elements in a whole that there can be a whole which is a one. Accordingly, in attacking the presented complex, the method, just because the object is a complex, is analytico-synthetic. I must look for the parts in the total which, as a mere synopsis, is already a *presumed* "one in many" or "many in one"; and I find that each moment of the Dialectic discharges its own specific function in dealing with this problem.

(a) Will as a dividing force separates and isolates the elements in the complex, reducing each to the self-conscious subject, and *eo actu* perceiving and affirming each in close relation to the synoptic total which it is taking to pieces. In other words, Will functions Percipience. It, further, functions Concipience, for this is a crude act of Will holding together (as constituting the Whole of presentation) the parts which it has discriminated in a series of judgments. The synoptic single whole is now a rational synthesis; but only of a mechanical kind. There is no inner relation of parts perceptible.

Just as a sensate is constantly confounded with a percept, so we often find characters assigned to Percipience of the single total which belong (I think) only to the act of Concipience.

(b) Meanwhile mere sense-attuition has been accumulating (unselfconsciously) sentient or image-universals of a vague kind, and these suffice for the practical purposes of the animal and of infant man. Although they are inaccurate, they yet contain certain elements which are a true reflex of reality. (A dog, *e.g.*, sees a figure approaching and senses that it is a man, and, under an unregulated and purely dynamical psychical compulsion,

acts accordingly.) The Dialectic as Will (with form of End), in seeking to exhaust the implicit predicates of the complex object, and having, of set purpose, corrected, extended, and named these vague sentient universals, which are now general concepts, finds in them an abbreviation of its work. Under the Law of Identity (which guarantees the syllogism) Reason can affirm of the particular complex whole before it many predicates through the said general concept. It is this Law of Identity which enables it thus to accept mediate perceptions and predications as valid of an individual, no less than immediate perceptions. In this way these artificial constructions of Will-reason shorten the road to the terminus of explanation.

And they do so, not merely by yielding a number of predicative judgments in bulk, so to speak; for the natural history of the General Concept reveals that the aggregate percepts which constitute it are, *as aggregates*, true of that *series* of real things to which the object of our investigation belongs, and of *no others*; thus gathering together and affirming what is "essential" (logically speaking) to that series. The General Concept is, accordingly, a distinct step on the way to the discovery of the real distinguishing, or (as they are called) essential, characteristics of the particular object in presentation. Thus the Socratic "eidos" becomes the Platonic "idea".¹

The above functioning acts of the Will-moment of the Dialectic in contact with matter are merely preliminary, and result only in a quasi-mechanical synthesis of experience. They are preliminary to the fulfilment of the dialectic movement—the Telos. This End is immanent in Will from its first initiation, and to arrest our-

¹ See Note at end of this Meditation.

selves at any moment short of the fulfilled movement cannot give truth.

(c) The functioning act of the second prime moment of the Dialectic—the mediating ground and sufficient reason of the fulfilled idea (End)—is, in the sphere of the phenomenal Space and Time series, called Cause; and many difficult questions have arisen round this notion. As Ground is logical antecedent of End, so Cause is both real and time antecedent of effect. “Negation or Formal Cause,” “Determining-so” or formative cause, and “End” are only logically distinguishable as moments: that is to say, as Thought, the former are in the last. So it is of the whole dialectic movement, it is a One which breaks itself up into moments. As functioning “Cause” in the *realitas-phenomenon*, the dialectic necessarily carries the fundamental identity of moments with it, and involves itself in difficulties from not recognising that it is now in a sphere where the logical prius must be also a time and space prius; and where the dialectic identity of “negation,” “determining-so” and “end” is not predicable in the same way, inasmuch as we are dealing with parts in space and time-sequence. That which affects the *status quo* of *B* is *A*, and *A* is Cause: *B* as affected, is the Effect: *B* as changed is now *A B*. There is thus an identity in the notion Cause-Effect. And this identity is the ultimate ground of the “necessary nexus,” although it does not fully explain it as a subjective necessity.¹

(d) What now is the functioning act of the last moment of the Dialectic, *viz.*, End, Telos, the fulfilment of the idea in the concrete whole of movement? It must be the affirmation of the attained resultant of the *whole*

¹ See *Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta*, chapter on “Cause”.

Dialectic movement: the complex presentate is not now merely an attuited synopsis; nor yet a mere percept of a single whole differing from other wholes *as a whole*; nor yet a mere conceptual aggregate of elements (predicative judgments) held together as a synthesis by the sheer force of Will (which has always kept before itself the complex synopsis or attuit from which it started its attempt to "know"); but a grounded necessitated whole—grounded in the negation of all else and necessitated by the "determining-so," which "determining-so" is Essence, Idea, Form of the object. This resultant then is an affirmation of the "thing" as now a "many in the One of idea or end"—a fulfilled thought as a reason-synthesis and, therefore, a fulfilled and explained actuality.

Such are the moments of knowing—the steps of the Dialectic in contact with "matter," whether the "matter" be a particular complex or the cosmic total. The synoptic single becomes a quasi-dynamical synthesis or "unity," and then passes into a "one" in many, a many in "one": not a mere numerical "one".

Thus it is that the Dialectic movement grasps, and must grasp, Experience, and that not merely formally but really; for this Dialectic is the universal dialectic of Absolute Being determining itself into a universe, permeating and forming all things, and rising to clearer and higher grades of explicitness till it shines forth in Man in all its purity as "essence" or "idea" of the man-creature and constitutive of Ego.

It is now, also, that Thought, turned back on itself, sees that its predicative judgments were all the while implicit in the synoptic presentate, belonging to it *of*

right as the modal expression of the idea or essence, in it, and by virtue of which modality it was an existent. All these predicates are held in the thought-grip of the one dialectic process from the first, although not explicitly realised in the earlier and preliminary stages of dialectic interpretation. The preliminary acts of separation were a logical violence done to the single synoptic whole in order that it might be truly known as a reasoned synthetic "one": and each of them can by itself give only a partial and inadequate and contradictory knowledge of the object, and of experience generally.

The man-plane is the Dialectic; and we err in complaining of contradictions which are due to our wilful ignoring of the insistence of the dialectic that objects shall be subsumed *in the one whole movement*.

Note.—The General Concept. A history of the discussions that have centred round the General Concept or Notion would form a great part of the history of Philosophy. There is a stability for knowledge about the Concept, as contrasted with the flux of particulars; and in the midst of sophistic pretensions, the Socratic seized on it like a drowning man on a life-belt. But this should not hide from us that it rests for its truth and significance on percepts of the real, which it summarises.

The question of "Essence" arose in connection with it, because the Concept holds together the totality of qualities in which a series of individuals are like each other, and unlike, *as a totality*, all else. The colligation of abstracts is symbolised in the sign P; which then is the essence of the series or class *as a series or class*. But this colligation as so symbolised cannot give the quiddity of any one individual in the class, and, consequently, is a "logical" essence of the class *as such* alone. It differentiates a class of reals from other classes of reals. At the same time, it is a step towards the ascertainment of the essence of the individual—its ground difference from all other individuals. Hence it was not surprising that the *eidos* should gradually come to be regarded as *idea*, and P, the essence of the "class," come to be regarded as the essence of each particular *p*.

MEDITATION XIII.

THE PERCEPT OF ESSENCE AS CONTAINED IN THE DIALECTIC. The Dialectic Moment of "Determining-so" is Essence. The Thing. The imperfection of the Finite. The Reality of Individua—Certain Conclusions that seem to involve a World-View: (*a*) Essence and Matter: (*b*) The Body of Man-Mind. (*c*) The One in the Many. (*d*) Subject and Predicates—Remarks suggested by the preceding paragraphs: (1) Method, (2) Knowing and Known, (3) Mechanism, (4) Truth of the Object, (5) Justification of Pluralism, (6) Ontological deduction, (7) Matter, (8) Objective Being-Mind.

IN dealing with Experience or the Object, each plane of mind must be content to exhaust its own possibilities and accept its own limitations.

Knowing is a one act, but it consists, as we have seen, of many moments from Feeling upwards; and all these moments are always present. Knowing, in the narrower sense, is the Dialectic movement in several moments, but we may, for shortness, speak of it as in four prime moments, *viz.* :—

(1) Will or Kinetic initiation with implicit empty form of End.

(2) Mediating ground (Negation and Formal Cause).

(3) Determining-so (Formative Cause).

(4) The End attained, *viz.*, The Determinate.

The Sensate in attuition is, through this dialectic, raised to a Percept. And the process is ever repeat-

ing itself in order to reduce to dialectic unity the complex of our experience. The End is in each moment, and each of the first three moments is in the End.

To deal with the moments of the Dialectic as separate rational entities is illegitimate; for we then put them side by side as distinct, though concurrent, "principles"; thereby making pure reason, or the dialectic, consist of pigeon-holed forms of knowing and being, instead of being an organic one whole of movement.¹

And not only is it illegitimate to abstract from each other the moments of the Dialectic, but it is even illegitimate to abstract the prior moment of Sense generally from that of the Dialectic. Let us recall that as the deliverance to Sense is objective reality, so the Dialectic is objective reality, which becomes for us in and through the inner activity of subjective dialectic or Will-reason. Through this dialectic as objective, the *realitas*-phenomenon is an Actual: and through it also it becomes for us an Actual; which from the subjective point of view we call the Notion. The dialectic and the real "given" being a concrete one in all presentation, there can be no conflict between Sense and Knowing. In the former moment of mind, the object delivers Being and the *a posteriori* categories to subject; in the latter, the object further yields to the activity of the subjective dialectic, the dialectic which is in Nature, and is in us because it is in Nature; by which word I here mean the absolute system of externalisation including man as culmination of the system. The *a priori* is not over against the *a posteriori*. Nature as the phenomenal is that in which the Dialectic is; and the Dialectic is that by which Nature exists as it exists.

¹ See *Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta*, pt. iii., c. 5.

“Determining-so” as Essence.

Now, the moments of the one dialectic in grasping things suggest inevitably the old questions of Being and Essence and Existence, which have been adverted to as our argument has advanced. Just as we see that the dialectic is a one-movement in several moments resting in, and emerging out of, Absolute Being as immanent, so the “actual,” as concrete totality, is always a One in which we distinguish moments.¹ If we keep this in mind, we shall avoid the discussion of these moments as if they were distinct entities in themselves. And yet, we have to emphasise each in turn in order to see its place in the whole.

Hellenic and mediæval discussions on “Essence” are not so trivial as it is the modern fashion to think. My course of thought has led me, unwittingly, into the midst of them, and it is possible that some may now choose to part company with my argument.

I see the explanation of these discussions, and the justification of them, in one of the moments of the Dialectic as I interpret it. The moment in the process which we should identify as “essence” is “determining-so”: the attained End is the concrete “determinate”.

Being, then, is, under such a conception, One, unique in all things, and sole ultimate reality: essence is the determination of Being as difference; and the concrete before us is this determination as effecting itself in the negating or finite phenomenal (matter)—the determinate.

¹I say moments not principles because I do not see clearly the meaning of the word “principles” in relation to these moments, unless I were to use it as synonymous with Principia.

Being absolute, as determining, passes into, and is caught by, its own negation, and constitutes the "determinate"; *i.e.*, "existence," as we have it in presentation. The whole movement is the dialectic *in rebus*.¹

Essence, accordingly, is the positive mediating "form" and ground of the determinate or existent; and is, *ipso facto*, Idea. But, manifestly, Essence, as Idea, is already presupposed in the Will-initiation seeking End. Again, the concrete resultant, the determinate in its fulness, *i.e.*, the Notion or Actual, contains Being and the whole dialectic.

The essence or idea of a simple individuum, accordingly, is the "determining-so" of Being; and the essence or idea of a *complex* actual is that "determination" whereby individual determinates are organised into a one-whole. It dominates parts and subordinates and regulates them to an end.

We can see, know and affirm only the *fact* of Essence or Idea; and if it were possible to do more and we could know *it*, we should, doubtless, see in it all the properties of the concrete determinate, simple or complex, lying concealed, and evolving themselves into the phenomenal "many" of the existent "determinate". That which logically and really flowed from the essence would be properties² of or in the "thing". The essence,

¹ The Aristotelian schoolmen (but not Aristotle himself) would say that "primal matter" is a real entity *per se*, although encountered only in composite bodies. I can find nothing but beent Negation as in modal shapes; and (so-called) "matter" is merely the sense-mode in which this beent Negation resides as the possibility of finitude.

² It would be better to reserve the term "accidents" for the superficial modifications caused by environment, giving a large interpretation to this word: they may be said to be adventitious. There are two

idea, or end would be the source; all else the consequence. The determining idea becomes "essence" *in the crisis of "becoming" in Quantity*, etc. In the modality, and by virtue of the negation in the modality, the concretizing of the idea effects itself, and is *then* to be called "essence" as the spiritual moment in the "thing". Till this is accomplished the "idea" may be called a "thinking" but not a "thought". The axe-stroke on a tree trunk is not a stroke till it has encountered the negation of the tree.

All essence individuates itself in phenomenon, and this is at once the negation and revelation of essence or idea.

Since we cannot, however, know essence *per se*, we can say nothing about it *per se* more than has been said. So of Being Universal. We know differences, and consequently determinations of Being or essences, only in and through the phenomenal concrete in which they present themselves to us on our plane of Being.

Essence, accordingly, is a universal to be known in its particularity or uniqueness only phenomenally, *i.e.*, in its modality. Each thing in its presentation is a single complex; in presence of the subjective dialectic it falls to pieces into distinctions. There is, for example, Universal Being differentiated, and thereupon, and *eo actu*, individuated in and through its negating and affirming phenomenal characters. What then? We have before us a complex presentate which contains entity, quiddity and individuation. But the *entité* is the quiddity, and the quiddity is, in the sense-world, the

kinds of accidents,—those that come from within and yet are not properties, *e.g.*, a hornless cow so generated and born; and those that come from without, as in a cow whose horns have been cut off (privative).

phenomenal individuation—the fulfilled “determinate”. If I take the elements of this concrete separately and begin to talk about them, I am involved in fruitless verbal disputations. Note that it is only in the Will-dialectic itself as object to thought that we become aware of essence in its purity: there is no distinction, at this point, between a “thing” and its essence: the “thing” is its form or essence.

The isolation of abstracts as entities or quasi-entities has always been a fruitful source of eristic controversy. Not only the universe as a whole, but each “thing” is given to us as a concrete; and our business is to *distinguish* the fundamental universals in it, but always with close reference to the complex unity before us. You wish to *see* Being? There it is in the phenomenon. You wish further to see Essence? There it is in the phenomenon as Being determined thus or thus.

[I hold that there is nothing “speculative” in what I have been saying. It is the analysis of the moments of the Dialectic that compels me to reconsider and restate, from my own point of view, certain scholastic questions.]

The Thing.

It would appear, then, that a “thing” is Absolute Unconditioned Being determining itself thus or thus in endless differentiations, and that the sensible qualities are not by themselves the “thing,” but that by which the thing cosmically fulfils itself as an existent in Quantity, Quality, etc.: that is to say, as it exists in the sphere to which man belongs; which is also God’s sphere as finite. The qualities or properties, static and dynamic, of a thing (summed up in the *a posteriori* categories) are thus the “modes” of essence on the plane

of Sense : in other words, the way in which things exist and make themselves known to sentient beings that belong to the one same continuous system within the Absolute Whole. Thus when I look abroad, I see essences spread out before me as God's modality of quantity, quality, relation, motion, etc., and the mode is just as real as essence is ; more real, we may say, because it is essence fulfilled. I ought not to allow myself to be blinded to that great Reality by designating what I have in sense-presentation as predicates, adjectives, or accidents *of* Being. They themselves *are*, as modality of Mind-universal. *Relatively* to determining or essence, they have to be designated as predicates, etc., but their reality is not thereby impeached ; their truth, as the truth of God, is not thereby invalidated. We ourselves perversely insinuate invalidity into these words (as also into "relatedness"), and then say that that which they denote has invalidity. Is it not so ? I have no right to call predicates quasi-realities : than essence and its predicative modes there is no other reality. This *is* reality ; or, to adhere to our own terminology, "actuality". What would I have to satisfy my craving for reality ? Predicates subsisting separately and flocking together to constitute a thing ! I cannot so break up the concrete before me without stultifying myself. The predicates, moreover, would have no bond of union. I exist on the dialectic plane and I must subsume experience dialectically, *and in the one whole dialectic*.

If we are to refine our distinctions, we should say that determining-so is "idea," while the term "essence" is strictly applicable only to the idea as ground of the determined-so or determinate ; but

I cannot legitimately abstract the determining idea or essence or form (call it what you will) from the concrete and call it the "thing in itself"—a nude abstract, etc., which I clothe. Note the ultimate consequences of such a procedure: nothing less than the banishing of God from His world into a sphere called The Unknowable: in short, agnosticism is the consequence. I must not usurp the name and notion "THING" for only *one* element of the concrete determinate: this alone, in its concreteness of essence and modality, is the "thing". God is always there.

And yet even the idea, the spiritual essence—the pure form, is not, like Being-universal, *a se*: essence, however pure of phenomenal conditions, is manifestly not *a se*, because it is a *determinatio essendi universalis*. But it alone of all known existences may be said to be *per se*. All else we know of it is to be found in its phenomenal individuation, *i.e.*, as a concrete, and when we would speak of the "essences" of things as *per se*, we illegitimately isolate that which is given to us as only one moment in the concrete notion: logomachy and disputation are thereupon inevitable. Notwithstanding, the questions put by the Greeks and pursued by the Schoolmen were by no means idle, and, I submit, they are not obsolete.

The above brief statement of the dialectic in things will show that a metaphysic, which is disturbed by any possible mechanical or chemico-atomic theory of the sensible world, has deserted its own standpoint, or has failed to go to the roots of things; so, a theology is based on sand which is afraid of physico-scientific truth. It is the *thought* that is in the concrete thing—the universals—that metaphysic deals with, and the ultimate

statements of physical science a thousand years hence are no more to it than any one "thing" here and now. In the sphere of the phenomenal (Quantity, Quality, etc.), the dynamical categories are triumphant, but this phenomenal itself has its ground and possibility and law in that which is not seen.

Now more clearly appears what I meant to convey when I said some time ago the "phenomenon is, and is not". Essence, or determination of Being, finds its fulfilment as a determinate or individuum in the crisis of concretion; that is to say, in and through the phenomenal. These sense-categories contain the "Not"; they are the Mode of Negation; negation is inherent in their possibility. Abstractly viewed, these categories are "*not*"; but, as concretely given, they *are*; for Being is *in* the negation and in the mode of the negation, which we call sense-qualities. As will appear in the sequel, the more correct form of expression is that the Negation is within Absolute Being as creative. Our abstraction of the elements of what is given in the presentate, *viz.*, mode, negation, being, is illegitimate. Consequently, that kind of treatment of the modality of Universal Being (the sense-categories), which gives it an illusory character and calls it *mere* appearance, is fundamentally false, for it rests on the abstraction of one element in the given *being determined and dialecticised concrete*—an abstraction which is nothing real, but only a logical fiction.

It is the function of Physics—not of Metaphysics—to know God as displayed in phenomena: the function of Metaphysics is to reveal phenomena as in God. The Physicist who does not realise God is an atheist:

the Metaphysicist who disparages the phenomenon, throws contempt on the method of God and is an acosmist.

Through the modal only (then let us say) the negation of Universal Being can arise ; but Being and the Dialectic are there all the while. The term modal I use, it will be seen, as a single word whereby to denote the *a posteriori* categories (sense-predicaments), and Dialectic is a single term whereby to denote the *a priori* categories—offspring of pure reason in its Will-energy—the Reason *in* the world and institutive of the world.

The Imperfection of the Finite.

As essence or idea each individuum is perfect ; but as immersed in the negation of the sense-phenomenal (in order that it may be an individuum) it is *eo actu* imperfect ; for it is “being” now involved in limitations and in the struggle to maintain itself against all other individua, while at the same time fulfilling itself in and through them. But while we may say this much, we are not allowed to separate idea or essence from phenomenal individuation. We have all things as concretes. If we hold to this, we escape the unintelligibility of crude dualism, and at the same time preserve the reality and actuality of the phenomenon—the “Yes” in the “Not”.

The Reality of Individua.

It will be seen that what I have just been saying is in harmony with my interpretation of the word “Notion” (the subjective name of the objective “actual”). All that is presented to me is a composite or complex ; the Notion is the total of each thing—metaphysical and

physical. Each of the elements of any complex is as much an individuum or determinate as the total thing is. In existing as they do for the total thing as an organism (more or less), they do not thereby part with their own individuality. That they should exist for "the other" is possible only if first they exist "for themselves". There is an integration, and there must be something to integrate. The parts are all subject to the organising idea or form of the complex thing and obey that idea. In short, they stand to the idea in the same relation as beënt negating modality stands to Absolute Being dialectically determining a universe. They are, relatively to the essence or idea, "matter".

And as to "Relation" the same line of argument holds: All things are concretes and all concretes contain relata. But the very term "relation" implies that things that are non-identical retain, in their union, a non-identity; otherwise there could be no difference, and the word "relation" would be unmeaning. There would be only a numerical *one*. The truth is that the union is a new identity, which is an identity that contains more of difference and reality than before: so the world is built. The new identity has its "idea" which determines the mode of union of the differences, and so on for ever. And just as the idea of an element is the form or being-determination or essence, determining its sense-characters; so the idea of a complex is the "form" (or idea) of the complex determining the elements into a unity which is a union—a many which is a "one"

So speaks the Dialectic, it appears to me.

CERTAIN CONCLUSIONS THAT SEEM TO INVOLVE A
WORLD-VIEW.

These remarks carry with them a certain world-view, *viz.*, Being, dialectically determining itself into determinates.

•(a) *Essence and Matter*.—It is in the *crisis* of the idea passing into the determinate that we use the term “essence”. Each given determinate is the Telos of a process, the first moment of which is objective Will that contains the end. Thus each thing is an interwoven concrete; and a Nemesis overtakes us if we hold the strands apart. Phenomenon, for example, if it is held apart, at once becomes unreality, or rather Nothing (non-being); and, in like manner, the ground of all, *viz.*, Being-determining, if held apart, escapes us and seems to lose itself in the air, as if it were a fiction more illusory even than phenomenon. This is the inevitable result of an objective dualism; and such a dualism resists all attempts at resolution. We have two independent *res*, it is said, and how can one act on the other? But what do we truly have presented to us? On the attitudinal plane of mind, nothing save spatio-motor modes *being* (the real, empirical or attitudinal): on the reason plane of mind, we have Being dialectically determining itself into determinates, in and through, and as, spatio-motor modes (which are thus as real as their ground); in other words, we have the concrete actual. If spatio-motor modes of Being are all we have for matter, how does this affect our conception of Man?

(b) *The Body of the Man-mind*.—It cannot be said that there is less of universal Dialectic in a stone than in a man, but there is less of Being, and there is no *conscious* mind. We arrange the *scala naturæ* according to the mind

that is in each grade—first as unconscious, and, thereafter, as Feeling, as Conscious and, finally, Self-conscious. At a certain stage in the evolution of Absolute Being it begins to determine itself as finite mind, recipient to the extent of its range and potency of the “other,” and “implicitly” referring all to an inner one of feeling. Of this I have said enough. I refer to it now only to say, that when we come to man and speak of his mind *and* body, we are apt to forget that he is only the supreme term in an infinite series which is in its method and process One throughout. The “body” of man, like all body, can be nothing save the phenomenal or spatio-motor mode of mind, *i.e.*, Being determining itself and becoming a determinate; and, as a concrete determinate, finding such a full expression (a modal expression) of the essence as is adequate to the subtlety and wonderfulness of that which is expressed. The whole evolving process is consummated in the human body. Just as the visible world is God in His essences writ large, so the body of man is individual self-conscious mind writ large. The body, *i.e.*, the phenomenal determinate of mind, is the other or “not” of mind and yet it *is* mind—the two being an inseparable concrete. This phenomenal determinate is, as beënt negation, subject to the processes and “laws” (mechanical and chemical) of the negation; and, so far as it is negation, it resists mind, which yet, whether as unconscious, conscious, or self-conscious, compels it to be its vehicle. We know that, in an absolutely healthy state, the body of man is the happy and easy vehicle of mind; but *it* has its own individual ends and laws because of the negation inherent in the mechanism, and thus resists mind or the idea. This body-involvement explains much of our incompleteness as “minds”

There would seem to be no other way of creating a finite world save through the negation of the One of Being, and this again is inconceivable save as resistance to The One, and the conflict of each with all.¹ Body and mind act and re-act on each other as a matter of fact; but the *how* of the union and interpenetration will be solved only when I can see *how* the determining idea becomes a phenomenalised "determinate" and so deduce the finite from the infinite: which will be never. If I could, by an arbitrary act, expel mind out of a human body it would still be a dynamical organism so long as it retained vitality, but it would not be a man; any more than it would remain an organism if I, furthermore, expelled vitality, but, by injecting some chemical ingredient, enabled it to maintain its shape.

(c) *The One in the Many*.—If it be accepted that Being finds its fulfilment, as essence or idea, in and through the phenomenal, we have here the simplest case of the One in the Many. Essence in relation to the "many" (the sensible properties and elements) of its manifestation is a potential energy initiating and sustaining the quantitative and qualitative conditions—the modality of its concrete life; and these, if it is truly to live, must be reduced to itself as essence or idea. Essence or idea, in brief, passes into the "many" that it may "live" as a finite; and it moulds the "many" into being a harmonious expression and vehicle of its own essential being—its idea. The end of its energy is, in brief, particulars governed and unified by a "one" which is itself. This many in one and one in many is the Actual as presented to us.

¹ The problem of the universe accordingly as a practical problem is Harmony; and Harmony is also the personal problem for all men.

The determination or essence of an individual then, is revealed by its predicates, not concealed; but the individual is more than "manifold and different qualities reflected into unity".¹ For, a specific determination of Being, *i.e.*, essence or idea, is the necessary mind-element in the concrete of a thing, and gives and sustains the unity. So the Dialectic compels me to say. As in the simple individuum, so in the complex: the "how" of the relation of the individua to the one of essence or idea is a secret. Qualities exist for the idea or "one," but the idea or "one" does not annihilate their individuality. The individuum exists "for itself," in existing for the "other" of the idea; and the idea finds itself in the "other" of its modality. There is a seeming contradiction here; but the only way of solving it is to accept the utterance of the dialectic which tells us that the "thing" is always a mediated one *in* many and a many *in* one. The actuality before us is neither the idea (or "one") nor the individual characters; but the idea as unfolding itself through the individua and the individua as *for* the idea. Again "one" is not a single unit, nor yet mere unity: this is the language of intuition and the phenomenal. The One of metaphysic *means* one *in* many: without the many there could be no "One". Our difficulties seem to arise out of our dwelling on the *phenomenal* relations; we refuse to accept the metaphysical or thought solution which is the Dialectic in its one-whole movement.

(d) *Subject and Predicates*.—In like manner we are in the habit of talking of a "subject *and* its predicates," and unwittingly insinuate the heresy that the subject is itself

¹ Professor A. S. Pringle-Pattison, p. 177 of *Scottish Philosophy*.

a phenomenal "somewhat" or "thing" on which predicates are piled. The Dialectic will not admit this for a moment. The "subject" is metaphysical, for it is the essence; and the predicates are merely its unfolding in the modality of predicates and their relations. Logically to abstract these predicates and then puzzle ourselves as to how they are related seems to me a kind of disloyalty to the plane of mind which we occupy.

It would appear, then, that the question of man's body and mind is only one aspect of a much larger question—the relation of universal Being-Mind to its Body, *viz.*, to the universe of Quantity, Motion, Quality, etc. By what subtle process does the real-reality become the modal reality? and how does the modal reality, once effected, re-act on the real-reality, its own ground and possibility, resisting—nay, sometimes defeating, the Spirit? Who can tell? The fact of Negation, however, is unquestionably there.

Remarks suggested by the preceding paragraphs.

(1) *Method.*—It may be regarded as an anachronism thus to allow myself to introduce echoes of Aristotle and the Schoolmen into present-day philosophy. It is, however, a blunder to suppose that philosophy, which is simply thought on experience, sheds the thoughts of the past as if they were dead leaves. Philosophy in a very vital sense is continuous, and we cannot break with the past. But, while the Aristotelian and the Schoolman pursue truth by contemplating long and steadily the "object" till it

breaks itself up into its elements and reveals the universals in it, it seems to me that there is still another, and, if not a better, certainly a complementary, method; and that is the contemplation of the "subject" as sentient, and then in its pure activity. • My method has been to look fixedly at the feeling and knowing, rather than at the felt and known. The matter of all speculative thought is subject-object, and I have emphasised subject. The subject is seen to be the continuity of the object in self-referent individuals. The Method is Epistemological.

(2) *Knowing and Known*.—Let us contemplate Objective Being, and, in and out of Absolute Being, we may see emerging the pure *nisus* of Will which proceeds dialectically to determine an object for itself and for the knowledge of those who can "know". This act of "determining" is essence or idea; the determinate is the particular thing—the idea involved in the many, and having now reached its *telos* in the concrete presentation to sense and reason. The method of knowing is the method of the known.

(3) *Mechanism*.—I cannot see that the doctrine of forms and qualities (Essence or Idea and Phenomenal exhibition) is antagonistic to a mechanical theory of the world, if by the "world" we mean the world of sense. It is through the quantitative and qualitative and the mechanical generally that essence affirms itself as a concrete actuality. Nay, the physicist, in all departments of inquiry, will do well to hold stringently by the mechanical conception, if he is to reveal (so-called) material pro-

cesses ; and this even in the department of biology. But he must not so stretch the idea of mechanism as to affect to explain anything save the world of sense. The idea, essence, differentiate, or form of a thing, as "universals," whereby the thing is and exists, is the aim of philosophical investigation ; but it is only as materialised that we can search for, or find it, as a concrete. And it is to *this* essence as phenomenalised that Science applies itself ; for this, we are dependent on physical investigation ; and, in scientific phraseology, we call it the "law" in the thing whereby it exists as it phenomenally exists. No metaphysic can yield it.

Thus the essence or determination and the phenomenal determinate are a concrete, and we cannot separate them save in thought. This concrete is the *ipsissima res* : not either the idea or essence nor yet the phenomenal or spatio-motor process or law (so-called).

(4) *Truth of the Object*.—I look at the complex whole presented to me and everywhere I find "matter," *i.e.*, the modes of Sense—the phenomenal. I do not find solid matter, for what do I know of so-called matter save phenomenal presentations in quantity, quality, motion, relation and resistance ? Were I merely an attuent being, I would stop here, my activities being a mere re-action against the phenomenal environment with a view to my self-persistence ; the individual tending to persist and struggle for existence, simply because it exists. I continue, however, with the eye of Reason, to look at the phenomenal object as in subject, and it reveals itself to me as Being and Dialectic,—a determination of Being (idea or essence) and a determinate which is the realised telos of external activities in terms of Sense.

If the sensible be the phenomenal expression of spiritual facts and processes, they are the sense-truth of the object—the truth, that is to say, of the spiritual reality on this plane of universal Being in which I find myself. They are the modal exposition of God by Himself. They are truth. I, a self-conscious organism, am also an “object” in the cosmic whole and in true continuity with it as a *sense* exhibition of Being-Mind.

(5) *Justification of Pluralism*.—The “oneness” revealed by the inner and unseen facts and processes of mind on the one hand and the sense-presentation of these facts on the other hand, might be regarded as yielding not a pluralistic, but a monistic, view of all experience; but there emerges also the fact of Negation in the determinate whereby it is constituted an individual—ultimately a twice-affirmed individual in the form of self-consciousness which contains *self*-affirmation or Ego. Thus what appears to be a pluralistic monism is, in fact, a Monistic Pluralism. There is a contradiction in the words I grant, but I have to accept it. The Universal One cannot pass into self-determination, save as determinate individua from the atom to man; on the other hand, the individua can never liberate themselves from the One without dissolving into nothing. And yet the so-called contradiction is held in the One of Being and the Dialectic, and so resolved. It is thereby transmuted into an Opposite or Contrary.

(6) *Ontological Deduction impossible*.—An ontological deduction of nature and finite mind is, and must be, a mere play of the imagination—an æsthetic exercise. I have reached the utmost bound of a possible philosophy

when I have found the thought-modes and thought-forms of actuality as *given*. Being with its modality and dialectic I accept, as the last word; and I await further revelations: which, however, will not be on this plane of The Absolute that I at present occupy. It is true that ultimate philosophy may be called the Logic of the Real, but the Real itself, *viz.*, Being and all its modes, are for ever a mystery, except in so far as revealed here and now. Being and Dialectic give the unity and universality into which all difference is resolved, in which all difference is held. It is this conception which gives to man the only God he will ever find; for it points, with unwavering finger, to the One out of which the diverse emanates and in which it ever reposes in conciliation.

(7) *Matter*.—Matter, we have said, is the modality of Being and Dialectic (infinite and universal) presented to us, and called by us sense-phenomenon (summed up as *a posteriori* categories). Infinite Mind satisfies itself in this modal manifestation, and speaks to finite mind in and through its modality. Independent “matter” is an impossible thought. Nobody ever either felt it or saw it. It is the living God that sustains His own modality. In each and all, Mind is, and is fulfilling itself in all we see as an infinite pluralism of identities till *self*-identity is reached in man. • Matter, then, is merely idea or essence in phenomenal terms; but these phenomenal terms have their *own* processes by virtue of the *negation* of the idea—by virtue, in other words, of the fact of individuality or finitude. And yet, the phenomenal is, as an abstract, naught and not; it *is* the idea

revealing itself as physical process—the only way in which man can be aware of the import of the idea. The idea as in phenomenal terms is the object of sense and physics; and the phenomenal terms apprehended as idea (Being and Dialectic) are mind and metaphysics.

Thus all creation is vital: that is to say, there can be no dead “thing”; for there is determining idea everywhere in ascending scale.

In the earlier Meditations we found Being-immanent in each presentate and in the Whole, but only as static. This was the *realitas-phenomenon* on the attuent plane; but now we find that the presentate is “dialectically determined” Being, which, as essence or idea, is “ground” relatively to its phenomenal characters; and, further, we find that while epistemology compels us to affirm this essence, its own distinctive and particular nature and significance is knowable only as phenomenon, *i.e.*, as matter and its processes or laws.

(8) *Objective Being-Mind*.—Universal Being and the emerging Dialectic constitute Mind-objective. This fact has not been introduced by me dogmatically in an external and mechanical and supra-mundane fashion to explain experience: it is found *in* experience. If we look long enough at subject-object, it reveals itself as implicit there. I *have* to receive and subsume the world of experience so, and not otherwise. The-world is a concrete synthesis.

I do not, however, mean to say that the Whole (including man) is a system of thought-determinations. Far from it. By “thought,” in its specific sense, I mean the active Dialectic. The “Whole” is Absolute

Being which determines itself dialectically, *in so far as it is determined*, into a world. But, Thought or Dialectic can never yield the Real and Feeling: it is the mere servant of Being which, in manifesting itself, does so dialectically as a determined somewhat—the pluralistic system; and, as system, a One. It is Being I feel and know as Reality—Being the eternal source of all Reality, including the Dialectic. Being, dialectically determined, is Actuality.

MEDITATION XIV.

PRIMORDIAL ACTUALS: Why does Thought demand Ultimate Units?

Ultimate Units are Immanent in the Percipient Functioning of the first Moment of the Dialectic—The Atom of Sense—The Metaphysical Unit—The One and the Whole in each mind-matter Monad—The Primordial Actual is a Positive Negation—Pluralism and the One—Necessity in Nature, and The Contingent—Mind and Matter—Pluralism and Monism—The Contingent and Casual. *Note*: Mind and Brain.

IN my search, I have been dealing with the implicates of the object as reflected into subject, and so far I feel that I am on safe ground; but when I find myself face to face with the question of units of existence—primates or atoms—I am conscious of being in a somewhat speculative atmosphere. But it would seem to be incumbent on a pluralist to form some rational imagination if no more, of units of being. Let it be understood that what I venture to propound is merely illustrative and to some extent pictorial: at the same time, I am showing *how* the Dialectic compels us to conceive the nature and process of a primate. This is all: for it is scarcely necessary to say that no finite mind can hope to have a vision of creation or preside over a manufactory of Being. I rest what I say on Epistemology.

The Will-dialectic comes forth to proclaim that the world is a rational system; it is itself the rational

system of the world—the organic logic of things reflected into or evolved in a particular consciousness: but it cannot be satisfied with a general proposition as to the concrete Whole. It has to rationalise the infinite number of complex individua forced on it in sense-presentation, and through the parts reach and justify the Whole. To accomplish this it must take the complex to pieces and re-constitute it: it must isolate elements. This analytico-synthetic process is the way of knowing—the functioning of the dialectic process in contact with matter. Accordingly, the Will-dialectic, in presence of a presentate, has, we found, in order to satisfy its own form, first of all to function Percipience which seeks and affirms the single percept; and the identity of the percept with itself (Judgment). It next gathers together the separated fragments and restores them *into* the unity of the presented total which has been the object of inquiry: in short, it functions Con-
cipience (of the individual), which is the holding together as a mere aggregate, by the sheer force of Will, of the “many” of elements in the unity of the total object—a crude quasi-mechanical synthesis. In like manner with the General Concept; which is symbolic of a community of real characters among real things, and renders possible mediate and syllogistic judgments. But all this is merely preliminary to the final moment in which the individual elements are gripped as a coherent one of mediating Ground and of idea or End fulfilled.

A single complex presentate, *e.g.*, a plant, has to be understood, known; and this is merely to say that it must be raised from the crude fused aggregate of properties by which it is an object in attuent mind to a rational or reasoned object; from being a synoptic

unity of undiscriminated parts to being a synthesised one of Reason. It is in the interests of this rational whole, this "notion," that the Will-Dialectic energises and is the illuminer and interpreter of the "real" of attuition.

Were man *merely* a Percipient activity, the percipient act would still be of service in giving definiteness, clearness and distinctness to the attitudinal crowd of sensates; and it would, doubtless, content itself with this. But it is the necessity in the Dialectic, as a one movement of rationalisation of given complex "wholes," that compels the functioning of percipience and concipience *as preliminaries or moments* in the one dialectic movement. All particular judgments are isolated threads that explain nothing, until woven into the one web of the Dialectic.

Now, it might well be said, "leave atoms or primordial reals or actuals alone: we can know nothing of them": take experience in its complex whole. On the other hand, a pluralist is driven (as I have said) to form some conception of primordial elements. All our philosophical efforts are, after all, directed to the attainment of such a way of looking at the whole of experience as will give us a rational explanation of it more or less approximate—in other words, satisfy the dialectic in us; and it is our interpretation of the Whole that must, in its turn, govern our way of looking at the ultimate parts. *De minimis et maximis eadem est ratio.*

Moreover, to ignore the atomic or unitary element in knowledge is to misconceive the nature of Reason as a subjective, as well as an objective, fact. For

it is the *necessity implicit in the percipient function of the dialectic* that compels, and will ever compel, men to fix their attention on ultimate units and try to give some account of them. The ultimate unit, in short, is immanent in the Percipient function of the Dialectic. For myself, I merely desire to make clear to my own thought how primordial actuals are to be regarded in the light of previous meditations on knowing, and I make no pretensions to touch questions of molecular dynamics, or to criticise the statements of speculative mathematico-physicists.

The Atom of Sense.

When we attempt to reach the minimal part of the Spatial (including Motion, Time, Quality, etc.), we are met by a contradiction. Now, it is not the *act* of percipience, *by itself*, that reveals to us infinite divisibility, but our inability to think or imagine the sensible outer save as Quantity, which is the synthetic sense-necessary or mode of all experience of the external. The act of percipience is merely a dividing, isolating and limiting act. We affirm the minimum or atom we fondly hope, and, *instantly*, it leaps into Quantity; and this, *as* Quantity, is again necessarily divisible. Thus the external must be to thought infinitely divisible, so long as the external is in quantity. Always the atom is to thought-imagination quantified; and indeed tri-dimensional. While, therefore, we may "posit" atoms, we can never by any possibility have an atom in consciousness so long as we are under the necessity of spatial conditions; in other words, so long as we must image the atom in Quantity, etc. The physical atom, accordingly, is a fiction—a useful (and so far as I know a necessary)

postulate or hypothesis of a mechanical interpretation of the phenomenal universal.

If it be said that we can "think" an atom outside the conditions of Quantity, etc., we merely say that we think the abstract "point" of Geometry. But this is a limitative percept and, as such, outside the "real" of Quantity, etc. We may thus, it is true, get the atom we require for thought, but not the atom that enters into the constitution of a real phenomenal world. The required atom is the material or phenomenal atom, and that is a "unit" which is at the same time a "many" of Quantity; and indeed also of Quality in so far as one atom is unlike another. Given Quantity as a "sentient necessary" and Percipience as a dialectic act, the fact of the infinitely divisible in respect of Quantity is inevitable.

Again, mathematical "points" with effluxes of energy is a felicitous conception, but these are not within the sense-categories: they have no phenomenal existence, and it is the sensible real world we are dealing with. A point (I formerly said) is merely the imposition of a limit by an act of reason. All percipience is an act of determination, and the term "point" seems to me to be used simply to denote a determining of a quantity in space as beginning or ending. But it is not itself within space: it is an abstraction like a mathematical line itself, or abstract motion, or a point of time.

Doubtless, we may propound as an escape from contradictions that the atom, *i.e.*, the "ultimate real" out of which the world is built up, exists, but has not the qualities of the sensible *as given to us*. This may be; but it cannot be ultra-physical without being meta-physical. It is not improbable—nay, is it not certain?—

that the phenomenal primate may be unlike the matter we know, although containing it as a system of energies. But as such a system it could not be an "atom".

Contradiction, then, would seem to lie at the basis of our conception of the sensible world. We determine a minimum for our purposes, which minimum is a postulate of a mechanical theory—that is all. Is this final? After all, it only amounts to this: we are compelled to affirm an ultimate in sense which it is impossible ~~to~~ *image*. Let us give it up then, we may fairly say, except as a hypothesis of abstract dynamics.¹

The Metaphysical Unit as a One.

In any case, it appears to me that we are driven by force out of the physical into the metaphysical, if we resolve to continue our search; for so long as we try to think the atom under the sense categories, the contradiction is unresolvable; and we have just to sit down under it. And yet the persistent activity of subjective percipience in determining and ever-determining "singles" is such that we cannot have a cosmical conception that completely satisfies thought without units out of which to build the concrete, complex world. The percipient moment in the subjective dialectic insists on this. This is of its very essence. *The primordial unit, I repeat, is immanent in the Percipient act of the first moment (or rather functioning) of the Dialectic.* Is there no other way, then, of looking at the question—an

¹ An elastic continuous homogeneous fluid is probably the primal mode of the Negation of Being as Quantity; but then we should have to get atomic individua out of this—Electrons and their constituent corpuscles it may be; and the above metaphysical argument would stand unaffected

epistemological way? We are not merely attuent subjects receiving and reflexing the phenomenal world, but beings of reason whose function is to "know" the phenomenal complexes presented to us, *i.e.*, to transmute attuition into knowledge or the Notion, —the Real into the Actual. In this attempt we start with division or analysis, and go on in search of "primordial actuals" which shall have in them the possibility of the actuality of the rich and full phenomenal world.

Just as percipience is always *de singulis* or of the individuum; so in grasping the cosmic Whole we are driven to posit a "determination" of non-finite Objective Being into an individuum, and then we have a "determinate"; and a determinate is (as we have seen) essence or determination clothed in the *a posteriori* categories of Quantity, etc. If we fix our eyes on the determinate—the determination as phenomenalised, in vain do we seek for an ultimate unitary real—an atom. The ultimate actual then (let us rather say) is the dialectic *determination* itself, *i.e.*, essence as individuated in the modal, and, *eo actu* or *transitu*, a "determinate". Ultimate actuals are, in fact, Being and the Dialectic in their primordial "determinates". The cosmic act, we might say, is creative Percipience, and the result is a unit of that creative percipience. These are the "primordial actuals" out of which the world is built. The metaphysical "monad" is merely essence: the "primordial actual" is essence as incorporated in its phenomenal self-revealing characters. They are not monads, in the Leibnitzian sense; for a monad is metaphysical, whereas the ultimate or primate

is an actual—a “determination” that has *become* a “determinate,” and is both metaphysical and physical. This is the point of view from which my epistemology compels me to affirm the atomic unit as an “actual”; although it is, *in terms of sense*, unthinkable as “atom”. The contradiction in sense remains, but the point of view is now changed and gives a certain rest to thought.

In point of fact, we always find ourselves driven out of the sensible into the non-sensible to explain the implicated content of the phenomenal presentation. And, as of the phenomenal world of complexes generally, so of ultimate actuals we hold that they are simply Being dialectically determined into Quantity, Quality, Motion, etc. Of our world, accordingly, let us say that the ultimate actual is Being determined into that minimum of Quantity, Motion, etc., that makes possible a world of phenomenon. What these primordial elements are, as quantitative and qualitative, we can probably never know. This, however, is of no consequence for thought. The “ultimate actuals” then, may, after all, be called “monads” because they are veritably unitary “determinations” of Being (which have their analogue in our subjective act of percipient affirmation); but as existent “determinates,” they *must* present themselves as discrete continua inasmuch as we are compelled to think of them in the modality of Quantity, Quality, Motion, etc.

It will be seen that it is the Meditation on Essence that leads me to say that the primordial actual is a “unitary determination of Being passing into, or effecting, its actualisation in the many of sense-categories”; and it may be, nay it must be, that the primordial

"determinate" (as distinct from the determination or idea) is not sense-"atom" at all, because it must be qualitative and quantitative and, accordingly, *from the first*, complex. A "primate" in the sphere of sense may, however, really exist (nay, must exist unless the percipient act in a rational synthesis is misleading) as the barest thing that can enter into the composition of a physical world; but, in so far as within the sphere of sense, it is not an "atom," for it is *ab initio* and, by a saltus, clothed with certain categories. There is in fact no sense-"atom," and the correct term would be primate. And as we have an exuberantly various world, so these primates probably vary both quantitatively and qualitatively *ad infinitum*. Why not? Let us think, then, of the "atom" as a unitary determination of Being passing at once, and by one leap, into the "many" of the sense-categories—a one in many.

It is by means of such primates and their reciprocal inter-relations which, when we see them, we call laws, that Universal Mind externalises itself as a dynamic system. The positive determination or idea gives to each its import, energies and relations in and through the sense-categories. The sense-categories again contain the negation of the idea and give individuality.

All this, speculative as it may appear, seems to flow from what I have said on Essence. And yet I freely grant that all attempts to define ultimate actuals must be unsatisfactory. When I say that the unitary determination of Being, *i.e.*, the idea, leaps into sense-categories at once—I merely mean that it must be quantitative, qualitative and moving, but not necessarily in quantity and quality as these are *finally* presented

to the sentient subject. It does not pick up its qualities one after the other; it must leap into existence fully clothed with the totality of energies which effect the phenomenal as presented to us.

Even, however, if we cannot find the unit which is immanent in Percipience, *i.e.*, the primary generative physical element in things,—these insistences of the dialectic have their manifest uses. It is under their compulsion, *e.g.*, that Biology goes back to a speck of protoplasm. Nor can Reason ever shake off its necessary impulses, because these constitute its very self. Man may fail to find what he seeks, but he *must* go on seeking.

The One and the Whole is in each mind-matter Monad.

Why there should be externalisation at all is an unsolvable question; and a futile one. Hegel says the Idea “resolves to let the element of its particularity . . . go forth freely from itself as Nature”. This “resolution” must then be an act of Will, and Will must be preceded by Desire. Nature is, he also says, “the existent Idea”. I seem to be in accord with this general position.

It is absurd to presume a repetition of the objective Dialectic act for the co-ordinating of the parts. It would be superfluous to supersede the energy of the idea in ultimate actuals. Each ultimate *must* be conceived under the total movement of the Dialectic, just as the Absolute Whole of externalisation must be so conceived. Each, then, contains Ground, Determined-so and End. If that End be the building up of the Whole, each must contain the possibility of the Whole in it.

Each "mind-matter monad," or ultimate actual, in merely fulfilling itself, contributes to the fulfilment of the whole. All are let loose, so to speak, with the *possibility* and *purpose* of an ordered world already in each. It is in *this sense* only that into the chaos of primordial elements, thus constituted, the dialectic prolongs its activity and determines the ultimate units into the organised world we see—the system of correlated phenomenal ends and processes or laws.¹ That is to say, the positive character of *each individuum* determines its positive and negative relational possibilities to all else (action and reaction)—the one continuum in all difference being Being and the Dialectic which are in the Whole *by being in each*. But Being-Dialectic ever remains The One in all difference. All difference is within it; and it always remains the One of continuity. It is in the "matter" of Being-Dialectic activity (the spatio-motor) that they find differentiation, which is individuation, which is Negation. Were there not a One (and this a teleological-causal dialectic insists on), every difference would fly asunder from every other, and there would be chaos.

These primordial actuals, accordingly, may be said to be all set round with open windows: they are centres of energy in terms of their determination, essence or idea. Being and the Dialectic in all its moments are *in* them: the same Being and Dialectic that constitutes the complex mind-matter monad, Man. Hence our mystic sympathy with even the lowest grades in the scale of existence.

¹ If the *initia* of the world were barren static atoms, the world could be created only *ab extra*; and created by utilising "atoms" each of which was nothing!

Individua are concrete essences or ideas which, as individua, can live only by negating all else; and, as concrete wholes, can live only *through* all else (to the extent of their potentiality); just as man truly lives only through all else, especially his brother man. There can be no such thing as a wholly independent unit. Each hangs on God, each is within Absolute Being, and, moreover, lives only through the "other" of itself: which other is, in truth, the Universâl. The negation in it, however, separates it from God and from all else, and gives it (dependent) independence. Hence each monad is a contradiction containing in itself the Yes of affirmation or idea and the No of negation and resistance. So with the cosmic Totality: it is God and not God. The phenomenal *is*, and is "Not".

The Primordial Actual is a Positive Negation.

The world, then, is a world of individua working out their own inherent characters, whereby they tend to constitute an organised and purposed Whole. If it be so, then it follows that each individual determinate is, as a unique finite, not only (as we have seen) a negation of the One of Being and Dialectic and of all other individua in the interests of the preservation of itself, but has *positive* relations to all others which are its fulfilment as a determination of Being (idea or essence), and go to effect a world. The "in itself" of potentiality has to become "for itself" through the "other" in the history of each monad. And it is because the determining idea cannot individuate itself save through the Negation, which is inherent in the

finite of sense-modes, that the *positive* movement of the idea into a system of harmonious relations with all else may be arrested or deflected. The idea as a centre of positive relations, finds the vehicle of its activity in these very modes; the dynamism of nature, which we call laws, is the idea in its living modality. But the idea is, at the same time, met by the hard fact of individuality as involved in the finite negation: the idea is negated in order that it may constitute itself an individuum. Abstractly regarded, this resistance of the individual is a blind stupid movement; but I need scarcely say that I am analysing the elements of what is always a concrete.

The primordial actual, then, is determination of Being, *i.e.*, idea, which effects its telos, *viz.*, the individual "determinate," through the moment of Negation inherent in the modality of the spatio-motor (or that which generates the spatio-motor) and all qualities and quantities as we see them in their final aspect on this plane of Being. The individual "determinate" thus contains the idea, but, as individuum, it negates the idea and all other individua. Notwithstanding, as the result of the struggle of individua negating each other, we have on the whole a harmony; not a perfect, but a discordant, harmony; and an evolutionary process, not movement in a straight line. Only through conciliation of contraries could the word harmony have a meaning. *The primordial actual is thus a "positive negation"*. The Thesis is "idea"; the Antithesis is Negation; and the concrete "individual" is the Synthesis. This contradiction alone makes possible the transition of the One into a many. This contradiction is the Actual. All this in order that there may be a world of existent individualities

in which The Absolute delights as the finite exposition of its own Being—its way of feeling itself, knowing itself, and proclaiming itself; and thereby unfolding its mysterious essential nature.

If the “Absolute Idea” be the infinite Thought which is at once the beginning and the end, it mediates the end through individua each of which contains the potentiality of the Whole.

Pluralism and The One.

The sole ultimate Reality is that which holds all (so-called) realities as qualities of itself. Absolute Being as Dialectic always remains in identity with itself through all difference. Negation and difference are within the universal; not outside it. From a universal point of view, even men and angels are adjectives—substantival adjectives. It must be so: otherwise everything would either be a fortuitous whirl of atoms or everything down to the primordial monad would be a self-existent substantial god, and worse than chaos would be the destiny of the unintelligible world. The question is, How are primordial individua and complex single totals, although plurals, yet to be regarded as adjectives of a *One* Whole? They are one, I say, in the continuous living reality of Being and Dialectic which, working towards ends, gives unity to parts and wholes, weaving the whole into one mighty web. There is no difficulty in comprehending this.

In each individuum, I would repeat, there is inherent, as its *esse* and form, the capacity for, and the necessity for, the Whole in order to the fulfilling of itself. [The monad accordingly may be said to be infinite in its relations.] The phenomenal is but the modality of the

spiritual fact; the "primordial actual" is thus instinct with reason *implicit*: and it is in this sense only that it is endowed with "desire to fulfil itself"; but as this is automatic, it should be called "tendency," not "desire".

Let us keep to the concrete; if we abstract the Noumenal, we have a silent One and no world; for essences do not constitute a shadowy universe by themselves: and if we try to think of an abstracted Phenomenal we encounter—Nothing.

Necessity in Nature.

It is the essence or idea (the one) of a complex "thing" that, as genetic and dominant, gives unity and significance and direction to the subordinated "many" of phenomenal difference. The idea fulfils its end, in phenomenon as determined by it, after a specific way—which we call physical law, departure from which would be to defeat the reason implicit in the phenomenon. Hence physical law is necessity. To put it crudely, the idea is always in identity with itself, and has only its own specific positive function. For the idea to move about from one tendency to another, save as fixed reactions, would be to plunge the phenomenal world in confusion. In the fact that objective reason is at this stage only implicit lies the "necessity" that belongs to nature. So with all lower grades of Being. There is a certain fluency of movement hither and thither as existences rise out of mechanical conditions and when life, and still more when sentient subject, appears. And yet, it is possible that even in the inorganic grade of existence the individuate, as in conflict with all other individuates, may deflect and disturb the natural order, and give rise to the casual.

Mind and Matter.

It will be now more apparent than ever that, while Mind and Matter are always with us, they are not disparate substances; for there is only one Substance, *viz.*, Mind as Being-Dialectic. But Mind, in determining itself into a finite series, does so as what we call the sense categories and the phenomena which are dependent on these, and, in doing so, *ipso facto* negates itself while revealing itself. Thus the sense phenomenal or "matter" while having its own laws, and these embrace the whole sphere of mechanism and chemism, is truly manifesting the idea in and through these laws; but it does so in a quasi-independence given to it, as phenomenon, by the fact of Negation. Thus we have a mind-matter pluralism. To affirm disparateness is to set up two worlds rubbing against each other—the one Mind-full, the other Mind-less.

How is it, then, that matter takes such a hold of us that it insists on imposing itself on the ordinary consciousness as an "independent somewhat"? The only explanation of this I can see is the fact, which analysis yields to us, that the finite, the phenomenal or matter is the Negation of the very Mind-universal that affirms it and uses it as the vehicle for unrolling its own hidden life.

Pluralism and Monism.

Let me recall that we have already found the universe to be one Absolute Being immanent in the Many as a Will-Dialectic that determines with a view to ends. Accordingly, we do not set up a congeries or aggregate of independent plurals which go, each its

own way, and find an accidental harmony like Democritic atoms. The infinite One is, as Dialectic, necessarily teleological in the activity that constitutes its own externalisation as a One-Whole. But Plurality is an undoubted empirical fact, and each thing must have its *own* centre of energy or be merely the illusory many of a *One* life ; and this is a fatalistic Monism. By no device or gloss can a logical Monism give reality, still less actuality, to mountain, mouse or man. Monism gives us an emanant, not an immanent, God. There is no use in trying to shirk this conclusion ; and, if it be true, we must just accept all its pernicious consequences in ethics and politics, and also the personal despair which it carries with it. But it is not true : the individual is everywhere too strong for such a theory, and it is equally too strong for a theory of casual arbitrary conflict of unmeaning plurals. Absolute Infinite Being is immanent in the idea which determines the finite. He is *ever* uttering that idea ; otherwise all would collapse. He is thus always present in his creation : the finite is within Him, as well as not Him : the truth of the idea in "things" is the truth of God-finite. Our analysis of subject-object demonstrates the truth of these sayings : they would be of no value were they merely dogmatic.

If The One of Being is to find its own life by way of the individual and the many, it can only do so by such a dialectic constituting of the individual as places in each the inevitable process and harmony of the whole ; "The Whole is reflected in all the parts," says Nicolas of Cusa. The One of Being and Dialectic must be "all in the whole and all in every part". The Dialectic of the Whole is in and through the Dialectic of the parts, and yet, only by contraries and opposites

can there be a "many"; only through discords can there be harmony. Order is an unmeaning conception except where there is a "many" of difference and contraries.

Absolute Being externalising itself in Space and Time must retain its externalisation within Itself. That externalisation cannot be thrown out as a waste and meaningless by-product of eternal Being. And further, I may add, that since the externalisation is *as* Time, it *ought* to show the evolution of the Eternal as once for all committed to a Space and Time series, —if its life is to be wholly unveiled as a *process* as well as a fact.

Let us note, meanwhile, that the metaphysic of the concrete individuum is the metaphysic of all things. Every instant of our lives you and I illustrate it. I, a man, can fulfil myself only by fulfilling the "idea" in me (which is the subjective dialectic)—truly finding myself in all my "positive" relations to the scheme of things; my negating individuality must subsume all that truly flows from the "idea": this is the condition of my being a fulfilled personality. So with all other things according to their grade of Being. No individuum—be it primate or man, can fulfil its function save through its universal positive relations (essence). In so far as it does not subsume these into its activity, it is wicked and worthless. And yet each is non-existent as an individual save in so far as it energises from its own centre; while each, as part of a Whole that is a system, may be said to contain that Whole in itself. Through their *positive relations* they enter into each other to make the world, and yet, by virtue of the inherent negation, they remain individua.

The Contingent and Casual

Thus, from lowest to highest, the world is the issue of a continual striving and struggle. The idea, which is God, is always affirming itself in each ; the individual negation is always resisting. The world is, accordingly, a living world, and God's immanence means God's continuous activity as idea or essence, without which all would vanish. The casual and chaotic enter through the effort of the individuum, as such, to negate its God-given idea and all other individua for the sake of its bare and barren self. If the idea had free flow in the individuum we should have, I have said, a harmonious and (so-called) happy world ; but it would be a lotus-eating happiness. There would be no individuum—not even a jelly-fish.

Mind-universal (Absolute Being as Dialectic) is in all things and determines all things. Objects in nature show more and more of the characteristics of Mind as they rise from the deadness of slime to Shakspeare. We cannot contemplate the vast all-inclusive Object which constitutes our natural environment without seeing the ascending evolutionary order that prevails—evolution, that is to say, not of one grade out of a lower, but of Mind-universal evolving Itself and immanent in the ascending grades. And this Universal, at a certain point in the rising ordered series, begins to reveal itself not as implicit *in* things alone, but *to* itself by reflecting itself into an entity *that feels*—*viz.*, finite subject. It thus nucleates itself (so to speak), and then starts on a fresh evolution of Itself, from the amœba upwards, in phenomenal modes fitted to hold it and to express those determinations of Being whose function is to feel, to sense, all things ; and, finally, that determination whose function is to know and govern its very self

as a self-conscious entity. When, then, we talk of the finite conscious subject as mind in opposition to object, we merely mean that Universal Mind, which is determined into all things, is now determined or reflected into itself—is conscious. It begins its evolution from Pure Feeling and, passing through grades of animal sentience, it finds phenomenal modes, at every advance, fit to be its vehicle and, at the same time, its negation; for in everything there is the synthesis of affirmation and negation.

The casual is the outcome of the negating or individuating element in the concrete thing. We see casuality all round us; and were there no casuality, there would be no freedom: all would be inflexible necessity. The world would exhibit the dead unity of a lump of lead—not the oneness of a living actuality.

The higher we rise in our empirical observation of nature, we rise out of the mechanical system of calculable sequents to those selective activities and adaptations peculiar to organisms. These defy calculation, although the *general* result or telos of the individual is not thereby necessarily defeated. A plant or animal exhibits unexpected deviations from the straight line of mechanical necessity which lifts it partially out of that necessity. The casual, the unexpected, and the arbitrary, although often admitting of explanation after they have occurred, cannot be anticipated. We are thus driven to the conclusion that all primordial actuals, and still more the infinitely complex actuals which are classed as biological, have their character and tendency and telos implicit in them from the first, but not *therefore* the various incidental manifestations of activity, by which each reaches its fulfilment and yields its contribution to a cosmic harmony.

Most of all is this power of deviation and deflection patent in Man. The freedom, which is incipient in plants and is visible in all sentient beings, is conspicuous in the being who is himself a Will-dialectic—a finite god constituting his own ends and the means of attaining them; although always under limitations imposed by the general law of things. For man does not stand alone; he is hemmed in on every side by natural law and also by the conflicting purposes of his fellowmen. Thus the casual and arbitrary seem almost to fill our experience; and to find our way through these to a fulfilled purpose in ourselves is always difficult, and sometimes hopeless.

Hence conflict; and by this way of conflict it would appear that the cosmic purpose is, and can alone be, secured. The aim of this conflict in each is the identification of the individual with its idea—or the subsumption of the idea by the individual. By this means alone can finite things be brought into a divine concord. The absolute idea can be realised in the Whole only *by being realised in each*. Accordingly the externalisation of Absolute Being is not an equilibrium of unmeaning contradictions: it is a scene of strife through which, however, a final purpose runs, as the Dialectic assures us; whatever that purpose may be.

Note.—MIND AND BRAIN.

If the conception of the whole which I have formed be true, the body of a worm or of a man is merely the determining idea writ large in Quantity, Quality, etc. But inasmuch as the idea passes into that which contains *negation*, the phenomenal body has a life and laws of its own which, although they exhibit the nature and life of mind, at the same time limit, condition, and resist it. The phenomenal conditions flow from the idea; and this is simply to say that function in

the process of evolution precedes organ. Does brain exist for the sake of feeling and thought or *vice-versa* ?

"How" idea and phenomenon are related and interact in a world which unquestionably is a One of system, I doubt if we shall ever be able to tell.

But this generally I am compelled to say by the preceding argument, *viz.*, that the relation must vary as the evolution of mind in "*Natura*" works itself out. Prior to "Pure Feeling" we have what is, if not "mind," at least the anticipation of mind, amounting to little more than a central "point" of re-action to bodily impacts. It is for a biology which will study the appearance and growth of "mind" along with the growth of nerve tissue to throw some light on this.

As mind evolves out of one grade into a higher, it seems to become more and more an independent centre of activity in the bodily organism, until it plants itself on what I have called the Attitudinal Plane. On this plane, my observation leads me to say, that there is reciprocity in the sense that mind acts on nerve and nerve on mind; and this involves an important conclusion. For it is evident that to say mind acts on nerve and excites feeling or desire and so determines to action, is to say that it is possible for mind to have experiences—at least in the secondary form of re-presentations, *which experiences are not set up by nerve*. nay more, that there is a mechanism and chemism of mind *apart from nerve* which, by associating presentations originally derived through nerve, constitutes new experiences. Mind in short has here attained to an equality of privilege with nerve as to the initiation in itself (not *by* itself) of experiences. Accordingly, the locus of the origin of these experiences is mind pure and simple, and not nerve; but, inasmuch as there is reciprocity, they involve nerve and modify nerve (whether in its molecular adaptations or in some other way—undulatory movements or vibrations or what not), so that the recurrence of these nerve-adaptations themselves would necessarily throw into consciousness the past experiences. A reciprocity which does not assign this independence to mind is not reciprocity at all; for, if the independence be not allowed, then all presentations and re-presentations, and also associations of these, *in mind* must be of physical not psychical origin. And thus we should find ourselves committed to monistic materialism, and mind would have to be regarded, at this attitudinal stage, as merely a flash in the pan,—an epiphenomenon and no more. On the contrary, Mind on the attitudinal plane is dependent on body and independent. There is Reciprocity.

Now, when conscious subject evolves itself into the higher plane, it does so as Will-reason and calls itself "I". The dialectic of the universe that penetrates all things is reflected into the attitudinal subject, and subject thereupon becomes self-conscious through Will as root of its new development. This is Man. And, of course, it follows that man is now a creature of ends and purpose, and self-directing. The "subject," as now Ego, is still "subject". it carries with it all *given* experience and is still involved in nature: but Ego is, in so far as it is a new evolution, *supra naturam*. By its necessary nature it *seeks* ends and controls experiences to ends, whether of thought or action. The solicitations and suggestions of the attitudinal plane of mind, in which it is planted and out of which it springs, are now arrested and weighed. Ego, in short, originates in and for itself; but, being still involved in an organism, it has to function its pure reason (or dialectic) activities through that organism, thus freely and high-handedly *using* that organism as its servant, and no longer its master.

In the nerve-organism, accordingly, are embedded the past and present *pure activities* of mind, and the modifications of nerve-substance which this presumes may of their own accord recur, and thus throw back into the self-conscious mind its own self-created images, thoughts and purposes. The relation here is one of reciprocity; but this in a significantly modified sense; for there is no equality of interaction as we find on the attitudinal plane. Finite mind in its highest evolution as Will-reason (or its resultant ego) *initiates* changes in the nerve-substance. This is to be *supra naturam*. But in so far as Ego sublates attuent subject it is still within nature.

In short, the transition from the mechanical to mind is infinitely gradual; but when mind is fairly born into the cosmic system, it starts on an evolution of *its own* whereby it equates itself more and more with the Object until it reaches its culmination as Ego, and then and there finally sists itself as a free and co-ordinating and controlling dialectic within the Absolute Whole.

Of course, if the determination of Absolute Being in its finite revelation does not, passing from the mechanical and chemical, posit itself at all as what we can only call *mind-entity*, the Ego and all its freedom and teleological activity are wholly illusory, and, as we said when speaking of attuition, mind is then an irrelevant epiphenomenon of Phenomenon: in truth, Phenomenon is the only Real, and "mind" is only one phenomenal attribute more of a mechanical Absolute; and a useless and futile attribute.

MEDITATION XV.

THE INFINITE: The Indefinite and the Infinite—The Infinite Unconditioned—The Infinite as given in and through the conditioned and as generated by the Dialectic—In what sense do we “know” the two Infinities?

By the lifting of finite mind out of mere Attuition and planting it on the plane of the Dialectic, the evolving God creates Man. The subjective dialectic is the form of freedom: it is supra-naturam: it is spirit. It grasps the individual and the whole as a teleologico-causal system and gives oneness and coherence to experience. The *a priori* categories are, in fact, a list of the new conceptions under which the rise of the Dialectic compels us to subsume experience as a reasoned system. Moreover this Dialectic, by its very nature, introduces mind to a region beyond and above the Categories. What is that?

The common character of the dialectic, in dealing with things, being always determination of parts, or of a synthesis of parts—a Concipient or a Causal synthesis—this act is impossible save as implicitly affirming the indeterminate or indefinite; and, further, as revealing to us the fact of Infiniteness.

· *The Infinite Unconditioned.*—Feeling, as embryo subject, has, for its object, Being indefinite and unconditioned.

This is the True Infinite—the not-yet-finitised. But it is in Feeling only, and not in the form of knowledge.

On the dialectic plane this “feeling” of Being Unconditioned is, however, perceived and affirmed as *not* the Finite. It is perceived and affirmed as the Positive which the Finite negates. As determined through the finite it is a negative percept. But it is only the perception “that Being-unconditioned *is*” that we attain to; and we can “know” nothing of the “what” or “how” or “why” of it as Being. The what and how of it is the Finite. It is the first and ground moment in our conception of The Absolute Whole; and there we must leave it. All things, including Ego and Knowing, repose on this unknowable foundation, and in this Absolute Being as first moment of the Concrete Whole they have their mysterious genesis: it is *as unknowable* that we affirm it as a “Feeling”. That is to say, the fact of Being Unconditioned is known (perceived), but only as in Feeling.

We can never detach ourselves from this the Universal of Universals—Being Unconditioned.¹ We find it continuing itself into the Conditioned in which and of which we are: and within the Conditioned we again encounter the Infinite—the infinite of transcendence, and it appears to arise thus:—

The Infinite as given in the Conditioned, and as generated by the Dialectic.—“Sense” of the outer begins its career with a feeling of homogeneous diffusion. This continuousness is broken up into diverse and limited objects which are forced on sense. In sensing an object, the subject feels an undefined beyond as

¹ In this Infinite as perceived there is nothing geometrical.

given in the defined presentate. This is a feeling of the "Indefinite" in space and time.

Subject, rising to the dialectic plane, further "determines" each percept and concept as a finite and conditioned, and is therein conscious of an undetermined and a Beyond: also, in determining or limiting Space and Time (the sense-universals), it *ipso facto* perceives and affirms the Indefinite (which the attuent mind only "felt"), *viz.*, the fact of a "greater than any assigned quantity". This, however, is not a true infinite, but only an *affirmed* or "perceived" Indefinite.

Haunted by this Indefinite which ever shadows it, Reason (implicitly) consults its own processes and sees that, inasmuch as the act of percipience or rudimentary knowing, and of all knowing, is always determination, the *undeterminability* of the finite is involved in this very *act*. The undeterminable in all "knowing" of the conditioned—space, time, and all else, *must be*, as long as man is man. Thus the Knowing subject now clearly perceives that in the affirmation of the finite is wrapt up a "greater than any assignable quantity," in other words, immeasurableness: and this of *necessity*, because it is involved in the *act* of percipience. Percipience imposes limits, just to be forced to remove them. Necessary immeasurableness is given to consciousness, accordingly, not *in* and through the measured or limited, but as revealed in the *act* of measuring or limiting; and this is the perception of the true infinite *within the conditioned of* space, time, etc.;—the Quantitative Infinite (geometrical). The consciousness of a non-limited which limiting involves is merely, at best, I say, the perception of an "indefinite" beyond: it is only when we see (or implicitly are aware) that the act

itself of limiting, determining, perceiving, judging, knowing carries in its bosom the non-limited necessarily, that we perceive the illimitable or infinite. The infinite is not in the *fact* of limiting, but in the *act*.

So with intellectual and moral conceptions. No man can grasp a *fulfilled* ideal. Truth, Goodness, Beauty, we affirm, and imaginatively clothe them with perfection; but absolute Truth, absolute Goodness, absolute Beauty, must always elude us because of the infinite in them. The conception of Perfection is impossible as a real. This is the Qualitative Infinite and is necessarily involved in the very "act" of conceiving an ideal whole.

The non-finite of Unconditioned Being has now revealed itself in the not-to-be-finitised of Conditioned Being, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Man is within a certain circle of evolving Mind-universal; but the consciousness of the fact of the Infinite breaks through the circle at every point in its circumference.

As to the Infinite generally: we may so define "knowing" as to exclude the infinite from the possibility of being known, and so relegate it to "belief". But what is Belief here? There must be a consciousness of the Infinite to admit of the introduction even of the word "belief". What is this specific consciousness? We may also define the infinite in a peculiar sense as the ever-going out and return into itself; or as that which is limited only by itself. The symbol of this would be the snake with its tail in its mouth. But however this may be, it does not unveil the genesis of the percept, Infinite; nor yet its true nature.

In brief, we may say that the quantitative and quali-

tative indefinite within the conditioned arises *in determinando*: the true infinite is contained and revealed *in actu ipso determinandi*.

On the side of the *minimum possibile*, it is precisely because the infinite lies concealed in *actu ipso determinandi* that there is infinite divisibility. So with the *maximum possibile*. Am I therefore entitled to say that in largeness, Space and Time are endless, or that in smallness the process of division is endless, and that there is no real atom; or, on the other hand, that there is a subsistent real atom, etheric or other, in *rerum natura*? I am entitled to say none of these things. The *minimum materiale*, doubtless, is the postulate of physics; but of its existence as a "real" I can say nothing. All I can say is that, within my sphere of Universal Being, the reason-percipient act affirms, and must affirm, the endlessness of littleness. So also of the *maximum possibile*, it must affirm the endlessness of bigness.

Thus, man finds himself in a peculiar position, standing as he does between two infinities—the non-finite (or not *yet* finitised) of the Unconditioned and the infinite (or not *to be* finitised) of the Conditioned,—sometimes, but wrongly, called the Sense-Infinite. I say wrongly so called, because this expression covers only the Indefinite, and also leaves the qualitative outside. It is, properly speaking, the dialectic Infinite: it is a dialectic percept.

The Dialectic, then, in all its functioning determines the indeterminate, and in that determination affirms the indeterminate beyond; nay more, a closer examination reveals the infinite as implicit in all dialectic affirmative

acts as such. This is sufficient to satisfy us that a completed knowledge—a synthesis of The Absolute is for man impossible. An “Absolute synthesis” of his experience however, which shall contain this very *fact* of the unattainable, is possible.

This consciousness of the transcendent Infinite as the gift of the Dialectic is a wonderful revelation—not the result of a mind-impotence, but of a mighty potency. It is worth to man more than all his reasoned judgments regarding finite things. It exalts and elevates him by carrying him outside and above the range of his ordinary life. Thus the Dialectic contains the possibility and prescience of a higher plane of mind than itself.

There are those who treat the consciousness of the Infinite as if it were an illusion. To say that we “know” the Infinite is a manifest contradiction, for “knowing” is, as we have said, determining or finitising. But to say that we know the *fact* of the Infinite in the conditioned is not a contradiction: it is simply a fact—a dialectic percept: so called because it is generated by the Dialectic as Act.

But it will, further, be said that to say we “know” Infinite Unconditioned Being is a contradiction. Not so: for it is not Infinite Unconditioned Being that we “know,” but the “Feeling” of Infinite Unconditioned Being that we know and affirm.

In short, the *fact* of the transcendent Infinite is generated by the *act* of the Dialectic in contact with the matter of sense and thought: and the *fact* of the Absoluto-Infinite (or Unconditioned Being) is given in Feeling—affirmed or known as Feeling. Does Feeling count for nothing in the epistemology of Man?

Thus, Man as the head of a finite world is not restricted to the finite, but, on the contrary, has the Infinite insistently thrust on him in Feeling and also in all knowing of the conditioned. In the root-experience—Pure Feeling of Being Unconditioned, in his further experience of the same Being as immanent in sense, Man is permeated and surrounded with that which is not less but more than knowledge, because it is the *ground* both of existence and of knowledge, and is compelled to the further affirmation of that which is *above* all knowledge. He is thus, from the first and always, involved in the Universal,—a conscious sharer in the Divine Life in his feeling, his sentience and his knowing. To be consciously at home with the Infinite is the privilege of Man.

Note.—The feeling of the Unconditioned Infinite has nothing to do with the Geometrical Infinite, I have said above, unless we first sensualise it, which would be absurd.

The Unconditioned, as Source of all, finds in the "All-other" Itself which it yet retains. It thus may be said to be infinite, because it is not limited by difference, or, if limited, it is by a self-limitation which it at the same moment cancels. It is a ceaseless outgoing and return. But infiniteness is not in the "ceaselessness" (this would bring it under the geometrical infinite of Time) but in the fact of non-finitisation. The finitisation or negation is *within* Itself. Thus Absolute Being continually says within itself "I am not No" and I am everything that is "No". This, however, is little more than to say that Absolute Being is always and necessarily in its own determinations. Were it not so, the world would be a seething, fermenting vat of microbial godlets. The thought of the non-finite in the finite is not more difficult to realise than the fact that this sentence, as printed, is me and not me.

MEDITATION XVI.

SYNTHETIC NECESSARIES : Synthetic Conditions of Sense—Synthetic Conditions of the Dialectic—Analytic Necessaries—Unity and Continuity of Experience—Subject is Object.

Synthetic Conditions of Sense.—Space—the mode of Being as externalised, is the fundamental condition of Sense—the sentient universal of universals. Accordingly all other categories of the Outer must involve Space as the ground of their possibility. For example, Motion is change of body from one point of space to another: and Time is the “one-after-another” of changes or events in space. Time as an abstract, again, has to be conceived *in terms of* space, *viz.*, as a line. These, *viz.*, Space, Motion, Time, are generally accepted as the fundamental Sense-categories;—more accurately, however, to be denominated the synthetic conditions of the “existence” (externalisation) of Being and of a sentient subject. As such they not only enter into all our predications of the external, but are so interwoven in our experience that, even when the object, on the higher plane of mind, is a pure thought, we tend, in our attempts to think it clearly, to represent it in space and motion modes. All our language—the most abstract even—is metaphor.

Although the strict phrase is synthetic “conditions” of sentience, we can speak of Space and Time as syn-

thetic "necessaries" of (or in) sentience. Space and Time are not *a priori* (any more than the other predicaments) in the sense of being subject-generated: they are the synthetic conditions of sentience merely because they are the synthetic conditions or modes of a finite world reflected into a sensing subject *as itself organically involved in that world*. Space, Motion, Time are true universals of recipience because true universals of existence. They spread themselves into and through all sentience. They do not find merely a responsive "analogue" in subject; they find *themselves* reflexed and assimilated. They are at once warp and woof of the external diversified universe and of the determination of Being which we call sentient subject; it being itself a determinate in the same universe. A determination of Being becomes a determinate concrete individual (primordial actual) by spreading itself into the spatio-motor as the modality of its specific existence.

Synthetic Conditions of the Subjective Dialectic.—The moments in the one movement are the form of knowing as it intromits with the given matter of knowledge. But the dialectic is not "necessary" in the ordinary sense. That a man can "know" only as a dialectic and not otherwise, the highest plane of finite mind being a dialectic, is simply a fact. The synthetic conditions of subjective mind on the sentient plane are the modes of space, motion, and time; and the synthetic condition on the knowing plane is the dialectic Form. Both are in and of the constitution of Absolute Being as externalised and are reflected into

a sentient and knowing subject in continuity with the whole.¹

If the ultimate necessities are simply the ways in which mind *must* receive and the ways in which the reason-energy *must* energise, they are synthetic or constitutive; by which I mean that they are built into the constitution of the cosmic whole, and, *therefore*, of subjective mind. And what is this but to say again, what I have often said, that the conscious entity is in ontological and phenomenological continuity with the larger universe of reality and fact within which it meanwhile finds itself? All is One.

Analytic Necessaries.—These two together—the ultimate sense-modes and the ultimate reason (or dialectic) forms, are conditioning necessities; and they give rise to necessary judgments and propositions when they touch the concrete. It would appear that all analytic necessities

¹ Given, however, the synthetic Sensible Modality generally (the *a posteriori* predicaments) and the synthetic Dialectic Form (the content of which is the *a priori* categories), there are judgments born of the intromission of the dialectic with matter which we more correctly call “necessary” judgments or propositions. They are analytic necessities as opposed to synthetic or constitutive necessities or conditions. The terminus of the dialectic movement is “*A* is *A*,” which again involves “*A* is not *B*”—the Laws (as they are called) of Identity and Contradiction, while both involve the Law of Excluded Middle. “Yes” and “No,” predicated of the same reality or concept at the same time destroy each other.

As I have previously said: To the attitudinal plane of mind there can be no “necessaries”; and thus the Sensationalist or Ideologue is hard driven to explain necessity. There is nothing possible to attitudinal but a various, contingent, and fluent experience helped out by dynamic associations: the analytic necessary arises out of reason alone—the moments of the subjective dialectic.

are necessities in and through the synthetic necessities, *e.g.*, " $2 + 3 = 2\frac{1}{2} + 2\frac{1}{2}$ ". "Things that are equal to the same thing," etc. "The world must have a cause." "A thing cannot at the same time and in the same sense be and not be." All these and others are already implicit in the synthetic form of active reason, which affirms identity as resultant of a formal mediating process that involves the principium of contradiction. The "causal nexus," as it is called, is also a case of identity, the predicate being involved in the subject. But I would remark that the perception of a *real of sense* (*A*) reappearing in an effect (*B*) could not possibly give necessity of nexus. I merely see *A* in one situation and thereafter in another, *viz.*, *AB*. Attuition can see as much as this. It is the *concept B* as involved in, and so far identical with, the concept *A* that yields the necessary nexus. Any other view throws us back into the arms of empirical sensationalism.

Analytical judgments, it is sometimes said, yield no new knowledge. This seems to me to be a purely logical view. Experience is a *real* complex. We take it to pieces, and all our judgments are analytic and, as such, they are *ipso facto* ampliative; for they enlarge the content of the knowledge of the thing before us. The "thing," given to us as an already existing synthesis, is rationally re-synthesised by the help of our analytic discoveries. It remains the same thing; but for knowledge it is virtually a new thing. Is not this the aim of all science? I have to find the total content of what is before me, and the whole functioning of the Dialectic in contact with things is analytico-synthetic.

A synthetic judgment (in the sense of ampliative) is

possible only through analysis (a truism). A synthetic necessary, on the other hand, I understand to be an ampliative judgment, which is either a universal condition of the subject as Sensile or a universal condition of the subject as active Dialectic or reason. These are built into the mind as conditions of all sentient consciousness and of reason ; and, similarly, are built into the universe as reals, the finite mind being an organic part or continuation or reflection of the said universe. I cannot get below these necessities without abolishing sense and stultifying cognition. These constitute the ultimate Truth of finite experience : they are names for the universal synthetic constitution of the whole man-sphere of Universal Being. The totality before us is Subject-Object.

Unity and Continuity of Experience. — It would appear then that the synthetic constitution of Man as subject is in identity with the whole of object. Any other view than that of a One of Being and Mode and Form in the cosmic Whole *including man*, gives rise, by emphasising dualism, to innumerable misapprehensions and consequent difficulties. A consistent subjective idealism (ideologism as it ought to be called), for example, must find the reality and actuality of an object to be “the consciousness of it” (call it idea, perception, or sensation or what you will), and this annihilates the object as such and as *per se* and *in se* ; for I can neither sense nor know *it*. Natural Realism says that the reality and actuality of an object are *in* the consciousness of it for the subject that feels and knows ; but that the object *per se* is as much a reality and actuality as the

subject *per se*; neither more nor less. The universe, in brief, is a one of fact and process which at a certain point of its evolution turns over into feeling, *i.e.*, a feeling subject, at which point the term "object" first emerges and has a meaning. It would be nearer the truth of things to emphasise the "object" side of dualism rather than the "subject" side. Why should I, as sentient subject and active ego, detach myself from the All?

The *synthetic* elements which go to the building up of attuent and rational mind have to be accepted, and any attempt to get below them or above them is manifestly futile. I must be something else and greater than myself to explain them in their genesis. "We are in a world of facts," says Cardinal Newman.¹ "We do not quarrel with them, but we take them as they are, and avail ourselves of what they can do for us." And as to ourselves to which all is referred, "if I may not assume that I exist, and in a particular way, with a particular mental constitution, I have nothing to speculate about, and had better let speculation alone. Such as I am, it is my all. . . . I am what I am, or I am nothing. . . . I cannot avoid being sufficient for myself, for I cannot make myself anything else, and to change me is to destroy me. If I do not use myself, I have no other self to use. My only business is to ascertain what I am, in order to put it to use. . . . Every being is in a true sense sufficient for itself, so as to be able to fulfil its particular needs. . . . The fact that other beings find their good in the use of their particular nature is a reason for anticipating that to use duly our own is our interest as well as our necessity."

¹ *Grammar of Assent*, p. 339.

The synthetic conditions of mind are connate, *i.e.*, constitutive of mind ; but they are not, on that account, modes of sense and forms of reason whereby a confused manifold is constituted into a rational experience. On the contrary, they are an outer, 'already rational, reflected into a unitary conscious and self-conscious subject. The dialectic web, like the phenomenal web, is woven into man and constitutes him in his specific individuality. There is both a phenomenal and ontological continuity—a One in Difference. This is what I call the doctrine of Common Sense (*sensus communis*) and Natural Realism.

Subject is Object.—Thus, as regards the categories of Sense and Reason and the content of experience generally, Object is Subject, Subject is Object. "Self" is itself within the sweep of the universal movement. And yet it separates itself and its own connate characteristics from the Universal, and consciously and self-consciously contemplates the Whole, including itself. This is its cosmic function.

One has to complain sometimes of vagueness in the way in which some use the proposition "Subject is Object," inasmuch as they sometimes have in view the Infinite Subject and the externalisation which is *Its* Object ; at other times they have in view the finite subject and its correlate the given finite object. These two aspects of the proposition, it is true, fundamentally involve each other : and are to be accepted, it seems to me, provided the "subject" *and* the "object" remain. It is not, we presume, maintained that we are to "identify" object and subject ; for if there be identity, then it is only confused thinking that can affirm a world at all :

there is nothing but a blank One. Knowing in its supreme activity has killed itself. In the universal aspect of the proposition, all that can be meant is that, given an Infinite Subject as source of the externalisation,*the latter is truly the former in the projected form of "Other" and Difference. The formula, in brief, is not Identity of the eternal Subject and Difference, but Identity *in* Difference.

Now, as the highest expression of this finite "other"—the manifold Difference, we find a conscious and self-conscious *finite* subject which alone can raise the question of the *modus essendi et operandi* of the whole. Here to say that the Object is Subject is a blunt way of talking. Distinctions are overlooked. The Object—the Universal Object, that is to say, the object to the Eternal consciousness, includes my finite subject, and my finite subject is the "other" of It, just as the sun and moon are. It is only *one* of innumerable differences; but it is of a peculiar kind, because it can receive, and then actively co-ordinate, all other differences in itself. It stands apart—so much apart that it constantly forgets that it is *of* and *within* the totality of fact and process—so much apart that it even places itself in antagonism to all experience and gives rise to the hard dualism of the natural and the scientific man. It resents being lost in the object, and deprived of its individual position and its self-affirming personality. And it is right in so doing: it resists suicide even for the glory of God or of a philosophical system. To say that the finite object *is* the finite subject is to ignore the system within which the finite subject is placed—a system of negation and difference. In and through difference the Eternal lives as Time and Space; and the difference and

individuation of each thing are ever afresh and more intensely affirmed as we rise in the scale of created individuals, until we reach the affirmation of self-identity in and by man. But, meanwhile, the self-conscious subject is apt to forget that it is bedded in a One Being and a One Process. Our point of view in these excursions recognises the fact that the subject is object in the sense of being in continuity with the Whole as regards the content and the universals which it receives along with, or finds in, object. As an individual in a system of difference, the subject, first as conscious and then as self-conscious, *is a being* thus differentiated; but differentiated only as a beënt and substantive potency for the receiving and reflexing of the Object; and, even in its dialectic activity, it is merely the reflection into its own unity of being of the Dialectic of the universe. Thus the One cosmic movement completes itself.

Accordingly, all that is or can be in the subject, in so far as sentient, is first of all, non-subject; and the subject is reduced to being the potency of reflexive recipience: and, further, in so far as it is self-conscious dialectic, it *is* the very dialectic, already there in the whole, that is reflected into it: but none the less is it a specific entity as Ego. The Object in its infinite modality fills the subject and constitutes its "reality"; and the dialectic as in the Object, *is*, the form of the subject as a Will-reason: in the former case, the subject-individual is a beënt *potency*, and in the latter case it is a *self-referent* individual constituted by a will-movement within the subject-individual.

So far, then, the subject, as a living subject, may be said to be the object: it is *within* a system, and its

specific function is the actualisation in itself of the vast and various Object in its totality of Being, Phenomenon and Dialectic. This is Knowledge. Object is subject, in short, as regards both content, mode, and form ; but *so* that subject remains self, and only *as self* can find out its universal relations and reduce the Whole to coherence and unity. This, it may be said, is Monism. Not so : it is a pluralistic monism, in which, by the fact of negation, the world of entities is saved for itself, as I have endeavoured to show.

It is the reflection of the universal dialectic, as Will and its form of movement, into the finite being, or (otherwise put) the evolution of Will-reason in and out of the attuent subject individual, that lifts man above other conscious creatures, and imposes on him the task of freely knowing, and freely co-ordinating himself with, the system in which he finds himself. By virtue of this, while he is as a Real within the natural system, he is, as an Actual, lifted above it, and belongs to the transcendental.¹

Man, accordingly, is not only a true receiver of the objective truth to the extent of his range of Being and his place in a system ; but we may say that, were his senses purified and the dialectic in him perfect in its operation, he would be himself the very truth as it is in and to God whose life he shares. What we call Evil would then be impossible. How, indeed, can it be otherwise ? The cosmic synthesis is a One of Continuity in all its parts and degrees. If a man could break through the hard crust of his negating individuality, he would find to his surprise what a thin par-

¹ See also the Meditation on Immortality.

tition there was between him and God. And yet, just because the specific nature of man is free Will-dialectic, God waits to be *taken*. He does not flood the finite soul with Himself, as the mystic might say. Man is not a Son of God; but has the "power to become" a son of God, as Scripture says. That is so. If we say that man is in a specific sense an incarnation of God, we mislead; for all that can be meant is that, just as the whole visible world is an incarnation of God, so man is the fullest incarnation, gathering up the whole into himself in so far as a finite self-consciousness can. And thus, the fulness of his being is the full realisation of his personality; and that realisation contains God.

To prevent misunderstanding:—

I have said that the Object builds itself up into the subject as its real of content. This is experience. But note this: Were experience to become *for* the subject according to a certain immanent process of movement, man would be no more in the universal system than a plant or an animal. This, were it a complete account of man, would yield monistic pantheism. When man appears, he *sists himself* within the Absolute, throws himself aggressively on all experience and, himself a Will-reason, proceeds, from *his own centre* and by the strength of his own right hand, to build up the "actual" of experience in himself in terms of the dialectic. He is much more than a mere vehicle for the realising of an experience which is other than his own; he is an active Ego inreasoning his experiences and directing all his pure activity to Ends—the ideals of Truth and Conduct.

It may seem to the reader that I part with Plural-

ism when I say that even Will-reason—the subjective dialectic, is object. And yet this is involved in the fact that subjective dialectic is objective dialectic. The Source of all does not wait for the appearance of man before His thought enters into things. Thus the subject, both as recipient and as pure dialectic, is as regards content and form, the object. It is the Absolute One Movement reflected into a determined centre of feeling and activity which we call Man. The “thinking” of subject-ego is the infinite Divine Process as finite. The Objective dialectic is, as Will, free and self-determining ; it becomes the subjective dialectic, which, as such, is also free and self-determining, in so far as a finite determinate can be free.

Were subject not object as Feeling and thereafter as Dialectic, it could never know the true truth of things. All is One : and yet, the dualism of Common-sense is emphasised in this monistic pluralism which I endeavour to expound. The object finds in the subject the meaning *which it already has* in the Absolute. The subject meanwhile is an individual entity as much as a star is, but it is greater than any star, for it can hold all the stars. Universal Mind is *in* the object, but it *is* the subject ; and to Universal Mind also the stars are Object—created, not given.

The outcome of this Meditation is, that I am entitled to appropriate Hegel's words which are true only, I think, in a poetic sense of his own system of interpretation.

“ Nature is Spirit in alienation from itself [I have called this a revealing of itself in and through the Negation]. Hence the study of Nature is the liberation of Spirit in Nature or the liberation of Nature itself : for nature is potentially reason, but only through the

Spirit does this inherent rationality become actual and apparent. Spirit has the certainty which Adam had when he saw Eve. This is flesh of my flesh and bone of my bone. For Nature is in like manner the bride to which Spirit is wedded. . . . The inner heart of Nature is nothing but the universal. Hence when we have thoughts, we recognise in Nature's inner heart only our own reason and feel ourselves at home there."¹

I, also, a mere pedestrian plodding my way along the weary road in search of truth, am entitled to say that sense-experience and dialectic experience are God revealing Himself to the reflexing and reflecting conscious creature. This is what I mean by the philosophy of Common Sense or Natural Realism.

¹ *Werke* VII., 22, as quoted in A. S. Pringle-Pattison's *Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 128.

MEDITATION XVII.

CONTRARIES, CONTRADICTIONS AND ANTINOMIES: (1) The Dialectic and Sense Necessaries—(2) The One and the Many—(3) The Functioning acts of the Subjective Dialectic in contact with Experience: (a) Percipience and Identity; (b) The Dialectic as Functioning Concipience; (c) Identity (*continued*), (d) The Functioning of Ground and Consequent (the Causal Nexus), (e) The Kinetic Moment in Cause; (f) The Teleological Moment in Cause—(4) The Contradiction in Man as a Concrete.

IN the Real there can be no contradictions in the strict sense of the term. If contradictions were to emerge the one would cancel the other. There can only be opposites and contraries. Note also that on the attitudinal plane of mind there are no contradictions. Contradictions arise with the appearance of the subjective dialectic. It is the functioning acts of the moments of the dialectic in contact with matter that yield (so-called) contradictions.

(1) THE DIALECTIC AND SENSE-NECESSARIES.

Will, as percipient act, determines or limits Space and Time and Motion, and in the *act* of determining lies the infinitude of these.¹ Thus we are said to have the contradiction of the infinite and finite in abstract Quantity and the Quantum—that is to say, to thought or the dialectic. The so-called contradiction, as inherent in the very *act* of percipience, can never be overcome. Now,

¹ See Meditation on The Infinite.

if by contradiction we mean the affirmation of two mutually exclusive predicates of the same object at the same time and in the same sense, I cannot see the contradiction here. We do not affirm of any determined portion of Space, Motion, Time, that they are finite and infinite in one and the same breath. As regards both Extension and Protension, all we say is that in limiting or prescinding the *given indefinite* space, etc., the *fact* of the Infinite emerges as, or in, space, etc. : and as regards Intension or divisibility, that the *fact* of "infinite-ness" again emerges. All our knowledge, in short, is limitation necessarily involving the *fact* of infiniteness as revealed in and by the dialectic *act*.

In short, Space, Motion, etc., are the synthetic necessary modes of sentient consciousness, and we cannot, consequently, liberate ourselves from their all-embracingness. They are *given* as indefinite and unconditioned—the synthetic mode of existence and sentience alike. These synthetic necessities are, *ipso facto*, first indefinite (to Attuition), and thereafter (to Reason) infinite, *i.e.*, they refuse to be held in mind as completed wholes. And this simply because we cannot transcend our own ultimate conditions of existence as men. When we proceed to "know or determine," it is these sentient necessities that we first encounter ; and the Infinite, as distinguished from the Indefinite, of Time and Space, is seen to be an offspring of subjective conditioning as *act*. It appears to me, accordingly, that when we are told that we cannot think the World either as finite or as infinite, there must be a fallacy somewhere. I can think *a* world as finite, and I do not call the *same* world infinite ; nor is any such necessity imposed on me. By "*the* World" is evidently meant the Totality of Exten-

sion. Certainly I cannot think (image) Extension as finite nor as infinite. This is merely, however, to repeat what we have already said, that determination of Space carries in it, as *act*, the fact of indeterminability. So far from this revealing the impotence of Reason, it is its very glory, strength and distinction. It points to a still higher plane of mind than the present.

To try to know anything *about* the Infinite beyond the fact of it, is to make it a "real," instead of a dialectic birth, and lands us in subtle and eristic disputations which are worthless. In brief, I must affirm the Infinite as immanent in the dialectic as percipient of Space and Time, but I do not affirm the infiniteness of Space and Time as reals; still less do I affirm finiteness and infiniteness of Space and Time in the same breath.

The *act* of limiting or perceiving, then, carries with it the *fact* of infiniteness as yielded not only in the Space-expansion, but also in the Time-series. When, then (for example), we ask "Had the world a beginning in Time?" we forget that Time itself is within the totality which we call the phenomenal world, and we are asking "Had Time a beginning in Time?" I am, in fact, asked to think (image) the totality of the Time-series; and because of the universality and synthetic necessity of the fundamental Space-category, we have to conceive the Time-series under the category of Quantity: this being so, the question is similar to that of the totality of Extension. We cannot affirm the first point of a series without, *ipso actu*, affirming a part before the first, *because* percipience is limiting or prescinding and thus contains the positing of illimitability. The point of view, accordingly, of those who exhibit the sense-contradictions as unsolvable seems to me to be wrong.

So long as I do not affirm finite and infinite of the *same* space and motion and time, there is no true contradiction. The dialectic *act* is such that in limiting (whereby "knowledge" is made possible), it reveals to consciousness the new fact of infiniteness. And when I attempt to perceive, *i.e.*, limit, an imagined total of space or time, the infiniteness in both is thrust on me by the essential nature of the act. Thus, then, in the functioning act of the first moment of the dialectic process, I affirm the infinite. Do I "know" it? Certainly: I know illimitability in respect of space and time; and the consciousness of infiniteness is a simple perception. But I do not "perceive" infinite *space* or *time*. Why not? Because to perceive is to limit, and to cancel infiniteness. The dialectic act throws the Infinite into the consciousness of man, and while I truly "feel" the Infinite, it is only the *fact* of the Infinite that I "perceive".

Put it thus: On the attitudinal plane of mind, the animal is aware of, or senses, a determinate object, *e.g.*, a cart, and, along with this, is vaguely aware of, *i.e.*, "feels," indeterminateness, or "being indeterminate," outside the particular determined sense-synopsis. On the dialectic plane of mind, percipience affirms and determines the synoptic sensate and, along with this, perceives and affirms (or sub-affirms) Being indeterminate (*i.e.*, the *fact* of Being-indeterminate). And when I endeavour to grasp the "totality" of space and time, it is the fact of the "indeterminate" that, I first affirm; and, subsequently, the fact of infiniteness or "indeterminability" as contained in the very act of percipience as a determining energy.

So, in perceiving and affirming Being-conditioned, I affirm Being-unconditioned. I do not perceive it; for,

inasmuch as to perceive is to limit, to perceive the unconditioned would be, *ipso facto*, to cancel it as unconditioned. It is the *fact* of Unconditioned Being that I perceive and affirm.

Where, then, do we find the Infinite in the Conditioned and of the Unconditioned as positive fact and possession of conscious mind? We find it in the sphere of *Feeling*. They are too large, too mighty for the act of finite "knowing".

In the embryo subject as Pure Feeling we found Unconditioned Being as object. This feeling always accompanies us, and is brought into full relief in the act of knowing things: and in the end we shall see that the Ego, with all its knowledge and all its life-experience, finds the culmination of its finite possibilities in the supra-rational feeling or intuition of the very "That" in which it, all unawares, began its career as embryo subject. Mind-universal in its finite evolution—begins in "Pure Feeling" and culminates in the "Reason-Feeling" we call Intuition. Knowing is merely a passage.

If the fact of The Infinite, as affirmed in respect of space and time, stopped there, it would be, both intellectually and ethically, unfruitful. But it is given in *all* knowledge, because knowing is limiting and thus and therefrom ideals arise: in knowing, for example, we are forced on by the *nisus* of the Will-dialectic to the conception and pursuit of Absolute Truth; in Feeling and Emotion, we ever aspire and push on to the unattainable of Absolute Beauty and Goodness and to the perfection of all we are and can be, and of all the world is and can be. This is the true significance of the fact of Infiniteness as given within the conditioned, yet ever transcending it. Happily, Man can never get beyond the knowledge of the "That" of the fact of the Infinite.

(2) THE ONE AND THE MANY.

Every finitisation re-affirms the infiniteness of Being. The infinite One holds the finite in its arms. In other words, the finite is a moment within the Infinite Unconditioned. Now, start from this non-finite—the absoluto-infinite given to Feeling as indeterminate and unconditioned Being, and, thereafter, as affirmed as fact by reason, and it is no great strain on reason-imagination to see that, while there is a system of differences and limits and opposites, there is no contradiction in the strict sense of the word, save to the formal logic of the understanding. One infinite Being and Dialectic is in all things as common ground, sustainer, and holder,—these things being merely the finite othering of Infinite Being. The ontological standpoint, accordingly, reveals to us pluralities as, we might say, the mere phases or play of a continuous Infinite. This may be called a mystical view of the facts of our experience as opposed to a logical one. The mystical view may be the true one. If it be not so, and if absoluto-infinite Being in His transcendence be *alone* God, and this God is not immanent in His finite externalisation, we are landed in a hopeless, disheartening and unmeaning Pluralism. God Absolute would then be a “unit” merely. He is, on the contrary, a “One” in whom all is rooted. God is a finite, as well as an infinite, God. As immanent in all, He holds all within Himself and is at once the source, the beginning, the process, and the end of the great totality. He is “The Absolute”. As a matter of fact, we see that it is not as a somewhat beyond and far away that we get our knowledge of Him, but as very close to us; first of all, *in* Feeling and then *in* the Being and Reason that are *in* things

as in us. He holds the Negation within himself : it is the Possibility of His Existence as plurality.

Thus we can metaphysically (and not merely pictorially) contemplate Absolute Being passing as immanent into its own beënt negation—the finite of Quantity and Motion and Quality generally—and as thereby passing into differences, contraries and oppositions, but never into contradictories, because there is always the Continuum of Being and Dialectic. Thus we get a One *in* Many. Contradictions are only Appearance.

In truth, we do not find the One *and* the Many in our experience. We have a concrete before us, and it is the dialectic necessity of analysing and dividing that gives us a dualism of two contrary elements, or a pluralism of an infinite number. It is no discredit to the subjective dialectic that it should have to take things to pieces as condition of seeing the truth of a synthesis. This is the only way that is possible to a finite reason. Doubtless there is a One *and* a Many ; but how do we find these contradictions as a matter of fact, and apart from logical statement ? We find them *given* to us in presentates that are a concrete One *in* Many. In every “law” of nature, too, we find the one in a vast number of individuals. The conception is familiar to us. To every eye it is manifest that the One does not, as a matter of fact, part with its Oneness because of the Many or its presence in the Many. I have pointed out in speaking of phenomenon, not that there is Being *and* Negation, but Being in *its own* Negation. The negation itself is beënt. The concrete presentation does not tell us that *Being* “is” and “is *not*” ; but that the “*thing*” always “is” and “*is*”—a Not. There is here

only a contrary, a “*beent* not”—an *affirmed* negation. In like manner I have spoken of the non-finite *in* the finite. The contradictories in the phenomenal, unsolvable if taken abstractly, are thus transmuted into mere contraries or oppositions as soon as I comprehend the concrete whole in ontological as well as phenomenal continuity. And I seem to learn from the contraries and opposites all that is worth learning.

We naturally pass to relations in an individual one of phenomenal experience—a complex presentate. We know that processes are going on in each thing which make it what it is as distinct from other things—constitute, in brief, its physical identity. Whether it be a lump of ore, a plant, or a sentient organism, we find before us a totality which is affirmed by us as a unity in the sense of a “one” of related parts—an identity, whether the unity be constituted by what are called physical or biological laws. Relation does not constitute a thing: relation *per se* is in the air—merely an abstract term. It is a relation of parts, or rather parts in a specific relation of quantity and quality that constitute it. We might perhaps say that an inner process in the phenomenal (which we may perhaps place under the category of motion) controls and disposes the parts so as to effect the thing (what the Schoolmen called *materialis dispositio*). But these inner motions have again to be conceived as parts in relation.¹ Thus the part has finally to be conceived as an individuum *per se* which is always functioning that which is not itself. In short, it is itself and it is not itself at one and the same time.

¹ The fact that parts related are themselves again parts related, and so in an indefinite regress, gives us difficulty only when we regard the infinitely divisible as a real, and not merely as a necessity of the percipient act.

Phenomenally, then, we are landed in what seems to be a contradiction. But surely our thought finds rest if we regard the "thing" metaphysically; in other words, as "Being *dialectically determining itself* in and through the phenomenal categories of Quantity, Motion, Quality, and utilising individua for a purpose beyond themselves"; which purpose is potentially in them as mind-matter monads. It is when the determination of Being or essence becomes, by the help of the sense-qualities (or categories), a "determinate" that seeming contradiction enters, and when we regard this determinate in its phenomenal aspect alone. There can be no phenomenal unit or single we have seen. The "primordial actual" is itself a "one in many".

In Judgment, for example, we posit a "subject" and insinuate into it a *phenomenal* character; and we then pile predicates on it, forgetting that there is no "subject" except essence, which is metaphysical; the characters and predicates flowing from essence, and held together by it. Each individual "thing" is a one *in* and through many. That the essence or idea of a thing should control the parts to a unity, while the parts still remain individua, is surely not a difficult conception; I illustrate it every time I stir the fire. *The One is in the parts*: these are controlled in the service of the idea or essence which effects the unity for itself; and yet the parts are individua. The Dialectic tells us this; but not content, I would fain see *how* this can be effected. Vain. Can I see *how* the motion of one billiard ball is transmitted to another?

Let me put this again in another way. There are grades of mind. The attitudinal synoptic single total given to percipience is broken up, in the dialectic

effort to understand it, into parts (judgments of subject and predicates), but it is still a *synoptic* whole, with this difference that it is now to thought an aggregate of affirmed parts—a *mere* aggregate, however. This concipient synthesis (as we may now call the synopsis) consists of contrary elements held together by *the mere force of Will*. The next moment of the Dialectic, however, gives the true rational synthesis in which the fused unity of the synopsis is metaphysically explained. The mechanical unity of sense-concipient with its collocated and colligated parts is now superseded. The dialectic as a one movement grips the unity, and it is now a *one*. The “How” of the fusion phenomenally is still beyond us; but reason is satisfied. Each “thing” is to be looked at as a “dialectic one” at first and at last. I am not entitled to stop short at any functioning act of the various moments of the dialectic, and then complain of contradictions.

Let us now look more closely at the successive functioning acts of the dialectic, and at the solution of its own “contradictions” which the dialectic offers. But let me beg the reader not to imagine that I think I can instruct better men than myself. I have been thinking for a long series of years, and I am now merely stating my own solutions of questions that are older than Plato, and I make no pretences.

(3) THE FUNCTIONING ACTS OF THE SUBJECTIVE DIALECTIC
IN CONTACT WITH EXPERIENCE.

(a) *Percipience and Formal Identity.*

The first function of the subjective dialectic in contact with experience we call Percipience, and the formula is, *A* is *A*, or *A* is identical with itself—a judgment of Identity. This is Formal.

So of the Universe generally : there is no such thing in presentation as an isolated identity. Existence is a web, and all existences and identities are only the distinctions of and within the Ultimate One which therein effects its activity. This common One of Being and Dialectic holds the whole together, not in an external way, but immanently ; is immanent also in the subsumption by subjective Will-Dialectic of the given world ; where, however, it finds *itself* already planted and operative.

In considering the vexed question of Identity, we must take account of Planes of Mind.

The Sensing of Identity.--The attitudinal stage of mind senses a single total which is a congeries of qualities as yet undiscriminated, and *feels* the equality of the single total with itself. A subsequent experience of the same total is a feeling of the "sameness" of the totality. Without this, no animal could adapt itself to its environment of diversity and be impelled to seek this and avoid that. Attuition, in its awareness of an aggregate of qualities which presents itself to consciousness as a single synoptic total, is driven into this awareness or sensation of any one "single" by the diversities which present themselves all round. These diversa are the negation of the single total *sensed as a total which is itself* and not these other diversa.

The Perceiving of Identity—Formal.—The first activity of percipience when, on the higher plane of mind, it appears, is merely the affirmation of the self-sameness of the single synoptic totality as an undiscriminated aggregate, an attuit and no more. It reaches this affirmation of the self-sameness of the thing through the negation of all else. The recurrence of the

aggregated totality of qualities is the recurrence in consciousness of the thing (synopsis) as an identity. But observe that percipience enters the field in a masterful way and proclaims, $A = A$. A is "affirmed" through the negation of all else, and in this negation lie its negative relations. But these negative relations are determined by the affirmation of the positive, A . It is the determination of Being as a positive "something" that carries, with it and in it, the negation. The negation is involved in the affirmation—not the other way about. It would appear, then, that Identity or self-sameness is simply individuation. Without such identity of A with A , the world not only of thought, but of sensation, would go to pieces. There would be nothing to talk about in presence of the chaotic whirl of interchanging nothings. This is Identity as formal, *i.e.*, as universal and necessary.

Real Identity.—But the phenomenal is in flux: all is motion and becoming. How, then, on the dialectic plane of mind, do we affirm the continuity of the identity of a real existence in space and time? Of an acorn, an oak living, an oak dead, we say they are identical or the same, spite of their phenomenal changes and unlikeness. But every existence in space and time is undergoing change whether we see it or not. Passing from the animate to the inanimate, What of Mont Blanc? What of the pyramid of Cheops?

Here I find it necessary to recall what has been already said.

(b) *The Dialectic as Functioning Concipience.*

We are now, for further understanding of Identity, driven into the sphere of the second functioning act

of the Dialectic in contact with things or the real—the functioning of concipience. The fused whole falls to pieces in presence of the dividing force of Will, but the pieces at once resume their place in the whole as originally presented. This restored whole, however, is not, as I have often said, a true synthesis but merely a colligation of qualities, properties, or elements in which the parts are held together by the main force of Will (the first moment of the dialectic)—an external and quasi-mechanical contrivance which leaves the qualities still apart and irreconcilable. They are only as yet tied together as with a string.

Now, the *esse* and purpose of the dialectic is to render things to itself in its own form. It cannot do so by merely looking at a complex presentate and affirming it as the percept of a total attuit; nor yet by separating its parts in a series of judgments and then, by sheer force of Will, holding them together in a mechanical synthesis like a bundle of sticks. They *will* not so unite to thought, although their *real* fusion to constitute the thing before us is not doubted. The never-ceasing activity of the subjective dialectic has for its end of activity the affirmation of a “one in many”: it cannot help itself. This is rational synthesis as opposed to mere conjunction. Where is this “one” to be found? Only in the differentiation of the complex before us from all else. It has many qualities in common with other things: all its qualities, in fact, are to be found in one thing or another in the universe of experience. The concipient synthesis has left all the qualities that go to make it very loose, but the dialectic process has, for its final moment, the end of the complex, its telos. The second of the prime moments

of the dialectic process is mediating or causal: the dialectic, accordingly, proceeds to its end by seeking the inner and immanent ground of the complex whole before it as a whole of parts. The "determining-so" whereby the complex concrete is what it is, is "idea". The idea of an individual, like the idea of the universe, can alone explain experience by satisfying the dialectic in us, because the idea is the essence of the "determinate". The contradictions involved in the separations of percipience, and the failure of the merely mechanical bond of concipience to restore the whole that lies in pieces before us, now disappear. For precisely in the idea or essence we have got the unifying centre of the whole. The aggregate of separates now becomes for thought the fused unity that it is in sense-reality. The "idea" is that which marshals all properties into the fused unity which is the determinate or "thing". The dialectic thus compels us to apprehend the whole as a synthesis, not of one *and* many (which lands us in contradictions), but of one *in* many—many in one. The terms "idea" and "essence" are equivalent: the former emphasises the determination of Being (which is the idea), the latter that idea in its relation to a concrete determinate. We can distinguish the idea and the determinate, but we cannot separate them. The world of presentation is *given* as such a concrete. We talk of subject and predicates. But where is the subject? If it were a "thing," it itself would be a predicate or a sum of predicates. But take the "subject" in its metaphysical truth, and it is a determination of Being (idea or essence) and, as such, contains and predicts all its predicates. It is the "one" which evolves its meaning in its phenomenal adjectives; and in our judgments we merely draw

out what is already there (see "Essence" and "Primordial Actuals").

Is it not because we dwell on the first functioning of the dialectic in contact with things—the divisions and separations of percipience and judgment, and on the first crude concipient conjunctions of the parts in a total, that we are dissatisfied? We arrest the dialectic when it has only begun its work. The dialectic transmutes the aggregated matter of the *content* into a *context*. Contradictions cannot but emanate from the dialectic in its preliminary functionings; but give the dialectic full play, and it either solves them, or points a way to their conciliation. Let us remember, meanwhile, that the question of the one of an individual concrete thing is the same question as the One in Many of the Absolute Totality.

The Realitas-phenomenon, as the given (inner as well as outer) of attuition, is thus seen in the first collision of the Dialectic with it to be full of contradictions—an aggregate of co-existences and sequences which for thought can have no connection or coherence, till thought goes a step further and sees in the individual and the concrete whole *its own* process. This is the method of Knowledge; and the result is Knowledge—true in the Absolute, and the absolute truth of this our plane of universal Being.

(c) *Identity Resumed.*

We may now return to Identity and see that it is not as Being that *A* is *A*; but as *determined-so* Being—determined as *A*. But this determination or essence (idea, end) reveals itself in the world of Time and Space as a system of qualities (a *system* because it is a one in

many), and leaving the pure realm of thought, I wrongly look for the identity of each thing in its fused phenomenal qualities and relations as a mere synopsis ; which, moreover, as the concrete manifestation of the idea, the fulfilled thing or “determinate,” is in terms of space and time and motion, and involved in the mutation of the spatial and temporal—growth and decay and death. Qualities in different identities also are similar, and all things seem capable of passing into each other. Numerous difficulties now present themselves and identities seem to stand on perilous ground, and to be always on the verge of dissolution into something else.

I do not pretend, here or in any part of this treatise, to solve the obvious difficulties ; but only to state my own view. I, of course, might content myself with affirming that the acorn is the same identity (*i.e.*, determination of Being—idea) as the oak in which the concrete vesture of the former has taken a hundred years to evolve. And as regards Protean transitions, I might say that, in the Absolute, care has been taken to preserve persistent differences and likenesses sufficiently to serve man’s life ; nay more, to satisfy thought in its attempt to co-ordinate the whole as a *many* in one as well as a *one* in many. These transitions serve to remind us that all things are in community one with another, and that flux by insensible transitions is a characteristic of all our experience. Things pass into each other. All the same, spite of certain fluctuating differences among individuals, a cow is always a cow not only in logic but in reality.

But I think we may, taught by the Dialectic, go a step further :—

"*A* is *A*," says Percipience : "that stone is a stone". But all is flux, all is motion, and at no one point of time is the phenomenal "thing" identical with itself says experience. Now, if we look at the thing dialectically (reason being physician of its own maladies), we find Being determining itself as this individuum and not any other. There is no doubt about that. The identity, then, consists in the *process of determination* whereby *A* is *A* and not *B*; and in the phenomenal *process* which is a consequent of that, and *whereby it is sustained as A phenomenally*. The concrete "thing" is Being and the Dialectic phenomenally exhibited, *i.e.*, passed into modality. This flows from our Meditation on Essence and on primordial Actuals. That thing before me, be it a stone, a tree, or a man, is a spiritual fact or reality in terms of sense; and I leave the latter to the physicist. Phenomenally regarded, the stone and tree contain contradictions because each always is and is not itself : all in short is Becoming.

Hegel says that the elements in the notion "Becoming" are being and not-being. The notion itself is doubtless suggested by the flux of nature, to which I have just been referring.¹ Just as a line is discrete continuity, so a process of movement, whether of growth or decay, is a discrete continuum. That is to say, there are fixed points in the process which are not fixed points. But what is this save the necessity of the conception of infinite divisibility over again which applies to motion as it does to space? The infinite divisibility of motion leaves us without fixed points—nay, it destroys altogether the possibility of merely phenomenal individua. But all this flux and becoming is given

¹ But it is contained in the Dialectic.

by the phenomenal and exists only in the phenomenal. Thought (like things) must have fixed points. Perception, as basis of all our thinking, insists on the single and simple and individual. Where, then, can we find it? It is demanded by subjective mind, and it exists in Objective Mind as the "idea" of the "determinate"—the phenomenalised unit of Being. That idea remains the same and identical with itself and is constant: its phenomenal manifestations are alone in flux. We carry this real fixedness of points into physical science. You may call them fictions; but they are necessary to the understanding of things. If *a* is at the same time all the other letters of the alphabet, knowledge is at an end.

All this, I am well aware, exposes me nude to the shafts of the supersubtle; but I am developing a theory on a definite and intelligible line, and perhaps I am somewhat impatient of Heraclitic enigmas.

It is surely mere extravagant phrasing to say that a "thing" *is* and is *not* itself. Of course a thing cannot fulfil itself save as other than itself, for the world is a web of reciprocating individua. Notwithstanding, a finite thing is a "for itself," and nothing can shake this. This is its negative relation to all else. But it is the idea as a *positive* that institutes the thing: so says the Dialectic. The telos is affirmation of idea as con-creted, and negation of all else is merely the ground of the possibility of the individual: it does not constitute it. Accordingly, it is in its positive relations (idea, essence) that the individual truly lives; otherwise there would be no world, but only an unmeaning aggregate of hard and barren plural points. The reciprocity of finite parts,

resting in immanent Being, makes a world possible. Each thing fulfils itself as an actual *through* its positive relations to *all else*. This "all else" does not contradict it: there is simply a system of "others" or contraries through which this particular thing fulfils its particularity, attains to its truth—*can alone attain to its truth*. It does not follow that that stone or atom *is* all else as well as itself, because it itself can complete itself only *through all else*. A thing fulfils itself through its own "other," but the "other" does not cancel the independence of the "thing". The monad has windows, I have said, set all round it: it is in its active relations to the whole as contained in its idea that it fulfils itself; but yet it is a monad. The "other" is an opposite or contrary which presumes the "for itselfness" of the thing to which it is the "other," and without which there would be no "other".

How long, then, in the phenomenal world, we may ingenuously ask, is a concrete thing identical with itself? I answer: As long as the idea which determines that oak or rabbit finds in its phenomenal qualities the *process* (or law) by which these existences constitute a phenomenal unity capable of expressing the one of idea, each is identical with itself. When these qualities, etc., through decay alter their character, the rabbit falls as phenomenal into a lower grade of being (which, as what we call corruption, has yet also its idea and ideas and is an actual). It is, I repeat, the infinite divisibility of space, motion, time that makes it impossible for us to put our finger on the point at which one thing becomes another. A physico-chemical explanation even would leave the question unanswered. Thus the idea flits from

organism to organism. This is the way of our world. *How* the parts and the whole of a "thing" as phenomenally related constitute an identity no man can tell.

[Let me interpose: at the stage which man occupies the identity affirms itself—"I am I". Is *such* an identity necessarily permanent when it drops its phenomenal body?]

I have tried to show that it is the Dialectic as form of creative Being that gives context and oneness to the many in the content of a presentation; and further, that the permanent one in change (which is a form of the same difficulty) is likewise to be sought for in the movement of Being as dialectic determining the idea or essence of each and, through each, of the Whole. Flux and contradiction are in the phenomenal alone as the sensible mode of the self-realising idea.

We conclude that the identity of an organic thing is in its essence and *consequent* phenomenal characteristics, and persists as long as these persist. At what point the idea or essence fails to find its phenomenal vehicle, we cannot say, because, I repeat, we are here involved in the question of infinite divisibility of space and motion and time. As in space and time, no idea or essence is immortal *in* any single individual.

But what of the inorganic—a pyramid for example? When is a pyramid not a pyramid? The answer is: It is a pyramid identical with itself so long as it is a pyramid. The essence or idea or purpose of the pyramid was in the builder who raised the pile, which was the phenomenal completion of his purpose. An earthquake may transmute the whole into an amorphous heap of stones, and it will be no longer a pyramid. But

if you ask me at what point in the slow weathering and detrition of the ages, it ceases to be a pyramid, *i.e.*, to incorporate the idea and purpose of a pyramid, I cannot, because of the infinite divisibility of space and time, tell you.

Passing, meanwhile, over the General Concept or Notion¹ which is a one of many qualities in diverse individuals and an entity of Reason only, giving us general propositions and making the syllogism possible, we come to

(d) *The Functioning of Ground and Consequent*
(Cause and Effect).

We have now to consider rational Ground — the mediating moment of the one dialectic process. This affirms each concrete individuum as effect of a cause. The whole field of actual and possible experience is so determined. This being the essential Form of the whole Dialectic, it is manifest that we must think the cause as itself caused, and so on *ad indefinitum* regressively. We are thus again lost in a contradiction. This contradiction, however, is cancelled, when we realise the fact that the causal regression is valid only of the phenomenal. It is the *noumenal ground* of the phenomenal or existent that we have sought and found in Being-Dialectic; and in this we *must* rest as ultimate: unless, indeed, we choose perversely to image the noumenal ground as itself also phenomenon or “thing,” and, consequently, as sensualised, demanding a prior causal process. *Within* the phenomenal as such there is, of course, no escape from the regressive necessity.

* Again, Cause and Effect in the *realitas*-phenomenon is always a “like in difference” and a continuity in time and

¹ See Note on page 205.

space. Within the phenomenal, the event is "preceded" by the cause in the time-series, but, inasmuch as cause and effect are a continuity, there is no lapse of time between the full realisation of the cause and the appearance of the effect. I suppose one would say this is a physical fact, and that the continuing of the cause into the effect as constitutive of it is a reappearance of the cause under a different shape—an identity (so far) of cause and effect. We cannot put our finger on the point of time at which the one becomes the other; and this simply because of the infinite divisibility of time and space, as we saw in the case of Identity. So, I cannot perceive at what point three seconds past two becomes four seconds, nor can I discriminate the infinitely small movements by which the dial-hand passes from three to four.

Causal Nexus.—A few words more on material identity—identity in the real—as explanation of Cause and Effect:—when I say that the bringing together in space and time of heat and cold water results in the boiling of the water, I may explain it as a physical fact by saying that the boiling is merely the heat re-appearing in the water. This gives *real* identity and continuity: *A* passes into and becomes *B*. It is *A B* I now have before me. I cannot tell what the causal connection may be non-phenomenally: I am dealing with phenomena and must not draw from the mind, or noumenal, element in the concrete before me to explain the phenomenal element. This would be bad science. Now such a phenomenal continuity cannot yield Cause-effect. Let *A* be the totality of conditions which totality reappears in *B* thereby constituting *A B*; I have here in my consciousness first one thing and

then another (A followed by B), and a million repetitions of this will not give me anything more than the first experience-continuity gave (though it may raise "expectation"). And yet I say, and I cannot help saying, A is cause and $A B$ is effect. Why? Because the *subjective dialectic* compels me to take up the particular, and also the totality, of existence and change as grounded in that which is competent to effect existence and change. This, as we have seen, is the very essence of the Will-dialectic. Cause and effect among phenomena are merely a "case" illustrating this Dialectic necessity, just as my "reason" for affirming any proposition is likewise a "case"; for *Ratio* and *Causa* have the same dialectic source. There *must be* a cause or ground for $A B$. What that cause may be is a matter of mere empirical observation, and I find it is A . But while there is a necessity that $A B$ be "caused," there is no visible or ascertainable "necessity" in the connection I see established between A and $A B$. It is simply a fact of sense-experience, of one thing passing into another; and, although an invariable event, it cannot by possibility yield necessity. The necessity of the nexus is in the identity of two *concepts*.¹ This is the true causal synthesis.

Subtle questions again, may be put as to the time-sequence of A and $A B$. We and the subjective dialectic are in Time, *i.e.*, a series of one thing or event after another; nay, Objective Being with its Dialectic, in other words God Himself, is in Time, sustaining the whole system of actuality. When then we ask as to the Time relation of A - $A B$, how can A , *if it be prius*, leap over a chasm and reach B ? Or, if it does not leap the chasm of

¹ See *Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta*, chapter on "Cause"

“empty Time” (an absurd conception) but *continues into A B*, at what point do the *A*-conditions end and the *B*-effect begin? I say, when we ask these questions we are again merely repeating the puzzle of infinite divisibility of the discrete continua of Time and Space. And further, we are treating the infinite divisibility as a reality, whereas it is only a necessity of the functioning of the first moment of the dialectic as Perception.

If, however, we transfer our thought to actuality as a system of mind-matter monads, *viz.*, ideas determining themselves in Quantity, Quality, Motion, etc., there is no insuperable difficulty in conceiving the efflux of energy through which the positive relations of each centre of monadic activity effect themselves; and go also to effect an ordered world by means of reciprocal and teleological relations. Inasmuch, however, as there is motion, there is succession. There is *A B*. *A* is prius of *B* in time, and if *A* did not first exist *B* could not exist. The dialectic moment of Ground must be, in the sphere of Time, a Time-series. Wherever connection is mediated, Time enters and, in the causal of nature, Space also enters, because they are the modality of Absolute Being as existent. We cannot consequently leap out of these conditions, and to find the *punctum temporis* at which antecedent reason or cause “becomes” the sequent judgment or effect is impossible. Discontinuity breaks the world to pieces, while continuity would seem to identify reason and consequent, cause and effect.

The Objective Dialectic as subjective, if my presentation of the man-plane of mind be correct, tells us that

Kinetic (efficient), mediating Ground, Determining-so and End or Idea are to thought ONE. The moments are the breaking up of a One thought into constituents which are intelligible only as a One.

Pass now from pure dialectic to its operation in subsuming the matter of knowledge:—what *must* it subsume? Space, Motion, Time as synthetic necessities. The very nature of these is either a co-existent or a co-sequent series, and I have now to deal with presentations spread out. Pure finite thought has now to translate itself into modality just as Absolute Being and its Dialectic have uttered themselves as modality. Where, then, can I find the conciliation of the contradiction of difference and identity (in cause-effect) in my contemplation of the given modality? Nowhere. All I can say is, that in Being Unconditioned all is One, all is Identity; in Being Conditioned the One passes into a many, the Identity breaks up into difference. The Unconditioned now reveals itself, to itself and to me, as modality with all the conditions of modality. My knowledge of the world of experience is as a given modal—a timed and spaced knowledge, and cause A *must* precede effect B; and if, either as a physicist or a philosopher, I wish to find “Ground” in the operations of nature or mind, I must seek for it in some *antecedent* event. The Dialectic order is the Time-order.

Meanwhile, let us never forget that no one existence is independent and sole. Being-immanent and Dialectic-immanent are the common ground of the Whole, and the fulfilment of each is only in and through the Whole. The One of Being and Purpose is in and through each, and each can truly be itself only in and through the Whole: it is our epistemology that yields us this. I

try to express, perhaps without success, a monistic pluralism.

(e) *The Kinetic Moment in Cause.*

The first moment in the teleologico-causal Dialectic is the initiating kinetic—the *actus purus* of Will. The spirit of man is a free energy, and yet, by virtue, or rather by vice, of the dialectic, we insist on bringing *it* within the scientific causal conception; and it is then no longer free. Here we have a contradiction. Conscious of our essential freedom, we yet stoop to bind ourselves and all our acts by the indefinitely regressive links of phenomenal causation. We cannot, at first sight, reconcile this contradiction; but it is vital to the position of man in the cosmic scheme to subvert it. The contradiction is resolvable; but, within the sphere of the empirical, this also, like other difficulties, is a permanent contradiction. We look more closely and we find that, if our analysis of Will-reason be correct, the subjective dialectic, initiated in the moment of Will as pure act, is *itself* Causal Form—causality as *ground* being the mediating moment of the one dialectic movement. Does Will as Kinetic, or efficient moment, provide causal bondage for itself in its dialectic process? Is there not some confusion of thought in placing Will under the causal condition which it itself initiates? The subjective dialectic, whose root is Will, places itself under its own Form! We have said that the dialectic emerges in the creature Man in order, *inter alia*, to prehend and comprehend the matter of attuition—the *realitas-phenomenon*. *Itself* also it can reflectively contemplate as part of experience; but to put itself under one of its own moments is impossible. It can do so

only by first placing itself among the *data of sentience*. In brief, the subjective dialectic is conceived as putting itself under itself, which it can do only by first converting itself into a given "thing"!

We further resolve, or subvert, the contradiction in the same way as we subvert the apparent necessity of the infinitely regressive Cause in the phenomenal. For a true epistemology tells us of objective Being and Dialectic as non-sensible ground of the phenomenal whole, itself logically prior to the causal series and constituting the causal series as its mode of externalisation. It, itself, meanwhile, is outside, *i.e.*, it is transcendental, while yet immanent in the series. And when we come to man, we find this same Being-Dialectic continued into him, and constituting him a spirit *above*, and dominating, the natural causal series in which he is immersed. He is free; he is Being and Will-Dialectic; in other words, God in finite form. As Absolute Being is *Fons Naturae*, so man is *supra naturam*. And yet so closely is man woven into the attitudinal causal series of inner and outer sentience, that he has difficulty in extricating himself, and beholding himself in his true majesty as transcendental, and as the creator of ends of activity out of the confused matter of experience. Thus a contradiction is, as we see, disposed of; and yet, it always continues to harass us, because of the vast power of the sentient in us, and the consequent dominance of the causal "scientific" notion whose sphere is elsewhere.

(f) *The Teleological Moment in Cause.*

Let us now take the Dialectic in its final moment, the teleological, wherein we affirm ends, ideas and ideals

(ideas perfected in their concreteness). Here Feeling and Reason interpenetrate. We know that neither absolute truth, nor absolute goodness, nor absolute beauty, nor absolute completion, is possible, because of the infinite which is implicit in the determining activity of reason.¹ Logically stated, we have here an unsolvable contradiction, just as we have in extensive space and protensive time, and for the same reason, *viz.*, the indeterminable *in the* determining *act* of percipience or knowing. These contradictions, however, are not impotencies, but transcending potencies: they are of such vital significance in the spiritual economy of man that they justify themselves: without them he would be little more than an attuent animal. By means of them he is lifted to his highest plane and has an outlook beyond. They are at the heart of the Dialectic: they constitute Man a being of a higher sphere than this, and confirm the dictum of the first moment of the Dialectic which places him, at one bound, *supra naturam* and gives promise of a still higher evolution.

(4) THE CONTRADICTION IN MAN AS A CONCRETE.

Further, the nature of Man, as a concrete whole of organism, contains a contradiction which, like other contradictions, is rather to be called a contrary. Man as Will-reason is left to find and constitute his own End—the Good for him, and is plunged into the anarchic life of feeling and desire and cognition. The dialectic movement carries the enslaving attitudinal in it and with it. The contradiction is resolved in the subsumption of the former by the latter, and its consequent direction to Ends—as ideas and as motives of conduct. None

¹ See Meditation on The Infinite.

the less is the opposition there as a fact in the constitution of man—an opposition only, however, not a contradiction, because we see the possibility and way of its solution in the ethical purpose which it subserves and which can be attained *only* through the conflict of opposites.

In short, opposites, involved in the fact of difference, are the universal mode of man's actuality here and now; they are the *truth* of that moment in the evolution of Absolute Being which we call our world. Man cannot lift himself out of his system, and, therefore, cannot reduce to his thought what is outside it. The "that" of the transcendent and of the transcendental is, however, within his system: the what, how, why and wherefore of the transcendental or noumenal, as such, is outside it. Man is not, in brief, the Absolute; and a synthesis which comprehends the grand totality, which we can possess only as a "That," is quite beyond his powers. But, meanwhile, man is the absolute of his own system; and, accordingly, while a "synthesis of the Absolute" is impossible, an "absolute synthesis" of his experience is quite within his reach (theoretically at least).

The supreme facts in such an "absolute synthesis" of experience are Objective Being and its Dialectic *nisus*. And the Dialectic, properly understood, makes it not impossible to find the That, the What, the How, the Why and Wherefore of all that is within our system in its relation to that system. To do this, and live this, is precisely the function of man in the world of which he is the head and interpreter.

From this and preceding Meditations, it will be seen that "Reality" completes itself in and through man as

sentence in this system of things and that, to the extent of his possible range, he, as dialectic, cognises reality as "Actuality". That actuality, as finding its fulfilment in the feeling and thought of man, should contain opposites and contraries is necessary: that it should further exhibit apparent contradictions is simply to say that the form of our sentient and cognitive life can never on this plane of the divine activity be a rounded and conciliated whole. What then? What would we have? If it were a conciliated whole we should seek no beyond and no ideals: we should be dead; or, at least, comatose. Man as Man would be extinct.

In conclusion, let me repeat that the unquestioning calm of attuition is disturbed to its foundations by the entrance of the subjective dialectic. Percipience, concipience, rational and causal ground, and end,—all these moments of reason-activity furnish, we have seen, each its own quota of apparent contradictions in the attuitional material of experience. Their function is to illumine and co-ordinate experience, and, in doing so, they raise difficulties in thought. But it seems to me, that these are exaggerated, and that when the contradictions cannot be traced to the general characteristic of reason-activity or knowing, which, by defining and limiting, throws the fact of the Infinite into consciousness, they can be metaphysically explained. If we are careful to take the dialectic in its wholeness of process, thought is satisfied by thought itself. In any case, the want of absoluteness in knowledge is all that is established by apparent contradictions. We can know within the man-sphere, and the very act of knowing points with steady finger to a higher sphere of Being. In other

words, we cannot attain to a synthesis of The Absolute, but only to an absolute synthesis which contains within it the fact of the unattainable; and this fact is its very self the guarantee of a further evolution of the spirit of man.

To affirm unsolvables is easy: the true service to philosophy is, I submit, to show *how* they arise out of the very nature of the subjective dialectic—which, as itself within a finite world, is finite, although containing in its inmost activity the fact and truth of the Infinite and the Ideal.

I say a finite world which is itself, *as finite* and a many, necessarily, a synthesis of contraries. For in the cosmic complex as presented to us—our reality and actuality, what do we see? Being dialectically affirming itself, as a world of ends, in and through the negation of itself; which ends it constantly fails to fulfil, because the attainment of them involves opposition as the very method of their possibility, *i.e.*, strife, evil, pain, disease, internecine conflict, death,—dire facts that seem to defeat the cosmic purpose which is (presumably) “The Good”; for these things are the contradictions of health, life, happiness, harmony, fulfilment. Objective Being and Dialectic, it would seem, can attain “The Good” (as externalised) only in and by means of the Negation and the interactivity of individual opposites. Absolute Being here and now, as itself in the moment of negation or finitude, is involved in the apparent contradictions inherent in the moments of the Dialectic as striving to overcome the Negation and reduce it to a One of Purpose and Idea. The possibility of the finite display of Eternal Being is, in short, through contraries and oppositions; and only in this way can “The Good” be mediated. The Absolute

is not a chaos of contradictions *somehow* conciliating each other; but there is, on the contrary, a purposed reciprocity and contention, and the system is Teleological. It could not be a "system" unless it were so, if I have truly exhibited the Objective Dialectic. God Himself would seem to be on His way to some far-off goal, and to us it seems a weary way, for every milestone has to be counted.

We may venture to say, then, that the world of presentation is not a confused aggregate of floating predicates, but of substantive thought-things "existing" by virtue of the co-ordination of predicates by and through the idea of each thing, these together, along with the fact of Negation, constituting the dialecticised synthesis of the individual. The form of the subjective dialectic, intromitting with the phenomenal predicates given in attuition, ensures all this, and denies that we live in a world of unintelligible chaotic atoms called predicates, or what not. For predication of a subject is the unfolding by us of the constituents which are given as fused into a one thing. They are not hung loosely on. There is nothing inconsistent, unintelligible, self-contradictory or irrational in this. Our knowledge is partial relatively to the Absolute Whole; but it is true — absolute. Pure phenomenism cannot find the "thing," but only co-existing or sequent predicates that hang in the air. This simply shows that pure phenomenism is not the truth of experience. It leaves out what the subjective dialectic insists on—*viz.*, the very dialectic itself,

by virtue of which the "singleness" of each totality before us is superseded by the "oneness" of an active synthesis. The one we seek (whatever be the object) presumes a many. It is not the number "one". That the "many" in a single totality is given, no one doubts; reason breaking up the totality is constrained to affirm end or idea of each "single" (this being the Form of the Dialectic), whereby the diverse in the concrete is controlled to the end which is the one in many. That is the utterance of reason or dialectic, not of attuition which is powerless to explain; and, indeed, seeks no explanation. So of the universe of experience as a whole: were there no "many," there would be no world; were there no One in the Many there would be no Idea, no thought, no correlation, no End, no God. How could ends be mediated save through opposites? Without this Divine Method we should have a universe of molten lava. Instead of the Good, the Beautiful and the True we should have a dead *status quo* which we could not even name.

If I wilfully remain in the region of attuition or even of rational percipience and concipience, and use reason as a mere tool to divide and to judge, stopping short there, I cannot truly synthesise or correlate; and I have nothing but floating predicates and chaos left. But in so doing, I ignore the function of the subjective dialectic, which is to restore the single totality, the loose aggregates of attuition, in the higher form of a reasoned synthesis. The mistake lies, it appears to me, in stopping short at that logical separation of parts which is only the initiatory function (as I have shown in the subjective dialectic; whereas the dialectic in its

wholeness propounds to itself end, idea, essence of the totality, and so synthesises the fragments of percipience and the colligations of concipience into a synthesis or one (not a mere unit); and this is the thing in presentation now penetrated by the said dialectic. And this dialectic, again, is the Universal Dialectic whereby things exist as they exist; which has become self-referent in man for knowledge and conduct. The concrete synthesis is there before me, and the subjective dialectic divides that it may govern, and reproduce for thought what, however, is already *there*. The subjective dialectic has no more difficulty in co-ordinating the parts for knowledge than the creative dialectic has in co-ordinating them for actuality. Accordingly, if I understand certain writers, I should say that their mistake lies in the defective analysis of the reason-act and in stopping short at the first functionings of the Dialectic—*viz.*, percipience and concipience; and so leaving us with a chaotic and unintelligible world. This is little more than the phenomenalism of attuition of which metaphysic is the corrective. If it be merely meant that I cannot understand the “how” of relations which I see as matter of fact and affirm as the utterance of reason, everybody will concur. I cannot “understand” how I lift my hand to my head or write this sentence: purpose in me followed by responsive muscular contraction is only a phenomenal explanation. To know the “ultimate how” of any part or relation of parts, of diversity or of unity in diversity, I must be present at the dawn of creation—the passing of the One into the Many, and feel the thrill and intuit the process of the Creative Energy.

Meanwhile let us conclude that the ultimate explanation and meaning of experience is in the Unseen : that the phenomenal as parts and successions must always yield the phenomenal only and an explanation within the phenomenal ; which is no explanation at all.

MEDITATION XVIII.

ABSOLUTE SYNTHESIS: The Synthesis of the Absolute and the Absolute Synthesis, *i.e.*, the Absolute Truth of the Related—Knowledge as Absolute and as Relative—Critical Pluralism—Planes of Being and of Mind—Man's Knowledge not solely of the Conditioned—Faith.

THE past discussions ought to satisfy us that finite mind cannot grasp The Absolute in its initiation, nature, inner process and ends. And yet, in these very strivings to bring the Absolute within the circle of his comprehension, lies the possibility of man's realising himself as distinctive Man. The definition of Man is that he is a striving being involved in the Infinite. Hence all his greatness and all his woe.

It is a truism to say that not to know "The Absolute" is not to know any one thing; for no thing is out of relation to the Whole, no thing but has its roots in the Absolute and to know it would be to know the Whole. Says the Sphinx:—¹

Who readeth one of my meanings,
Is Master of all I am.

Notwithstanding, Man has his rights: he is not made after the image of God to be flouted. Being and the Dialectic of the Universe do not emerge into self-consciousness in him without giving him the capacity to know; nay, imposing it as a duty in order that through knowledge he may truly live.

¹ Emerson.

Accordingly, an organised knowledge of that sphere of Universal Being in which man exists, theoretically is, and practically may be, within his power; but, even if he attained to this, it would carry with it *as part of its content* the affirmation of a "more" which ever lay beyond him, under him, around him and above him.

The completed result of possible human knowledge I have called the absolute synthesis as opposed to a synthesis of The Absolute, which is impossible. In an early Meditation we saw that there are many planes, or rather orbs, of Universal Being. In our own earth-experience we see that every feeling thing, from the protozoon to Man, has its orb determined by the potency and potentiality of its monadic entity. The orb within which man is placed is so far complete and harmonious in itself, as to be adequate to the evolution and fulfilment of the man-being. He perceives the truth or actuality of Universal Being as displayed within his own orb. And if there be in the animals, down to the very lowest, orbs of being in which there is a revelation falling short the one of the other, and, above all, falling short of the orb within which Man is placed, there are doubtless also orbs or planes of Being which transcend that of man. It is the very function of the Infinite in us to say so. My knowledge, then, can be absolute knowledge only on the stage of Being which I occupy. When I have exhausted the man-categories in my comprehension of a thing, I am at the end of my tether: the Absolute in its totality is for ever a mystery. The final truth of things is as they are in God and appear to God: the finite mind is ever pathetically groping its way to this; but it finds itself, at a certain point, grasping the mist.

It is in the above sense alone, we have said, that all knowledge is "relative". Even if we suppose Man to have exhausted all the experience which actuality can give on the plane of evolving Absolute Mind which he occupies, he will not yet have grasped the truth of Absolute Being, save on a certain plane of its endless and immeasurable evolution. God is great. This does not invalidate man's knowledge of Absolute Being as it actualises itself in his present recipient consciousness; nor yet the truth of his rational interpretation of the datum which he thus receives as his portion. In so far as a worm is aware of the object, it is aware of it truly and validly; but the datum to *it*, while true so far as it goes, is, in the cosmic system (as well as in the worm owing to its limitations), as nothing compared to that of man, whose higher range, however, embraces, without cancelling, the worm-reality. So with man: knowledge is *restricted*: it is within an orb, or on a certain plane; but as a step in the infinite and absolute process, it is objective fact and actuality; and any further evolution of finite mind will take up as true, and not cancel, what now is. The "more," in brief, as seen by a higher spirit, does not reveal the less to be illusion, but contains it; nay must do so, if there be a "system" at all.

Knowledge then is relative only because it is not absolute in the sense of knowledge of The Absolute; that is to say, because it is restricted by the range of the being that feels and knows. That which is felt and known is complete within itself, and true. The True and the Good to man is not only the True and the Good for man, *but for God on this plane of His Actuality*. And, man's function is, like that of all other individual and finite organisms, to work out the fulness of his own

life, having first ascertained the meaning and law of that. • Let any being—a snail or a man, negate its *own* “absolute” or truth, and it will be first miserable, and then perish.

And yet of Absolute Being unconditioned we are not ignorant, for we know the *fact* of it: and of Absolute Being, as externalised, we can know much: for we can see that, as an empirical fact, Evolution is the method of procedure—in other words, Evolution is the method of the universal process—that is to say the Evolution of God in and through things. The Absolute life is activity; not merely creative activity, but sustaining activity as Being and Formative Process. The Dialectic puts it beyond all question that it is a teleologico-causal Nisus, which, through various grades of Being, reveals The Absolute. The End or Idea (call it Absolute Idea if you like) is always there working itself out. I am stating the actual facts contained in our Epistemology. Each step or grade of Being is complete in itself, but it will also be found to contain, as an element in its very completeness, a prediction of a further—its own incompleteness. This is characteristic of all actuality, and of all knowledge of actuality. Do we not see the lowest forms of sentience predicting sensation as if feeling their way to a higher, and the fulfilled sentience which we call attuition predicting and feeling its way to reason?

In each lower stage, The Absolute as truth is determined for that stage—for it and in it; but, in the case of Man, it is determined *in* him as sentient, but *by* himself as a willing and knowing energy, through the necessity of the dialectic. God is not only *in*

man and *for* man but *with* man—the very nerve of the Man-being.

It is only Man who can raise the question of The Absolute in its totality, and try to look at the vast and various Whole of difference through the eyes (as it were) of God. Man has strained after this from time immemorial with indifferent success, and latterly, with the melancholy confession that the Absolute Being can be nothing but a semi-sentient “somewhat” or a “systematic individuality” or “absolute experience”—conceptions which will probably fail to evoke religious emotion in us, or rouse our sons to a strenuous moral life. Better far to erect an altar “To the Unknown God” and call upon the nations to sacrifice and worship there. I do not know, and cannot ever know, how and in what sense good and evil, right and wrong, black and white, straight and crooked, cause and effect, are held in the Absolute consciousness. But I do know, or may know, what they are on my grade of Being, which is one of God's grades. The differences between these contraries give the possibility of knowledge and virtue, and beauty, as of all existence: they are the keystone of the arch of human life; take out the keystone and the whole crumbles into dust.

The critical Natural Realist and Pluralist accepts the Whole of Being, Dialectic, and Externalisation as the sole actuality; and Being and Dialectic as One throughout. He accepts the patent fact of difference in continuity and continuity in difference. This contradiction is indeed the very basis of his thought, as it is of all possible finite reality,—Being in diverse beings, Mind in particular and individual minds: and this so that the diverse

and distinct is not only as much a factor in the total Actual as the One is ; but is the very *method* of the One as existent. Good and bad are real oppositions in man,—distinctions just as valid as the distinction between a man and a horse. Each unit, moreover, has its own rights, privileges, claims, and duties in and through the Whole, by virtue of the cosmic fact of Negation. That tree exists independently of me just as much as you do ; and it exists as I see it, whatever *further* significance it may have as a "That" in the Absolute.

Critical Pluralism again, is as rational and reasonable in its relation to The Absolute Whole as in its relation to the finite object. When I use the expression, "Man, like every other entity, is within a system," I mean that he is *inside* the system of related entities which constitute this universe. Although he is a conditioning Will-reason so far as his own experience is concerned, he is himself conditioned. The universe or system of relata, within which man is, existing as it does by means of individuals, individua *and* the One are, *to begin with*, accepted as an apparent contradiction by the Pluralist ; but, when he grips the object in the Whole of Being and Dialectic, he sees that the contradictions that arise out of the inadequate functioning of percipience and concipience are woven into a one in many, a many in one. Plurality does not contradict itself : it is only by virtue of plurals that there can be a One ; only by virtue of contraries that there can be harmony.

But, even when man has solved this problem for himself, he knows that he is limited by the essential potentialities of his own specific being as an entitative unit in the continuous One ; and consequently, that his possible knowledge is a true and absolute knowledge.

of the Absolute, only at this stage in its logical and time, evolution. The principles and law of the Whole, however, are necessarily in the part, for the part *must be* a veritable "moment" in the one infinite movement: and, *so far as I can know these*, I know the Absolute and God. The difficulty is to know them. The last word of physics will give us the truth of the phenomenal presentation as a truth in the infinite process and procession of the externalised Absolute—a truth *in* the Absolute and for ever true: so the last word of metaphysics, were that a possible achievement, would give us the truth of the infinite process of Universal Being-Mind,—a truth *in* the Absolute and for ever true. And by Truth we mean the Actual, *i.e.*, the conscious reflection of the object as comprehended and interpreted by the subjective will-dialectic. Were I a god (and there is no reason to doubt the probability of super-human minds), both the phenomenal and the noumenal would doubtless assume another and a higher aspect and meaning; but within this higher would be seen, as I have frequently said, the truth of the lower as contained in it. This lower would have reached further explication, but without detracting from the truth of the prior revelation as fact and necessity in the great evolving series. God is something more than a finite reason can comprehend, but he is not something *else*.

But because man is within the conditioned, does it follow that he can know only the conditioned? Far from it. The transcendent infinite, we have seen, is contained in the very act of conditioning: nay more, the man-mind *feels*, and reason subsequently affirms, the Infinite Unconditioned on which all reposes. That is to say he can "per-

ceive," as mediated by the finite, (not the Infinite and Unconditioned but) the fact of the Infinite and Unconditioned. Or, we may say, he has a *negative perception* of these ; but a positive Feeling. The windows which open out into the infinite are set all round him, and these are made of crystal so that he can look out into the infinite of the Conditioned and the infinite Unconditioned, although he cannot go out and take possession. Even the well-known Hamiltonian position affirms the Unconditioned as fact, and even, we may say, as ground. There is a prius of the conditioned—a pure *experience* which permeates, sustains—nay, makes possible my conscious being and all its content. If the strict definition of knowledge be the subsumption of an object under the moments of the subject as dialectic, man cannot "know" either the transcendent or the transcendental Infinite ; but he can be conscious of both as a Feeling ; and he can also "perceive" the Feeling. This Percipience I have called negative percipience : the positive Infinite Unconditioned being mediated through the negating finite and conditioned. If we object to the word "knowledge," let us call this percept intuition. Feeling is not precisely the word to use, because reason has, in the act of percipience, gone on to *affirm* what Feeling primarily *gives*.

It is, in fact, not correct to say that man's knowledge is of the conditioned alone, but rather that his knowing is conditioning, determining, finitising. The resultant of the process is the reduction to his self-consciousness of, it may be, only a particular—a sample of the infinite Universal. But it is a sample : and in that sample we find not only the sense-categories—the categories of limitation, negation and diversity ; but if we look long

enough and watch the process by which we win for ourselves a knowledge of God as finitised in His creation, we shall find the universals which are implicit in all sense-phenomena and give them reality and actuality. I have been attempting to do this, in the hope of revealing to myself the ground-affirmation of Being and Thought-universal in all the particulars presented to me in this finite sphere, and which alone give meaning to nature and human life. It is not merely an irrepressible reason-instinct that compels me to affirm that the very fact of plurals, of contraries and contradictions, *presupposes* a One of fact of Process and End. I "know" it.

Surely there is intellectual perversity in concluding that because man's knowledge is not absolute and he fails to grasp "all differences in an inclusive harmony" he does not "know". If it be truly so, man is a derelict wreck drifting in the infinite ocean of Being, without a hope of saving even a spar of the battered and broken vessel. The next ship that sails that sea may pick up a plank on which is painted the name of its predecessor; and the name is "Despair".

Finally,—Not to know is ignorance; to know the limitations of knowledge is knowledge: to know *how* it is that by the very nature of the act of knowing we can know nothing absolutely is the highest knowledge—*Docta ignorantia*. And this highest knowledge is itself an anticipation and a prophecy.

After all, the chief business of the thinker is to solve the problem of himself. What is Man in this system of differences and oppositions, and what is his function? Can the answer to this give us a key to the Whole? Our attempt to know the totality

thus falls back on ourselves, and we ask to know the knower as himself the sum of an infinite complex of differences—to know the knower and the process and limits of his knowing. The world-riddle is thus the riddle of Man, and, in solving that, we find a certain solution of the total of his experience—Man's Absolute. We find the unity in *his* differences and solve therein the problem of the world. Each unit in the whole belongs to every other unit, and all are one in the One of Being-Dialectic, and are harmonised in the teleological movement which is the central fact and nerve of the Absolute Process.

Strange it is that The Absolute should have for its highest terrestrial expression a finite reason asking questions that cannot be finally answered in terms of knowledge, although the very function of the said reason is to "know"! What is it in the dialectic that compels this? Is there any profound significance concealed in this reason-impulse and reason-impotence? Assuredly. The impotence is the birth of a higher potency: the purpose is to evoke the ever-aspiring energy of man and to predict a future. And what of this future—this Not-Yet? Briefly and perfunctorily, I would say here:—

The general conviction of *some* solution or other is Trust (a complex of Belief and Hope),—a solution that would preserve differences and does not suppress them. Suppression would be an evasion, not a solution. And, in like manner, as regards the destiny of the individual soul, we believe in and forecast some *special* solution. This is Faith or subjective conviction; not mawkish sentiment, nor yet engendered by unworthy weakness.

Faith is entitled to assert itself, however, only when reason has exhausted its powers; and, thus, it is far removed from credulity. Faith rests on what reason has so far clearly affirmed, but leaves incomplete; and it is thus that faith finds its guarantee in reason itself and draws its strength therefrom. It may be said to be fore-knowledge—anticipated knowledge, pre-science; for a philosophic and virile faith is merely the concluding judgment of a long induction resting on the total of a reasoned experience. I call such a faith virile; for the man who yields to the seductive and spurious intellectualism of ever dwelling on the ultimate mystery and obvious contradictions of things instead of manfully accepting the conditions of the system and doing his part, is a spiritual weakling.

And yet, it must be confessed, even the strongest man has his ebb-tides. As he thinks on the race to which he belongs and its eventful and bewildered story, his compassion and his wonder are aroused at the contradictions that beset this remarkable cosmic product, at the seemingly futile and ever-renewed conflict with evil in its myriad shapes and with the fateful necessities of natural environment. In a mood of despair, he may even have to withdraw awhile that he may brace himself anew for the striving and struggle and pain which, explain it how we may, lie at the root of the life of all who inherit the fatal gift of reason; but, if he be true to the highest in him, he will soon return to the arena, in the masculine conviction that there is a spiritual order, and that both mystery and misery have a significance which, if he saw the whole, would put to shame his passing pusillanimity.

MEDITATION XIX.

Retrospect and Conclusion.

I RETURN to my starting-point—the Actualisation in Consciousness; and there I find subject and object given as substantive entities, correlative; and one as valid as the other. Not correlation but community is the proper word; not identity, for identity would mean that there is only one, not two. Such is the psychical event, when reflectively contemplated by reason. I also find the resultant of the collision of the two as not strictly speaking even a relatedness, much less a “relativity,” but rather to be described as object in subject, subject in object in a differenced identity. Even “immediateness” is too weak a word to express the fact, because it suggests the possibility of mediation, a process which specially belongs to the activity of reason. From first to last it is “Subject-Object” that occupies our thought on things. The evolution of object to its full actuality is the evolution of subject; and *vice-versâ*.

It is only, however, when the event “subject-object” has already happened that we can retrospectively look at it and discern its characteristics. And we find that it is the “non-subject” which, by its stimulus, elicits subject. This is both the logical and the real order. The negation of the object calls forth the positive of

the subject, evoking it out of potentiality into life ; and its primary activity is simply a reflex placing of the object back into the place from which it came—as a beent presentation, a “ thing ” *not* the subject ; and this is the Real on the plane of sentience. Our primary “ experience ” on the attitudinal plane of mind is, in truth, not subject-object, but only object ; subject being necessarily there, but only as implicit in the content of the experience : it is reflectively discerned and affirmed at a later stage.

This “ Real ” as thus given in sentience, absorbed by the subject and reflexed, is the *body* (so to speak) of the particular conscious being which absorbs, reflexes and retains. The potential subject would seem to exist as a passivo-active recipient for the mere purpose of receiving and building up the object into itself—which object we may call Experience in the widest acceptation of that word ; and only in so far as it does this, has the subject reality or substance of mind. Each subject, indeed, has fulfilled itself only when the universe as revelation of God has become, in and for it, to the full extent of its native potency.

The process of mind-nutrition may be called the metabolism of mind : but it differs from the metabolism of body in this, that in the latter, tissues waste what they assimilate, and seek renewal, ever-repeating a process (never advancing after the organism is grown to its full size), whereas in mind there is no waste save obliviscence. It goes on, or ought to go on, ever growing in riches and strength, till the death of the body arrests it. Again, the food of mind is not an idea *corresponding with* the ideate, but it is the object itself in terms of mind (*i.e.*, of feeling or consciousness), whereas the food

of the body is transmuted into the specific substances (tissues) of the body. And yet we might say, if we desired to preserve the analogy, that the object is transmuted into the tissue of the subject mind.

Further, finite mind is aware of the finite predicates of Infinite Mind just as they exist, in so far as it is clearly and distinctly aware of them. From day to day and hour to hour Nature, visible even to the eye of the vulgar as God diffused, solicits us—nay, is urgent in its solicitations. It offers to us a vast estate of which this being of ours has the title-deeds in so far as it is conscious and self-conscious. It is our prerogative, as it is our duty, to know God by and in the things that He has made. Our business is to ascertain what it precisely is that is offered to us, and to fill up the potential of our being with all the proffered fulness. This is to realise the Universal (real and actual) in our finite selves.

When we pass from the attitudinal to the dialectic plane of mind, the object in cognition is always subject-object; percipience, as distinguished from attuition, being a subsumption by, and reduction to, the active subject as pure reason.

Again, object is subject inasmuch as it “becomes” for the attitudinal subject as its “real”; and, further, emerges in that subject as the Objective-dialectic now self-referent. All is One—must be One; and the last and highest is already immanent in the first and lowest. This, however, is not Monism if we are to be strict with that doctrine; for subject and object are distinct—mutually *negating*, and yet mutually interpenetrating, entities in the Absolute Whole. I call this Monistic Pluralism.

We have found that we cannot ascertain what the proffered gift of God to man is, save by the analysis of the conscious subject, first as a sensing, and, thereafter, as an active subject, *i.e.*, as attuition and as dialectic. Only thus can we preserve our feet from falling and plant them firmly on the basis of fact. There are many ideas, or, let us say, *aperçus*, that take, when explicitly enounced, the cast of a formula, which might yield an *a priori* deduction of the cosmic scheme of things, plausible in itself and pleasing to the unresting desire for synthetic completeness. As products of earnest thought, they probably send forth at least one ray of light over the mystery of life and may, indeed, even seem to illuminate the whole; but the method of procedure is, it seems to me, vitally erroneous. The single ray, however brilliant, must mislead, for it is an abstraction. Our method must be the analysis of our individual selves as conscious of object and self-conscious: this is what I mean by Epistemology. What precisely does the subject as Feeling and Sentience yield: what, further, does the same subject yield as *pure dialectic* taking up the record of sentience? From this, and resting on this, which, I submit, is genuine metaphysic as opposed to speculation, we may perchance create for ourselves an Absolute Synthesis of our own orb of Being: in other words, sum up our own reality and actuality—our own Absolute.

When I come to speak more in detail and synthetically of what we mean by the word "God," I shall follow the same method, being convinced that in speaking of Mind-universal, I have no data whatsoever save mind-finite in presence of an object; and the secret

processes of that mind. If it be said that I have the method of physical nature, I reply that the method of physical nature is naught save in so far as it is the method of the mind *in* which nature reveals itself.

In brief, if God be not immanent in the man-mind, He is nowhere.

Why, it may be asked, attempt such a question at all? Because man cannot do otherwise. He must strive after an absolute synthesis—*must* do so because the nature of the dialectic in us is such that it compels us to search, ever and infinitely, for the elemental beginning and the final ideal sum of all experience—for “The One” which is first and also last. Nay, so potent and imperious is this reason-impulse that, if man had attained to the absolute synthesis possible within his orb, he would still find himself gazing, from the summit which he had reached, away into infinite spheres. Whether this be the earnest of a higher plane of being awaiting him where he will breathe a purer air, and where feeling and life will be, although, perhaps, not richer and more profound, yet more harmonious than under present conditions, is a question that man can never cease to ask. Strange it would be if a being could emerge on the surface of one of innumerable worlds, asking questions and projecting infinite possibilities to which the only response was the brutal and stupid answer of The Grave.

END OF THE FIRST BOOK AND THE FIRST VOLUME.